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20 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1911–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Wolfe, M.green2 sentences2018See id. at 53-54 , 140 A.3d at 661 . 2018See id. at 53-54, 140 A.3d at 661 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt.red1 sentence2022In Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2017), the Court found SORNA I was an unconstitutional violation of offenders’ ex post facto rights. | 1 | 1 |
Francis v. Franklingreen1 sentence2022Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clancy, J., Aplt.green1 sentence2022We have explained a prosecutor has a responsibility to “seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.” Commonwealth v. Clancy, 192 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa. 2018) (internal quotations and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Maukgreen1 sentence2020First, he maintains that because Subchapters H and I of SORNA II remain punitive in effect, the retroactive application of SORNA II’s registration requirement is an unconstitutional violation of the ex post facto clause.8 Next, he posits that the mechanism for ____________________________________________ 8 “As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.” Commonwealth v. Mauk, 185 A.3d 406, 410 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.green2 sentences1986However, the Caldor decision clearly contemplated that an accommodation requirement that was not absolute and unqualified and did not have a primary purpose or effect of impermissibly advancing one religion over another is certainly constitutional. 4 Id., U.S. at , 86 L.Ed. 2d at 864 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 1986However, the Caldor decision clearly contemplated that an accommodation requirement that was not absolute and unqualified and did not have a primary purpose or effect of impermissibly advancing one religion over another is certainly constitutional. 4 Id., U.S. at , 86 L.Ed. 2d at 864 (O’Connor, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Silver v. Zoning Board of Adjustmentgreen2 sentences1982See Silver v. Zoning Hearing Board, 435 Pa. 99 , 255 A.2d 506 (1969). 1982See Silver v. Zoning Hearing Board, 435 Pa. 99 , 255 A.2d 506 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green2 sentences1981See also, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 , 52 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), which held Illinois Interstate Succession Law, which treated illegitimate children differently from legitimate children was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law, which denied equal rights to dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children was unconstitutional. 1981See also, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 , 52 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), which held Illinois Interstate Succession Law, which treated illegitimate children differently from legitimate children was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law, which denied equal rights to dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children was unconstitutional. | 1 | 1 |
Trimble v. Gordongreen2 sentences1981See also, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 , 52 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), which held Illinois Interstate Succession Law, which treated illegitimate children differently from legitimate children was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law, which denied equal rights to dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children was unconstitutional. 1981See also, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 , 52 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), which held Illinois Interstate Succession Law, which treated illegitimate children differently from legitimate children was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 , 92 S.Ct. 1400 , 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law, which denied equal rights to dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children was unconstitutional. | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Butlergreen2 sentences1976Appellant argues that this difference in treatment between spouses violates the Equality of Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 Appellant’s argument is answered by our recent decision in Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 528 , 347 A.2d 477, 480 (1975), in which we held that in order to avoid an unconstitutional presumption in this situation “anytime either a husband or wife contributes towards the purchase of entireties property their contribution is presumed to be a gift to the other.” 5 Thus, since Butler abolished the one-sided presumption of Shapiro and extended the presumpti 1976Appellant argues that this difference in treatment between spouses violates the Equality of Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 Appellant’s argument is answered by our recent decision in Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 528 , 347 A.2d 477, 480 (1975), in which we held that in order to avoid an unconstitutional presumption in this situation “anytime either a husband or wife contributes towards the purchase of entireties property their contribution is presumed to be a gift to the other.” 5 Thus, since Butler abolished the one-sided presumption of Shapiro and extended the presumpti | 1 | 1 |
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelingreen1 sentence1974However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F. 2d 1005, 1018 (1973), emphatically held that the fluid class recovery procedure constituted- “an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due process of law.” The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, did not consider the issue: 40 L. | 1 | 1 |
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelingreen1 sentence1974However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F. 2d 1005, 1018 (1973), emphatically held that the fluid class recovery procedure constituted- “an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due process of law.” The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, did not consider the issue: 40 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
green
2 sentences2019Those students’ “silent, passive expression of opinion” in favor of peace over violence, id. at 508 , was in no way similar to Appellant’s threat to commit mass murder. - 16 - J-S12006-19 disregard for the likelihood that his words would engender fear in those who heard them. 2019Those students’ “silent, passive expression of opinion” in favor of peace over violence, id. at 508 , was in no way similar to Appellant’s threat to commit mass murder. - 16 - J-S12006-19 disregard for the likelihood that his words would engender fear in those who heard them. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Rothermel v. Meyerle
green
2 sentences1932In Wood v. Philadelphia, supra, it is said (page 582): “But if, on the other hand, after cutting off the unconstitutional clause or section, there still remains an intelligent piece of legislation, capable of enforcement, in harmony as far as it goes with the apparent legislative intent, it is the plain duty of the courts to permit such portion of the act to stand,” though, as said in Rothermel v. Meyerle, supra: “The constitutional and the unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same section of the law.” The first part of section six provides that, in lieu of the lien given b 1911The familiar principle is thus stated in Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. 250 , one of the many cases on the subject: “A statute may be void only so far as its provisions are repugnant to the constitution: one provision may be void, and this will not affect other provisions of the statute. | 2 | 1911–1932 |
P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission
green
2 sentences2017Court held “the jurisdiction of this [C]ourt is not infringed when a regulation aimed at conduct is applied to all persons, and some of those persons happen to be attorneys.” P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 178 . 2017Court held “the jurisdiction of this [Cjourt is not infringed when a regulation aimed at conduct is applied to all persons, and some of those persons happen to be attorneys.” P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 178 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Peachey v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
green
1 sentence2010The trial court based its decision on Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342 , 684 A.2d 1060 (1996) (holding that 67 Pa.Code § 83.4(a), pertaining to driver’s license recalls due to seizure disorders, created an irrebuttable presumption of incompetency to drive and violated due process), and Peachey v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 979 A.2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth.2009) (following the holding in Clayton). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
COM. DEPT. OF TRANSP. v. Clayton
green
2 sentences2010The trial court based its decision on Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342 , 684 A.2d 1060 (1996) (holding that 67 Pa.Code § 83.4(a), pertaining to driver’s license recalls due to seizure disorders, created an irrebuttable presumption of incompetency to drive and violated due process), and Peachey v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 979 A.2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth.2009) (following the holding in Clayton). 2010The trial court based its decision on Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342 , 684 A.2d 1060 (1996) (holding that 67 Pa.Code § 83.4(a), pertaining to driver’s license recalls due to seizure disorders, created an irrebuttable presumption of incompetency to drive and violated due process), and Peachey v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 979 A.2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth.2009) (following the holding in Clayton). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Field
green
2 sentences1987The trial judge’s attempt to justify his decision by finding that Heck is “at variance” with Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345 , 437 A.2d 385 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519 , 417 A.2d 160 (1980), flies in the face of Heck’s determination that those Supreme Court cases did not decide the issue whether ordinary negligence was an unconstitutional standard of culpability in a vehicular homicide case. 1987The trial judge’s attempt to justify his decision by finding that Heck is “at variance” with Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345 , 437 A.2d 385 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519 , 417 A.2d 160 (1980), flies in the face of Heck’s determination that those Supreme Court cases did not decide the issue whether ordinary negligence was an unconstitutional standard of culpability in a vehicular homicide case. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Commonwealth v. Heck
green
2 sentences1987This Court in Heck carefully considered the holdings in Houtz and Field, see Heck, 341 Pa.Super. at 190-92 , 491 A.2d at 215-16 , and determined that, although those cases had settled that simple negligence was the level of culpability established by the vehicular homicide statute, they had not involved constitutional challenges to that level of culpability based on due process grounds. 1987This Court in Heck carefully considered the holdings in Houtz and Field, see Heck, 341 Pa.Super. at 190-92 , 491 A.2d at 215-16 , and determined that, although those cases had settled that simple negligence was the level of culpability established by the vehicular homicide statute, they had not involved constitutional challenges to that level of culpability based on due process grounds. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
In Re William L.
green
2 sentences1987Id., 477 Pa. at 330 , 383 A.2d at 1231 . 1987Id., 477 Pa. at 330 , 383 A.2d at 1231 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Commonwealth v. Houtz
green
2 sentences1987The trial judge’s attempt to justify his decision by finding that Heck is “at variance” with Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345 , 437 A.2d 385 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519 , 417 A.2d 160 (1980), flies in the face of Heck’s determination that those Supreme Court cases did not decide the issue whether ordinary negligence was an unconstitutional standard of culpability in a vehicular homicide case. 1987The trial judge’s attempt to justify his decision by finding that Heck is “at variance” with Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345 , 437 A.2d 385 (1981), and Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519 , 417 A.2d 160 (1980), flies in the face of Heck’s determination that those Supreme Court cases did not decide the issue whether ordinary negligence was an unconstitutional standard of culpability in a vehicular homicide case. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Brown v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1981Pennsylvania decisions have followed Weber, supra, in Le-high Foundations, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensations Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 416 , 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 42 , 394 A.2d 1071 (1978); Brown v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 342 A.2d 134 (1975). . 1981Pennsylvania decisions have followed Weber, supra, in Le-high Foundations, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensations Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 416 , 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 42 , 394 A.2d 1071 (1978); Brown v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 342 A.2d 134 (1975). . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1981Pennsylvania decisions have followed Weber, supra, in Le-high Foundations, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensations Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 416 , 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 42 , 394 A.2d 1071 (1978); Brown v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 342 A.2d 134 (1975). . 1981Pennsylvania decisions have followed Weber, supra, in Le-high Foundations, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensations Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 416 , 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 42 , 394 A.2d 1071 (1978); Brown v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 342 A.2d 134 (1975). . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Lehigh Foundations, Inc. v. Commonwealth
neutral
1 sentence1981Pennsylvania decisions have followed Weber, supra, in Le-high Foundations, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensations Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 416 , 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 42 , 394 A.2d 1071 (1978); Brown v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 342 A.2d 134 (1975). . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Greely
green
1 sentence1981Pennsylvania decisions have followed Weber, supra, in Le-high Foundations, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensations Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 416 , 395 A.2d 576 (1978); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 42 , 394 A.2d 1071 (1978); Brown v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 330 , 342 A.2d 134 (1975). . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Appeal of Murphy
green
2 sentences1979See Appeal of Donald S. Brooks (Filed October 6, 1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting opinion joined by Larsen, J.); Appeal of Murphy, 482 Pa. 43 , 393 A.2d 369 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting opinion joined by Larsen, J.) appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. 1979See Appeal of Donald S. Brooks (Filed October 6, 1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting opinion joined by Larsen, J.); Appeal of Murphy, 482 Pa. 43 , 393 A.2d 369 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting opinion joined by Larsen, J.) appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Wood v. Philadelphia
green
1 sentence1932In Wood v. Philadelphia, supra, it is said (page 582): “But if, on the other hand, after cutting off the unconstitutional clause or section, there still remains an intelligent piece of legislation, capable of enforcement, in harmony as far as it goes with the apparent legislative intent, it is the plain duty of the courts to permit such portion of the act to stand,” though, as said in Rothermel v. Meyerle, supra: “The constitutional and the unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same section of the law.” The first part of section six provides that, in lieu of the lien given b | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.