essence privilege in Indiana

1981The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) 167 Ind.App. 688, 691 , 340 N.E.2d 366 , 368: ‘In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a “criminal-type,” but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.’ (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely rela

1981The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) 167 Ind.App. 688, 691 , 340 N.E.2d 366 , 368: ‘In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a “criminal-type,” but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.’ (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely rela

1986A defendant, under T.R. 14(A), is entitled to implead a third-party defendant "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." The court in City of Elkhart v. Middleton (1976), 265 Ind. 514, 520 , 356 N.E.2d 207, 211 , described the typical situation in which a defendant may invoke the impleader provision of T.R. 14: ''The essence of the rule derives from the situation in which the third-party defendant's liability to the original defendant is contingent upon that defendant being held liable to the original plaintiff, where the original plaintiff could not

1986A defendant, under T.R. 14(A), is entitled to implead a third-party defendant "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." The court in City of Elkhart v. Middleton (1976), 265 Ind. 514, 520 , 356 N.E.2d 207, 211 , described the typical situation in which a defendant may invoke the impleader provision of T.R. 14: ''The essence of the rule derives from the situation in which the third-party defendant's liability to the original defendant is contingent upon that defendant being held liable to the original plaintiff, where the original plaintiff could not

1981The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) 167 Ind.App. 688, 691 , 340 N.E.2d 366 , 368: ‘In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a “criminal-type,” but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.’ (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely rela

1981The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) 167 Ind.App. 688, 691 , 340 N.E.2d 366 , 368: ‘In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a “criminal-type,” but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.’ (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely rela

1981The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) 167 Ind.App. 688, 691 , 340 N.E.2d 366 , 368: ‘In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a “criminal-type,” but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.’ (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely rela

1981The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) 167 Ind.App. 688, 691 , 340 N.E.2d 366 , 368: ‘In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a “criminal-type,” but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.’ (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely rela

1976The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) Ind. App., 340 N.E. 2d 366 , 368: “In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a ‘criminal-type,’ but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.” (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely related to the r

1976The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) Ind. App., 340 N.E. 2d 366 , 368: “In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a ‘criminal-type,’ but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.” (Citations omitted.) As to the automobile theft, we are of the opinion that this action was sufficiently closely related to the r

1959In the case of O’Brien v. State (1890), 125 Ind. 38 , 25 N. E. 137 , 9 L.

1959In the case of O’Brien v. State (1890), 125 Ind. 38 , 25 N. E. 137 , 9 L.

2025“The essence of the test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the working conditions are so unusually adverse that a reasonable employee in plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016“The essence of this exception is the foreseeability of the peculiar risk involved in the work and of the need for special precautions.” Id. (ci *1215 tation omitted).

2015“The essence of the requirement is that because a party need not object to questions on the grounds of admissibility when the deposition is taken, the party can ‘[w]ait and make his objection at trial or hearing when the deposition is read into evidence or otherwise used.’ ” Id. (quoting Augustine v. First Fed.

2012The instructions the court gave included several statements about a defendant’s “right to defend himself against attack -- the essence of the defense of self-defense.” Id. at 1071 .

2012Our Supreme Court found the instructions were adequate to instruct the jury and there was “no significant imbalance detrimental to the defendant.” Id.

2011This Court affirmed a denial of the request for a jury trial, stating that "the essence of the claim was for a judicial pronouncement that [the bank's] possessory lien was perfected and that the collateral could be liquidated" and that "[a]t its heart, this was a suit to foreclose a lien on property." Id. at 69 .

2011This Court affirmed a denial of the request for a jury trial, stating that “the essence of the claim was for a judicial pronouncement that [the bank’s] possesso-ry lien was perfected and that the collateral could be liquidated” and that “[a]t its heart, this was a suit to foreclose a lien on property.” Id. at 69 .

2009(App. at 392.) The City further alleges that it attempted to change the designee through the 2005 Economic Development Program. ( Id. ) It contends that any other agreement purporting to bind or restrict whom the City may select is void against public policy.

2005Put another way, the standard by which a constructive discharge is generally determined is an objective one: "whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit." Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 228 , 876 P.2d 1022 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Rockwell Internat., *736 Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 , 926 P.2d 1114 (1996).

2005Put another way, the standard by which a constructive discharge is generally determined is an objective one: "whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit." Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 228 , 876 P.2d 1022 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Rockwell Internat., *736 Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 , 926 P.2d 1114 (1996).

2005Put another way, the standard by which a constructive discharge is generally determined is an objective one: "whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit." Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 228 , 876 P.2d 1022 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Rockwell Internat., *736 Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 , 926 P.2d 1114 (1996).

2005Put another way, the standard by which a constructive discharge is generally determined is an objective one: "whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit." Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 228 , 876 P.2d 1022 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Rockwell Internat., *736 Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 , 926 P.2d 1114 (1996).

1999As this court explained in Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Purvis, 691 N.E.2d 1341 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, “liability is established only when, at the time of contracting, the employer should have foreseen that injury to others was ‘likely to happen.’ ” Id. at 1345-46 .

1999As this court explained in Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Purvis, 691 N.E.2d 1341 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, “liability is established only when, at the time of contracting, the employer should have foreseen that injury to others was ‘likely to happen.’ ” Id. at 1345-46 .

1999Exception Four: Probability of Injury Absent Due Precaution As the Court of Appeals majority noted, the due precaution exception 3 makes an employer “liable for the negligence of an independent contractor ‘where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken.’ ” Carie, 694 N.E.2d at 735 (quoting Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586 ). 4 This Court explained the exception in Bagley : The essence of this exception is the foreseeability of the peculiar risk involved in the work and of the need for special precautions.

1995Cummings, 173 Ind.App. at 387 , 363 N.E.2d at 1275 .

1995Cummings, 173 Ind.App. at 387 , 363 N.E.2d at 1275 .