46 California opinions name it 4 courts 1946–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Dillongreen2 sentences1987Felony-murder Rule Invalid Defendant urges that the felony-murder rule creates an unconstitutional presumption of malice, a contention we rejected in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 446 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ]. 1987Felony-murder Rule Invalid Defendant urges that the felony-murder rule creates an unconstitutional presumption of malice, a contention we rejected in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 446 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ]. | 4 | 4 |
Yates v. Evattgreen2 sentences2017(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449 ] [determining whether an instruction providing for an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict calls for “a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption”].) In Elizalde, our high court held that the erroneous admission of responses to the jail booking questions in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant’s gang membership was “amply established by in 2017(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449 ] [determining whether an instruction providing for an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict calls for “a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption”].) In Elizalde, our high court held that the erroneous admission of responses to the jail booking questions in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant’s gang membership was “amply established by in | 3 | 3 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(See Auto Equity Sales, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455 .) Cotton’s contention that the natural and probable consequences doctrine is an unconstitutional violation of his right to due process, and therefore it was reversible error for the court to instruct the jury on the doctrine, is without merit. 2018However, the Court summarily rejected a due process challenge to a former version of the statute, section 22: "[W]e reject defendant's argument that the withholding of voluntary intoxication evidence to negate the mental state of arson [a general intent crime] violates his due process rights by denying him the opportunity to prove he did not possess the required mental state." ( People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76 , 93, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 , citing Egelhoff , supra , 518 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 56, 116 S.Ct. 2013 .) We are, of course, bound by the rulings of our state's highest cour | 2 | 4 |
Estelle v. McGuiregreen2 sentences2017(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 [determining whether an instruction providing for an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict calls for "a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption"], disapproved on other grounds Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, fn. 4 .) We cannot conclude the erroneously admitted jailhouse intake statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2017(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 [determining whether an instruction providing for an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict calls for "a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption"], disapproved on other grounds Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, fn. 4 .) We cannot conclude the erroneously admitted jailhouse intake statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Nogueragreen2 sentences1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec 1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec 1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec 1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec | 2 | 2 |
Montana v. Egelhoffgreen2 sentences2018However, the Court summarily rejected a due process challenge to a former version of the statute, section 22: "[W]e reject defendant's argument that the withholding of voluntary intoxication evidence to negate the mental state of arson [a general intent crime] violates his due process rights by denying him the opportunity to prove he did not possess the required mental state." ( People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76 , 93, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 , citing Egelhoff , supra , 518 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 56, 116 S.Ct. 2013 .) We are, of course, bound by the rulings of our state's highest cour 2018However, the Court summarily rejected a due process challenge to a former version of the statute, section 22: “[W]e reject defendant’s argument that the withholding of voluntary intoxication evidence to negate the mental state of arson [a general intent crime] violates his due process rights by denying him the opportunity to prove he did not possess the required mental state.” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 93 , citing Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 56.) We are, of course, bound by the rulings of our state’s highest court. | 1 | 2 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec 1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec | 1 | 2 |
Murdock v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences1966It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free. ’ ’ See also Near v. Minnesota, supra (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 720 (“Characterizing the publication [of malicious, scandalous and defamatory matter in newspapers] as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105 [ 63 S.Ct. 870, 891 , 87 L.Ed. 1292 , 146 A.L.R. 81 ] (that a religious organization solicited “purchase” of its books and pamphlets did not weaken its right to First Amendment protection). 1966It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free. ’ ’ See also Near v. Minnesota, supra (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 720 (“Characterizing the publication [of malicious, scandalous and defamatory matter in newspapers] as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105 [ 63 S.Ct. 870, 891 , 87 L.Ed. 1292 , 146 A.L.R. 81 ] (that a religious organization solicited “purchase” of its books and pamphlets did not weaken its right to First Amendment protection). | 1 | 2 |
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal.green2 sentences1955Frost v. Railroad Com. of Calif., 271 U.S. 583 [ 46 S.Ct. 605 , 70 L.Ed. 1101 ].” ‘1 [N] or shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.” (Cal. Const., art. 1955Frost v. Railroad Com. of Calif., 271 U.S. 583 [ 46 S.Ct. 605 , 70 L.Ed. 1101 ].” ‘1 [N] or shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.” (Cal. Const., art. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hudsongreen1 sentence2022(People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 119-120 ; People v. Hudson (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1029 (Hudson); see People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 366 .) Defendant’s failure to object to this instruction did not forfeit 5 this argument as defendant asserts this instruction violated his due process rights by creating an unconstitutional presumption. (§ 1259; Tuggles, at p. 366.) On the merits, this instruction does not create any improper presumption. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tugglesgreen1 sentence2022(People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 119-120 ; People v. Hudson (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1029 (Hudson); see People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 366 .) Defendant’s failure to object to this instruction did not forfeit 5 this argument as defendant asserts this instruction violated his due process rights by creating an unconstitutional presumption. (§ 1259; Tuggles, at p. 366.) On the merits, this instruction does not create any improper presumption. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Elizaldegreen2 sentences2017(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 ] [determining whether an instruction providing for an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict calls for “a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption”].) In Elizalde , our high court held that the erroneous admission of responses to the jail booking questions in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant’s gang membership was ‘“ampl 2017(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449 ] [determining whether an instruction providing for an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict calls for “a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption”].) In Elizalde, our high court held that the erroneous admission of responses to the jail booking questions in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant’s gang membership was “amply established by in | 1 | 1 |
Ames v. City of Hermosa Beachgreen2 sentences2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 | 1 | 1 |
Harman v. City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 | 1 | 1 |
Lac Courte Oreilles Band Of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians Of Wisconsin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016(Lac Courte Oreilles, supra, 367 F.3d at p. 655.) The court’s understanding of the basis for invoking the request for concurrence, as authority to take the land into trust or authority to permit gaming on newly acquired land, was therefore immaterial to the resolution, rendering this analysis dicta. 2016(Lac Courte Oreilles, supra, 367 F.3d at p. 655.) The court’s understanding of the basis for invoking the request for concurrence, as authority to take the land into trust or authority to permit gaming on newly acquired land, was therefore immaterial to the resolution, rendering this analysis dicta. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Valentinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yeoman v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Welsh v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Califano v. Westcottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cage v. Louisianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sandovalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. Marshgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Francis v. Franklingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brooks v. Small Claims Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cornettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chapman v. Californiared | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kelleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Logginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Coffeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Near v. Minnesota Ex Rel. Olsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Speiser v. Randallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines v. Canadagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blair v. Pitchess
green
2 sentences2016Thus, in the seminal case of Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 , our high court affirmed a judgment issuing injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of what the court concluded was an unconstitutional claim and delivery law. 2016Thus, in the seminal case of Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 , our high court affirmed a judgment issuing injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of what the court concluded was an unconstitutional claim and delivery law. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Atkins
green
2 sentences2018However, the Court summarily rejected a due process challenge to a former version of the statute, section 22: "[W]e reject defendant's argument that the withholding of voluntary intoxication evidence to negate the mental state of arson [a general intent crime] violates his due process rights by denying him the opportunity to prove he did not possess the required mental state." ( People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76 , 93, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 , citing Egelhoff , supra , 518 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 56, 116 S.Ct. 2013 .) We are, of course, bound by the rulings of our state's highest cour 2018However, the Court summarily rejected a due process challenge to a former version of the statute, section 22: "[W]e reject defendant's argument that the withholding of voluntary intoxication evidence to negate the mental state of arson [a general intent crime] violates his due process rights by denying him the opportunity to prove he did not possess the required mental state." ( People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76 , 93, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 , citing Egelhoff , supra , 518 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 56, 116 S.Ct. 2013 .) We are, of course, bound by the rulings of our state's highest cour | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec 1994(Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190-191 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ].) This court further deems the People to have opposed this contention on the ground that under the principles of stare decisis (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), this court is bound by prior decisions of the California Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the definition of reasonable doubt as provided in CALJIC No. 2.90, which dec | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1985(People v. Cornett (1948) 33 Cal.2d 33, 42 [ 198 P.2d 877 ]; People v. Kelley (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1008-1013 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 392 ]; People v. Loggins (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 597, 601 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 528 ].) Noting that he failed to testify in his own defense and recognizing that the circumstantial evidence demonstrating he killed Olivier was overwhelming (see ante, p. 472) Hyde argues that the lack of a voluntary manslaughter instruction amounted to an unconstitutional presumption of malice prohibited by a series of United States Supreme Court cases beginning with Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 1985If such a reasonable possibility of an unconstitutional understanding exists, ‘we have no way of knowing that [the defendant] was not convicted on the basis of the unconstitutional instruction.’ Sandstrom, 442 U.S., at 526 .” (Francis v. Franklin, supra, — U.S. at pp.---, fn. 8 [85 L.Ed.2d at pp. 358-359, 105 S.Ct. at pp. 1075-1076].) Although the challenged instructions given in the case at bar are factually dissimilar to those in Sandstrom and Franklin , there can be little doubt, especially in light of Garcia, the California Supreme Court would find the reasoning of these cases directly app | 2 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Wheeler
green
1 sentence2025JURY BIAS AND IMPROPER REMOVAL OF JURORS Manly contends the defense counsel improperly “removed every person of African-American descent and every person who acknowledged their Christian faith.” He asserts this was unconstitutional in violation of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 . “‘“[A] party may exercise a peremptory challenge for any permissible reason or no reason at all” [citation] but “exercising peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race [or other cognizable group] offends the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of the equal protection of the laws” [citations]. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Collins
green
1 sentence2023(Ibid.) The Supreme Court rejected the federal appeals court’s conclusion “that the exchange regarding the defendant’s ‘ “failure to tell arresting officers the same story he told the jury” ’ was an unconstitutional inquiry about postarrest silence . . . explaining that the prosecutor’s cross-examination could not be ‘bifurcated so neatly’ and must be considered as a whole” and concluding “that questions regarding the defendant’s failure to tell the police the same story ‘were not designed to draw meaning from silence, 41 but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.’ [Citat | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Dueñas
green
1 sentence2023(Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160 .) “Dueñas held that it violates due process under the federal and state Constitutions to impose . . . court operations and facilities fees without first determining the convicted defendant’s ability to pay them. [Citation.] In addition, ‘to avoid serious constitutional questions’ raised by the statutory restitution scheme, [Dueñas held that] the [trial] court must stay execution of the mandatory restitution fine unless the court determines that the defendant 45 has the ability to pay it.” (People v. Taylor (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 390 , 397.)11 Even unde | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Golde
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 119-120 ; People v. Hudson (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1029 (Hudson); see People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 366 .) Defendant’s failure to object to this instruction did not forfeit 5 this argument as defendant asserts this instruction violated his due process rights by creating an unconstitutional presumption. (§ 1259; Tuggles, at p. 366.) On the merits, this instruction does not create any improper presumption. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Terry v. Bender
green
2 sentences2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Wirin v. Parker
green
2 sentences2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Osburn v. Stone
green
2 sentences2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Crowe v. Boyle
green
2 sentences2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 2016Within the context of illegal expenditures under section 526a, the court held an injunction under section 526a would properly issue to restrain the enforcement of a statute or other law that is unconstitutional. ( Id. at pp. 268-269, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 486 P.2d 1242 .) Even earlier, in Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 , 313 P.2d 844 , our high court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent the expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed microphones, on the theory that such surveillance violated the United States and *303 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Bransford
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Bransford (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885, 892-893 .) Admission of Evidence Stevens contends the trial court erred in admitting "evidence relating to the blood sample and its analysis." We disagree. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Trop v. Dulles green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Guinn green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Owens neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Estelle v. Gamble green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Cunningham v. California green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Flores green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Westbrooks green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Hernández Ríos green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Shelley v. Kraemer green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Collins green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Xerox Credit Corp. neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Carlos v. Superior Court red | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Mendoza v. Small Claims Court of Los Angeles Judicial District green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Mullaney v. Wilbur green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Prudhomme v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Griffin v. California green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| De Jonge v. Oregon green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.