22 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Henderson v. Snider Bros., Inc.green2 sentences2018The doctrine applies “[w]hen the parties are the same, and the essence of the claim and the evidence necessary to establish it are the same.” Id. at 484 . 2018The doctrine applies "[w]hen the parties are the same, and the essence of the claim and the evidence necessary to establish it are the same." Id. at 484 . | 3 | 5 |
Oesby v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980The test for a post-trial determination of whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated is whether his “counsel was grossly incompetent and [whether] that counsel’s incompetence blotted out the essence of his defense.” Oesby v. United States, D.C.App., 398 A.2d 1, 4 (1979). 1980Under *503 Angarano a convicted defendant must show two things: “that counsel was grossly incompetent and that counsel’s incompetence blotted out the essence of his defense.” Oesby v. United States, D.C.App., 398 A.2d 1, 4 (1979). | 2 | 3 |
Williams v. Gerstenfeldgreen2 sentences2006“It is the factual nucleus, not the theory upon which a plaintiff relies, which operates to constitute the cause of action for claim preclusion purposes.” Stutsman, 546 A.2d at 370 ; see also (Arthur) Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1179 (D.C.1986) (“It is irrelevant that the nature of the two proceedings is different; as long as the parties are the same, and the essence of the claim and evidence necessary to establish it are the same, res judicata applies.”). 1990It does not matter that the earlier and later proceedings differ in nature: “as long as the parties are the same, and the essence of the claim and evidence necessary to establish it are the same, res judicata applies.” Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1179 (D.C.1986) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Calomiris v. Calomirisgreen2 sentences2024Whether a “present claim is the same” for purposes of res judicata, id., depends “not [on] the theory on which a plaintiff relies” but on whether the claims share “a common nucleus of facts,” Faulkner, 618 A.2d at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Whiting v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 230 A.3d 916 , 927 (D.C. 2020) (“It does not matter that the earlier and later proceedings differ in nature: as long as . . . the essence of the claim and evidence necessary to establish it are the same . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2018"In determining whether res judicata applies, we consider (1) whether the claim was adjudicated finally in the first action; (2) whether the present claim is the same as the claim which was raised or which might have been raised in the prior proceeding; and (3) whether the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case." Calomiris v. Calomiris , 3 A.3d 1186 , 1190 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Faulkner v. Government Employees Insurance Co.green1 sentence2024Whether a “present claim is the same” for purposes of res judicata, id., depends “not [on] the theory on which a plaintiff relies” but on whether the claims share “a common nucleus of facts,” Faulkner, 618 A.2d at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Whiting v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 230 A.3d 916 , 927 (D.C. 2020) (“It does not matter that the earlier and later proceedings differ in nature: as long as . . . the essence of the claim and evidence necessary to establish it are the same . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Jenkinsgreen1 sentence2024In other words, “a second action may be precluded on the ground that the same claim or cause of action was advanced in the first action even though a different source of law is involved,” Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 614 (D.C. 1989) (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. | 1 | 1 |
Ingram v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1005 (D.C.1991). 2003See, e.g., Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1005 (D.C.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Ceco Corp. v. Colemangreen2 sentences1987In such circumstances, the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.” Ross, supra, 78 U.S.App.D.C. at 219 , 139 F.2d at 16 ; accord, Gaither, supra, 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 221 , 404 F.2d at 221 ; see also Ceco, supra, 441 A.2d at 944 (“The negligent act of a third party will operate as a superseding cause of the plaintiff’s harm only where the original actor should not have anticipated that act.”). 1987In such circumstances, the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.” Ross, supra, 78 U.S.App.D.C. at 219 , 139 F.2d at 16 ; accord, Gaither, supra, 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 221 , 404 F.2d at 221 ; see also Ceco, supra, 441 A.2d at 944 (“The negligent act of a third party will operate as a superseding cause of the plaintiff’s harm only where the original actor should not have anticipated that act.”). | 1 | 1 |
Frederick O. Gaither v. Charles R. Myers and American Motorist Insurance Co., a Corporationgreen2 sentences1987In such circumstances, the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.” Ross, supra, 78 U.S.App.D.C. at 219 , 139 F.2d at 16 ; accord, Gaither, supra, 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 221 , 404 F.2d at 221 ; see also Ceco, supra, 441 A.2d at 944 (“The negligent act of a third party will operate as a superseding cause of the plaintiff’s harm only where the original actor should not have anticipated that act.”). 1987In such circumstances, the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.” Ross, supra, 78 U.S.App.D.C. at 219 , 139 F.2d at 16 ; accord, Gaither, supra, 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 221 , 404 F.2d at 221 ; see also Ceco, supra, 441 A.2d at 944 (“The negligent act of a third party will operate as a superseding cause of the plaintiff’s harm only where the original actor should not have anticipated that act.”). | 1 | 1 |
World Wide Imp. Car Co., Ltd. v. Savings Bk. of Baltimoregreen2 sentences1981See World Wide Imported Car Co., Ltd. v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 41 Md.App. 263, 270-72 , 396 A.2d 547, 551 (1979), quoting *485 Klein v. Whitehead, 40 Md.App. 1 , 389 A.2d 374 (1978). 1981See World Wide Imported Car Co., Ltd. v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 41 Md.App. 263, 270-72 , 396 A.2d 547, 551 (1979), quoting *485 Klein v. Whitehead, 40 Md.App. 1 , 389 A.2d 374 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Klein v. Whiteheadgreen2 sentences1981See World Wide Imported Car Co., Ltd. v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 41 Md.App. 263, 270-72 , 396 A.2d 547, 551 (1979), quoting *485 Klein v. Whitehead, 40 Md.App. 1 , 389 A.2d 374 (1978). 1981See World Wide Imported Car Co., Ltd. v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 41 Md.App. 263, 270-72 , 396 A.2d 547, 551 (1979), quoting *485 Klein v. Whitehead, 40 Md.App. 1 , 389 A.2d 374 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Angarano v. United States
green
2 sentences1983Appellant’s motion was denied without a hearing on the grounds that (1) the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the standards of Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), reh’g *824 denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974), and (2) the submission of tape recorded instructions to the jury for use in its deliberations was proper as it had recently been expressly upheld in an unpublished opinion of this court. 1979Oesby *1244 v. United States, D.C.App., 398 A.2d 1 (1977); Woody v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 592 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.CApp., 312 A.2d 395 (1973), petition for reconsideration denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc). | 3 | 1979–1983 |
Angarano v. United States
green
2 sentences1983Appellant’s motion was denied without a hearing on the grounds that (1) the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the standards of Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), reh’g *824 denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974), and (2) the submission of tape recorded instructions to the jury for use in its deliberations was proper as it had recently been expressly upheld in an unpublished opinion of this court. 1979App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), rehearing en banc denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974). | 2 | 1979–1983 |
Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. Holle
green
1 sentence2020“It does not matter that the earlier and later proceedings differ in nature: ‘as long as the parties are the same, and the essence of the claim and evidence necessary to establish it are the same, res judicata applies.’” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sinai v. Polinger Co.
green
1 sentence2007“Here, the trial court’s instructions on contributory negligence ... encompassed [the very activity] that the defense assigned as evidence that [Ms. Jones] had assumed the risk.” Sinai, 498 A.2d at 526 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Stutsman v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006“It is the factual nucleus, not the theory upon which a plaintiff relies, which operates to constitute the cause of action for claim preclusion purposes.” Stutsman, 546 A.2d at 370 ; see also (Arthur) Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1179 (D.C.1986) (“It is irrelevant that the nature of the two proceedings is different; as long as the parties are the same, and the essence of the claim and evidence necessary to establish it are the same, res judicata applies.”). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Vereen v. Clayborne
green
1 sentence2005Vereen, 623 A.2d at 1194 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Mitchell v. Forsyth
green
2 sentences2001The essence of an immunity from suit is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 . 2001The essence of an immunity from suit is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Robinson v. Smith
green
1 sentence1998We further observed that “the essence of the hearing examiner’s statements is that there were inconsistencies in petitioner’s story.” Id. at 486 n. 4. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Ross v. Hartman
green
2 sentences1987In such circumstances, the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.” Ross, supra, 78 U.S.App.D.C. at 219 , 139 F.2d at 16 ; accord, Gaither, supra, 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 221 , 404 F.2d at 221 ; see also Ceco, supra, 441 A.2d at 944 (“The negligent act of a third party will operate as a superseding cause of the plaintiff’s harm only where the original actor should not have anticipated that act.”). 1987In such circumstances, the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.” Ross, supra, 78 U.S.App.D.C. at 219 , 139 F.2d at 16 ; accord, Gaither, supra, 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 221 , 404 F.2d at 221 ; see also Ceco, supra, 441 A.2d at 944 (“The negligent act of a third party will operate as a superseding cause of the plaintiff’s harm only where the original actor should not have anticipated that act.”). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Richardson Adoption Case
neutral
1 sentence1979Oesby *1244 v. United States, D.C.App., 398 A.2d 1 (1977); Woody v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 592 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.CApp., 312 A.2d 395 (1973), petition for reconsideration denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Woody v. United States
green
1 sentence1979Oesby *1244 v. United States, D.C.App., 398 A.2d 1 (1977); Woody v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 592 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.CApp., 312 A.2d 395 (1973), petition for reconsideration denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
McMann v. Richardson
green
2 sentences1977The right to effective assistance of counsel attaches before trial, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and extends through the post-trial proceedings; consequently, we examine trial counsel’s conduct chronologically from the time of the pretrial suppression hearing. 4 At that hearing, counsel called as a witness the owner of the car in which appellants were riding, apparently for the purpose of testifying that he saw no bullet holes in the windshield of the automobile. 1977The right to effective assistance of counsel attaches before trial, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and extends through the post-trial proceedings; consequently, we examine trial counsel’s conduct chronologically from the time of the pretrial suppression hearing. 4 At that hearing, counsel called as a witness the owner of the car in which appellants were riding, apparently for the purpose of testifying that he saw no bullet holes in the windshield of the automobile. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.