unconstitutional violation in Connecticut

1981The defendant has not briefed two of the grounds relied upon in his motion to strike the petition: that General Statutes § 46b-171 and § 46b-172 discriminate unconstitutionally on the basis of sex, a *749 claim which we rejected in Cross v. Wilson, 35 Conn. Sup. 628, 635 , 403 A.2d 1103 (1978); and that General Statutes § 17-324 creates an unconstitutional presumption of the eligibility of a recipient of state assistance, a subject some aspects of which are dealt with in State v. Griffiths, 152 Conn. 48, 56 , 203 A.2d 144 (1964).

1981The defendant has not briefed two of the grounds relied upon in his motion to strike the petition: that General Statutes § 46b-171 and § 46b-172 discriminate unconstitutionally on the basis of sex, a *749 claim which we rejected in Cross v. Wilson, 35 Conn. Sup. 628, 635 , 403 A.2d 1103 (1978); and that General Statutes § 17-324 creates an unconstitutional presumption of the eligibility of a recipient of state assistance, a subject some aspects of which are dealt with in State v. Griffiths, 152 Conn. 48, 56 , 203 A.2d 144 (1964).

1981The defendant has not briefed two of the grounds relied upon in his motion to strike the petition: that General Statutes § 46b-171 and § 46b-172 discriminate unconstitutionally on the basis of sex, a *749 claim which we rejected in Cross v. Wilson, 35 Conn. Sup. 628, 635 , 403 A.2d 1103 (1978); and that General Statutes § 17-324 creates an unconstitutional presumption of the eligibility of a recipient of state assistance, a subject some aspects of which are dealt with in State v. Griffiths, 152 Conn. 48, 56 , 203 A.2d 144 (1964).

1981The defendant has not briefed two of the grounds relied upon in his motion to strike the petition: that General Statutes § 46b-171 and § 46b-172 discriminate unconstitutionally on the basis of sex, a *749 claim which we rejected in Cross v. Wilson, 35 Conn. Sup. 628, 635 , 403 A.2d 1103 (1978); and that General Statutes § 17-324 creates an unconstitutional presumption of the eligibility of a recipient of state assistance, a subject some aspects of which are dealt with in State v. Griffiths, 152 Conn. 48, 56 , 203 A.2d 144 (1964).

2021Thus, we agree with the habeas court’s conclusion that, as a result of this court’s decision in State v. Farrar, supra, 186 Conn. App. 220 , the petitioner had failed to allege an unconstitutional violation of his liberty, and therefore it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

2019In his appellate brief, the petitioner maintained that (1) the respondent abandoned any claim that § 54-193 (d) is applicable, (2) the second habeas court ignored controlling precedent when applying § 54-193 (d) rather than State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 443 , 521 A.2d 1034 , (3) § 54-193 (d) is inapposite when a suspect has been identified and an arrest warrant has been issued, (4) indefinite tolling is disfavored by the law, (5) the second habeas court's findings of fact do not support the application of § 54-193 (d) as construed by State v. Ward , supra, 306 Conn. at 698, 52 A.3d 5

2019In his appellate brief, the petitioner maintained that (1) the respondent abandoned any claim that § 54-193 (d) is applicable, (2) the second habeas court ignored controlling precedent when applying § 54-193 (d) rather than State v. Crawford , supra, 202 Conn. at 443 , 521 A.2d 1034 , (3) § 54-193 (d) is inapposite when a suspect has been identified and an arrest warrant has been issued, (4) indefinite tolling is disfavored by the law, (5) the second habeas court's findings of fact do not support the application of § 54-193 (d) as construed by State v. Ward , supra, 306 Conn. at 698, 52 A.3d 5

2002It farther asserts that if C.G.S. § 17b-179 precludes the Magistrate from exercising any such discretion, said statute is an unconstitutional violation of the "separation of powers" clause of the Connecticut Constitution as an improper infringement on the Magistrate's judicial CT Page 9810-ab authority and as a significant interference with the orderly function of the Court's judicial role, citing State v. Campbell , 224 Conn. 168 , 177-178 , 617 A.2d 889 (1992).

2002It farther asserts that if C.G.S. § 17b-179 precludes the Magistrate from exercising any such discretion, said statute is an unconstitutional violation of the "separation of powers" clause of the Connecticut Constitution as an improper infringement on the Magistrate's judicial CT Page 9810-ab authority and as a significant interference with the orderly function of the Court's judicial role, citing State v. Campbell , 224 Conn. 168 , 177-178 , 617 A.2d 889 (1992).

1995Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 160-61 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968); Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991) (effectively overruling State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 511 , 353 A.2d 723 [1974], which held that the separation of powers clause of the state constitution is violated when one branch of government intrudes upon another “in an area which lies exclusively under [its] control”).

1995Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 160-61 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968); Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991) (effectively overruling State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 511 , 353 A.2d 723 [1974], which held that the separation of powers clause of the state constitution is violated when one branch of government intrudes upon another “in an area which lies exclusively under [its] control”).

1995Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 160-61 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968); Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991) (effectively overruling State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 511 , 353 A.2d 723 [1974], which held that the separation of powers clause of the state constitution is violated when one branch of government intrudes upon another “in an area which lies exclusively under [its] control”).

1995Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 160-61 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968); Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991) (effectively overruling State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 511 , 353 A.2d 723 [1974], which held that the separation of powers clause of the state constitution is violated when one branch of government intrudes upon another “in an area which lies exclusively under [its] control”).

1995Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 160-61 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968); Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991) (effectively overruling State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 511 , 353 A.2d 723 [1974], which held that the separation of powers clause of the state constitution is violated when one branch of government intrudes upon another “in an area which lies exclusively under [its] control”).

1995Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 160-61 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968); Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676 , 587 A.2d 1014 (1991) (effectively overruling State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 511 , 353 A.2d 723 [1974], which held that the separation of powers clause of the state constitution is violated when one branch of government intrudes upon another “in an area which lies exclusively under [its] control”).

1991CT Page 10287 In State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258 , 269 (1989), the Connecticut Supreme Court stated: In choosing between two constructions of a statute, one valid and one constitutionally precarious, we will search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the legislature's underlying intent.

1988Id.