essence claim in New Mexico

2013See, e.g., Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. Ark. 1994); Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc., 229 A.2d 366 (Conn. C.P. 1967); Waldron v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 236 N.W.2d 722 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).

2013See, e.g., Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. Ark. 1994); Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc., 229 A.2d 366 (Conn. C.P. 1967); Waldron v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 236 N.W.2d 722 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).

2005Thus, “a litigant is ordinarily not entitled to more than one fair bite at the applet,]” Ford, 119 N.M. at 407 , 891 P.2d at 548 , and some writers liken the doctrine to a “common-law rule of compulsory joinder” that requires a plaintiff to raise any and all legal theories in a single lawsuit.

2005Thus, “a litigant is ordinarily not entitled to more than one fair bite at the applet,]” Ford, 119 N.M. at 407 , 891 P.2d at 548 , and some writers liken the doctrine to a “common-law rule of compulsory joinder” that requires a plaintiff to raise any and all legal theories in a single lawsuit.

2005The essence of the claim preclusion doctrine is that “litigants are encouraged and afforded a full and fair opportunity to raise issues that exist between them in a single action [] [but t]here are consequences for the failure to take advantage of this opportunity.” Moffat I, 2002-NMCA-067, ¶ 26 , 132 N.M. 412 , 49 P.3d 673 (citation omitted).

2005The essence of the claim preclusion doctrine is that “litigants are encouraged and afforded a full and fair opportunity to raise issues that exist between them in a single action [] [but t]here are consequences for the failure to take advantage of this opportunity.” Moffat I, 2002-NMCA-067, ¶ 26 , 132 N.M. 412 , 49 P.3d 673 (citation omitted).

2016Brooks Trucking Co. v. Bull Rogers, Inc., 2006-NMCA-025, ¶ 11 , 139 N.M. 99 , 128 P.3d 1076 . {14} Claim preclusion “reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their entire controversies shall in fact do so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016Brooks Trucking Co. v. Bull Rogers, Inc., 2006-NMCA-025, ¶ 11 , 139 N.M. 99 , 128 P.3d 1076 . {14} Claim preclusion “reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their entire controversies shall in fact do so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2013Badilla relies on our limited holding in Fernandez v. Char-Li-Jon, Inc., 119 N.M. 25 , 888 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Romero v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, ¶ 16 , 130 N.M. 610 , 28 P.3d 1151 , to support his position that 2 The fact that Badilla never attempted to provide the required notice of the alleged warranty’s failure reinforces our determination of the essence of the claim as one for personal injury. 4 the UCC limitation should apply.

2013Badilla relies on our limited holding in Fernandez v. Char-Li-Jon, Inc., 119 N.M. 25 , 888 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Romero v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, ¶ 16 , 130 N.M. 610 , 28 P.3d 1151 , to support his position that 2 The fact that Badilla never attempted to provide the required notice of the alleged warranty’s failure reinforces our determination of the essence of the claim as one for personal injury. 4 the UCC limitation should apply.

2013Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6 , 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (stating that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc., 2009-NMCA-081, ¶ 7 , 146 N.M. 717 , 213 P.3d 1146 (holding that “if no material issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal presents only a question of law, we apply de novo review”). {7} The UCC provides that “[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after

2013Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6 , 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (stating that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc., 2009-NMCA-081, ¶ 7 , 146 N.M. 717 , 213 P.3d 1146 (holding that “if no material issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal presents only a question of law, we apply de novo review”). {7} The UCC provides that “[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after

2013Badilla relies on our limited holding in Fernandez v. Char-Li-Jon, Inc., 119 N.M. 25 , 888 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Romero v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, ¶ 16 , 130 N.M. 610 , 28 P.3d 1151 , to support his position that 2 The fact that Badilla never attempted to provide the required notice of the alleged warranty’s failure reinforces our determination of the essence of the claim as one for personal injury. 4 the UCC limitation should apply.

2013Badilla relies on our limited holding in Fernandez v. Char-Li-Jon, Inc., 119 N.M. 25 , 888 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Romero v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, ¶ 16 , 130 N.M. 610 , 28 P.3d 1151 , to support his position that 2 The fact that Badilla never attempted to provide the required notice of the alleged warranty’s failure reinforces our determination of the essence of the claim as one for personal injury. 4 the UCC limitation should apply.

2013Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6 , 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (stating that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc., 2009-NMCA-081, ¶ 7 , 146 N.M. 717 , 213 P.3d 1146 (holding that “if no material issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal presents only a question of law, we apply de novo review”). {7} The UCC provides that “[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after

2013Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6 , 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (stating that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc., 2009-NMCA-081, ¶ 7 , 146 N.M. 717 , 213 P.3d 1146 (holding that “if no material issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal presents only a question of law, we apply de novo review”). {7} The UCC provides that “[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after

2013Ass’n, 689 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1984); Garcia v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980). {10} However, other jurisdictions have applied the tort limitations period, reasoning that the essence of the claim determines the applicable statute of limitation.

2013Ass’n, 689 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1984); Garcia v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980). {10} However, other jurisdictions have applied the tort limitations period, reasoning that the essence of the claim determines the applicable statute of limitation.

2003Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 613 , 845 P.2d at 136 . {34} In discussing the federal collateral order doctrine, the Court in Carrillo stated that the essence of the doctrine is the requirement “that the order sought to be reviewed implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.

2003Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 613 , 845 P.2d at 136 . {34} In discussing the federal collateral order doctrine, the Court in Carrillo stated that the essence of the doctrine is the requirement “that the order sought to be reviewed implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.

1994The application of this general principle to concrete cases in both of the cited decisions [Bull and Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 [, 57 S.Ct. 851 , 81 L.Ed. 1265 ] (1937)] is instructive as to the limited scope given to recoupment in tax litigation.

1994The application of this general principle to concrete cases in both of the cited decisions [Bull and Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 [, 57 S.Ct. 851 , 81 L.Ed. 1265 ] (1937)] is instructive as to the limited scope given to recoupment in tax litigation.

1994The United States Supreme Court set forth the basic doctrine, together with the essential limitations, in Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299-300 , 67 S.Ct. 271, 272-73 , 91 L.Ed. 296 (1946): The essence of the doctrine of recoupment is stated in [ Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 , 55 S.Ct. 695 , 79 L.Ed. 1421 (1935)]: "[R]ecoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded." 295 U.S. 247, 262 [, 55 S.Ct. 695, 700 , 79 L.Ed. 1421 ].

1994The United States Supreme Court set forth the basic doctrine, together with the essential limitations, in Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299-300 , 67 S.Ct. 271, 272-73 , 91 L.Ed. 296 (1946): The essence of the doctrine of recoupment is stated in [ Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 , 55 S.Ct. 695 , 79 L.Ed. 1421 (1935)]: "[R]ecoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded." 295 U.S. 247, 262 [, 55 S.Ct. 695, 700 , 79 L.Ed. 1421 ].

1982Traditional fifth amendment analysis involving this type of evidence has been one of distinguishing “communications” or “testimony” from “real or physical evidence.” See Schmerber, supra. Although this distinction is often a “helpful framework for analysis * * there are “many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn.” Id. 384 U.S. at 764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

1982Traditional fifth amendment analysis involving this type of evidence has been one of distinguishing “communications” or “testimony” from “real or physical evidence.” See Schmerber, supra. Although this distinction is often a “helpful framework for analysis * * there are “many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn.” Id. 384 U.S. at 764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

1975In Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 , 92 S.Ct. 431 , 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared that: “Griffin v. Illinois [ 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S. Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)] and its progeny establish the principle that the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners.

1975In Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 , 92 S.Ct. 431 , 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared that: “Griffin v. Illinois [ 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S. Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)] and its progeny establish the principle that the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners.

1975In Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 , 92 S.Ct. 431 , 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared that: “Griffin v. Illinois [ 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S. Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)] and its progeny establish the principle that the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners.

1975In Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 , 92 S.Ct. 431 , 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared that: “Griffin v. Illinois [ 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S. Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)] and its progeny establish the principle that the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners.

1967State v. Alls, 55 N.M. 168 , 228 P.2d 952 ; State v. Reed, 55 N.M. 231 , 230 P.2d 966 ; State ex rel.

1967State v. Alls, 55 N.M. 168 , 228 P.2d 952 ; State v. Reed, 55 N.M. 231 , 230 P.2d 966 ; State ex rel.

1967State v. Alls, 55 N.M. 168 , 228 P.2d 952 ; State v. Reed, 55 N.M. 231 , 230 P.2d 966 ; State ex rel.

1967State v. Alls, 55 N.M. 168 , 228 P.2d 952 ; State v. Reed, 55 N.M. 231 , 230 P.2d 966 ; State ex rel.