essence doctrine in Ohio

2020“The very essence of the rule is that the evidence be such that the jury is unlikely to be confused by it or misuse it.” Id.

2019“The very essence of the rule is that the evidence be such that the jury is unlikely to be confused by it or misuse it.” Id.

2018"The essence of the doctrine of standing is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.' " Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304 v. Ohio State Racing Comm. , 28 Ohio St. 3d 317 , 321, 28 Ohio B. 386 , 503 N.E.2d 1025 (1986), quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 204, 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

2018"The essence of the doctrine of standing is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.' " Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304 v. Ohio State Racing Comm. , 28 Ohio St. 3d 317 , 321, 28 Ohio B. 386 , 503 N.E.2d 1025 (1986), quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 204, 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

2018"The essence of the doctrine of standing is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.' " Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304 v. Ohio State Racing Comm. , 28 Ohio St. 3d 317 , 321, 28 Ohio B. 386 , 503 N.E.2d 1025 (1986), quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 204, 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

2018"The essence of the doctrine of standing is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.' " Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304 v. Ohio State Racing Comm. , 28 Ohio St. 3d 317 , 321, 28 Ohio B. 386 , 503 N.E.2d 1025 (1986), quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 204, 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

2017Even where a claimant seeks relief that will ultimately result in the payment of money by the state, "a cause of action will sound in equity if 'money damages' is not the essence of the claim." Id. , citing Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 114 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2007-Ohio-2620 , 867 N.E.2d 400 , ¶ 15.

2017Comm. , 148 Ohio App.3d 589 , 2002-Ohio-3887 , 774 N.E.2d 769 , ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). {¶ 21} "Not every claim for monetary relief constitutes 'money damages.' Even when the relief sought consists of the state's ultimately paying money, a cause of action will sound in equity if 'money damages' is not the essence of the claim." Interim HealthCare at ¶ 15, citing Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 114 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2007-Ohio-2620 , 867 N.E.2d 400 , ¶ 15. " 'Damages are given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas specific remedies "are not sub

2018Id. at ¶ 10. {¶ 30} Although monetary damages are normally associated with compensation for previous damage or injury, the foregoing supreme court decisions make clear that "[e]ven when the relief sought consists of the state's ultimately paying money, a cause of action will sound in equity if 'money damages' is not the essence of the claim." Interim Healthcare , 2008-Ohio-2286 , 2008 WL 2025153 at ¶ 15.

2014“Even when the relief sought consists of the state’s ultimately paying money, a cause of action will sound in equity if ‘money damages’ is not the essence of the claim.” Id., citing Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 114 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2007-Ohio-2620 , 867 N.E.2d 400 , ¶ 15.

2018Under traditional standing principles, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that he has suffered " '(1) an injury that is (1) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.' " ProgressOhio.org, Inc. [ v. JobsOhio ], 139 Ohio St.3d 520 , 2014-Ohio-2382 , 13 N.E.3d 1101 , at ¶ 7, quoting Moore v. Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2012-Ohio-3897 , 975 N.E.2d 977 , ¶ 22.

2018Under traditional standing principles, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that he has suffered " '(1) an injury that is (1) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.' " ProgressOhio.org, Inc. [ v. JobsOhio ], 139 Ohio St.3d 520 , 2014-Ohio-2382 , 13 N.E.3d 1101 , at ¶ 7, quoting Moore v. Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2012-Ohio-3897 , 975 N.E.2d 977 , ¶ 22.

2018Under traditional standing principles, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that he has suffered " '(1) an injury that is (1) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.' " ProgressOhio.org, Inc. [ v. JobsOhio ], 139 Ohio St.3d 520 , 2014-Ohio-2382 , 13 N.E.3d 1101 , at ¶ 7, quoting Moore v. Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2012-Ohio-3897 , 975 N.E.2d 977 , ¶ 22.

2018Under traditional standing principles, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that he has suffered " '(1) an injury that is (1) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.' " ProgressOhio.org, Inc. [ v. JobsOhio ], 139 Ohio St.3d 520 , 2014-Ohio-2382 , 13 N.E.3d 1101 , at ¶ 7, quoting Moore v. Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2012-Ohio-3897 , 975 N.E.2d 977 , ¶ 22.

2017Echols, [ 2015-Ohio-5138, at ¶ 16 ], quoting State v. Echols, 128 Ohio App.3d 677, 694 , 716 N.E.2d 728 (1st Dist. 1998).

2016The very essence of the rule is that the evidence be such that the jury is unlikely to be confused by it or misuse it.’” Echols, 2015-Ohio-5138, at ¶ 16 , quoting State v. Echols, 128 Ohio App.3d 677, 694 , 716 N.E.2d 728 (1st Dist. 1998). {¶88} Evidence of multiple offenses is “simple and direct” where, for example, the offenses involved different victims, different incidents or different factual scenarios and different witnesses.

1999To establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legislative act, the person must show "a direct interest in the ordinance of such a nature that his rights will be adversely affected by its enforcement." (Emphasis added.) Anderson v. Brown, Mayor (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 53 , paragraph one of the syllabus; see, also, Prentiss v. Dittmer (1916), 93 Ohio St. 314 , 323 .

1999To establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legislative act, the person must show "a direct interest in the ordinance of such a nature that his rights will be adversely affected by its enforcement." (Emphasis added.) Anderson v. Brown, Mayor (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 53 , paragraph one of the syllabus; see, also, Prentiss v. Dittmer (1916), 93 Ohio St. 314 , 323 .

2023Zupancic v. Limbach, 58 Ohio St.3d 130, 132 , 568 N.E.2d 1206 (1991) (this court will look beyond the pleadings to ensure that a mandamus complaint is not a disguised request for a prohibitory injunction); Ruehmer v. Queen City Lodge, 2021-Ohio-2904 , 176 N.E.3d 350 , ¶ 32 (1st Dist.) (“Artful pleading does not alter the essence of the claim * * *”).

2023Zupancic v. Limbach, 58 Ohio St.3d 130, 132 , 568 N.E.2d 1206 (1991) (this court will look beyond the pleadings to ensure that a mandamus complaint is not a disguised request for a prohibitory injunction); Ruehmer v. Queen City Lodge, 2021-Ohio-2904 , 176 N.E.3d 350 , ¶ 32 (1st Dist.) (“Artful pleading does not alter the essence of the claim * * *”).

2018The plaintiffs subsequently filed a class-action lawsuit against the BWC, alleging that the reduction of their periodic benefits pursuant to the agreements should have stopped once the aggregate value of the periodic benefit reductions equaled the amount of the lump-sum advancements. {¶ 29} Relying upon Cristino , the Ohio Supreme Court noted that "[i]f the essence of a claim is not of restitution for money owed under a contract, but instead restitution for the state's unjust enrichment by *822 withholding funds to which a worker had a statutory right, then the ultimate relief sought is equita

2018The plaintiffs subsequently filed a class-action lawsuit against the BWC, alleging that the reduction of their periodic benefits pursuant to the agreements should have stopped once the aggregate value of the periodic benefit reductions equaled the amount of the lump-sum advancements. {¶ 29} Relying upon Cristino , the Ohio Supreme Court noted that "[i]f the essence of a claim is not of restitution for money owed under a contract, but instead restitution for the state's unjust enrichment by *822 withholding funds to which a worker had a statutory right, then the ultimate relief sought is equita

2017Assn. at 105, 579 N.E.2d 695 , quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts , 487 U.S. 879 , 895, 108 S.Ct. 2722 , 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), quoting Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. , 763 F.2d 1441 , 1446 (D.C.

2017Assn. at 105, 579 N.E.2d 695 , quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts , 487 U.S. 879 , 895, 108 S.Ct. 2722 , 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), quoting Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. , 763 F.2d 1441 , 1446 (D.C.

2017Assn. at 105, 579 N.E.2d 695 , quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts , 487 U.S. 879 , 895, 108 S.Ct. 2722 , 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), quoting Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. , 763 F.2d 1441 , 1446 (D.C.

2017Comm. , 148 Ohio App.3d 589 , 2002-Ohio-3887 , 774 N.E.2d 769 , ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). {¶ 21} "Not every claim for monetary relief constitutes 'money damages.' Even when the relief sought consists of the state's ultimately paying money, a cause of action will sound in equity if 'money damages' is not the essence of the claim." Interim HealthCare at ¶ 15, citing Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 114 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2007-Ohio-2620 , 867 N.E.2d 400 , ¶ 15. " 'Damages are given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas specific remedies "are not sub

2017Comm. , 148 Ohio App.3d 589 , 2002-Ohio-3887 , 774 N.E.2d 769 , ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). {¶ 21} "Not every claim for monetary relief constitutes 'money damages.' Even when the relief sought consists of the state's ultimately paying money, a cause of action will sound in equity if 'money damages' is not the essence of the claim." Interim HealthCare at ¶ 15, citing Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 114 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2007-Ohio-2620 , 867 N.E.2d 400 , ¶ 15. " 'Damages are given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas specific remedies "are not sub

2015“The object of the ‘simple and distinct’ test is to prevent the jury from improperly considering evidence of various crimes as corroborative of each other. ‘The very essence of the rule is that the evidence be such that the jury is unlikely to be confused by it or misuse it.’” Echols, 128 Ohio App.3d 677, 694 , 716 N.E.2d 728 , quoting Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C.Circ.1964).

2014Santos, 101 Ohio St.3d 74 , 2004-Ohio-28 , 801 N.E.2d 441, at ¶ 3-8 .

2014Santos, 101 Ohio St.3d 74 , 2004-Ohio-28 , 801 N.E.2d 441, at ¶ 3-8 .

2013Under the essence test, an award must be confirmed “when there is a rational nexus between the agreement and the award, and where the award is not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.” In contrast, an arbitrator’s award departs from the essence of the parties’ agreement when (1) it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement or (2) it lacks rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the agreement’s terms. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth., 190 Ohio App.3d 679 , 2010-Ohio-5494 , 943 N.E.2d 1075, ¶

2013Under the essence test, an award must be confirmed “when there is a rational nexus between the agreement and the award, and where the award is not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.” In contrast, an arbitrator’s award departs from the essence of the parties’ agreement when (1) it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement or (2) it lacks rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the agreement’s terms. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth., 190 Ohio App.3d 679 , 2010-Ohio-5494 , 943 N.E.2d 1075, ¶

2013Similarly, in Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining, 59 Ohio St.3d at 183 , 572 N.E.2d 71 , the Ohio Supreme Court vacated an arbitration award where the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under a collective-bargaining agreement by ignoring the agreement’s plain meaning, and created, in effect, a contract of his own, rather than applying the contract the parties had agreed upon.

2013Similarly, in Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining, 59 Ohio St.3d at 183 , 572 N.E.2d 71 , the Ohio Supreme Court vacated an arbitration award where the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under a collective-bargaining agreement by ignoring the agreement’s plain meaning, and created, in effect, a contract of his own, rather than applying the contract the parties had agreed upon.

2013The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319 , 2010-Ohio-2 , 922 N.E.2d 182 , articulated how to strike this balance without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause as follows: A defendant may be indicted and tried for allied offenses of similar import, but may be sentenced on only one of the allied offenses.

2013The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319 , 2010-Ohio-2 , 922 N.E.2d 182 , articulated how to strike this balance without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause as follows: A defendant may be indicted and tried for allied offenses of similar import, but may be sentenced on only one of the allied offenses.

2008"To have probable cause, the arresting officer must have sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source, to warrant a prudent man in believing that [an offense] has been committed and that it has been committed by the accused." State v. Timson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 122 , 127 .

2004State v. Tompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 678 N.E.2d 541 . {¶ 10} "Under pre-July 1, 1996, sentencing provisions, the sentencing judge was deemed in the best position to evaluate the appropriate sentence from the defendant's record, demeanor, remorse, and attitude.

2004State v. Tompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 678 N.E.2d 541 . {¶ 10} "Under pre-July 1, 1996, sentencing provisions, the sentencing judge was deemed in the best position to evaluate the appropriate sentence from the defendant's record, demeanor, remorse, and attitude.