essence claim in Illinois

2000In Gatlin, the Illinois Supreme Court comprehensively described the general principles governing the application of res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases: “ ‘When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.] This in essence is th

2000In Gatlin , the Illinois Supreme Court comprehensively described the general principles governing the application of res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases: "'When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.] This in essence is th

1984The essence of waiver was reiterated by this court in People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402 , 408: “We have consistently held that where review has once been had by a writ of error, *** any claim which might there have been raised, but was not, is considered waived.” (Emphasis added.) (See People v. La Frana, 4 Ill. 2d 261, 266 .) Thus, a party who fails to take an appeal, whether by careful choice, inadvertence, indigence, or as a result of fleeing the jurisdiction as here, may waive claims of error, but any right which may have existed to a post-conviction hearing on the constitutionality of impr

1981The essence of waiver was reiterated by this court in People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402 ,408: ‘We have consistently held that where review has once been had by a writ of error, * * * any claim which might there have been raised, but was not, is considered waived.’ (Emphasis added.) (See People v. LaFrana, 4 Ill. 2d 261, 266 .) Thus, a party who fails to take an appeal, whether by careful choice, inadvertence, indigence, or as a result of fleeing the jurisdiction as here, may waive claims of error, but any right which may have existed to a post-conviction hearing on the constitutionality of impr

1981(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co., 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenhach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) ( 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 .) In subsequent portions of the Metz case the court then uses the standard of “exclusive control” of the instrumentality as a requisite to the application of the doctrine.

1978(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co. 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant. *** Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law which must be decided by the court, but once this has been answered in the affirmative, it is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine whether the circumstantial evidence of negl

1981(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co., 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenhach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) ( 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 .) In subsequent portions of the Metz case the court then uses the standard of “exclusive control” of the instrumentality as a requisite to the application of the doctrine.

1978(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co. 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant. *** Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law which must be decided by the court, but once this has been answered in the affirmative, it is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine whether the circumstantial evidence of negl

2015The essence of the privilege is “ ‘the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961)). “[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right ‘to 45 1-11-0415 remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no pen

2015The essence of the privilege is “ ‘the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961)). “[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for

2015The essence of the privilege is “ ‘the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961)). “[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right ‘to 45 1-11-0415 remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no pen

2015The essence of the privilege is “ ‘the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961)). “[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for

2019“The essence of the inquiry concerning standing is whether the litigant *** is entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute or a particular issue.” Powell v. Dean Foods Co., 2012 IL 111714, ¶ 36 .

2018"The essence of the inquiry concerning standing is whether the litigant * * * is entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute or a particular issue." Powell v. Dean Foods Co. , 2012 IL 111714 , ¶ 36, 358 Ill.Dec. 333 , 965 N.E.2d 404 .

2014In Sheffler, we noted “a claim is for reparations when the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much for a service, while a claim is for civil damages when the essence of the complaint is that the utility has done something else to wrong the plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 42 (citing Flournoy v. Ameritech, 351 Ill.

2014In Sheffler, we noted “a claim is for reparations when the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much for a service, while a claim is for civil damages when the essence of the complaint is that the utility has done something else to wrong the plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 42 (citing Flournoy v. Ameritech, 351 Ill.

2012Id. ¶ 36 The essence of the inquiry concerning standing is whether the litigant, either in an individual capacity or in a representative capacity, is entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute or a particular issue.

2012Id. ¶ 36 The essence of the inquiry concerning standing is whether the litigant, either in an individual capacity or in a representative capacity, is entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute or a particular issue.

2008We noted in Healy, 133 Ill. 2d at 309 , that an action is against the state when there is “ ‘no allegation[ ] that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts.’ ” The essence of a claim for conversion is an allegation that the defendant engaged in an intentional, wrongful act.

2008We noted in Healy, 133 Ill.2d at 309 , 140 Ill.Dec. 368 , 549 N.E.2d 1240 , that an action is against the state when there is "`no allegation[ ] that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts.'" The essence of a claim for conversion is an allegation that the defendant engaged in an intentional, wrongful act.

2008Bowler, 376 Ill.

2008Bowler, 376 Ill.

2007It further explained the essence of waiver as follows: “ ‘We have consistently held that where review has once been had by a writ of error, *** any claim which might there have been raised, but was not, is considered waived.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Rose, 43 Ill. 2d at 279 , 253 N.E.2d at 461 , quoting People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402, 408 , 216 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1966).

2007It further explained the essence of waiver as follows: "'We have consistently held that where review has once been had by a writ of error, *** any claim which might there have been raised, but was not, is considered waived.'" (Emphasis in original.) Rose, 43 Ill. 2d at 279 , 253 N.E.2d at 461 , quoting People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402, 408 , 216 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1966).

2003Our supreme court said in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. , 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305 (1965) : "When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.] This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , and its pur

2003Nevertheless, res ipsa loquitur is ‘simply a rule of evidence relating to the sufficiency of plaintiffs proof.’ [Citation.]” Darrough v. Glendale Heights Community Hospital, 234 Ill.

1998In concluding that the ICC had original jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim, the court stated: “In determining whether an action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to section 72 [now sections 9 — 252 and 9 — 252.1] or within the circuit court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 73 [now section 5 — 201], courts have consistently focused on the nature of the relief sought rather than on the plaintiffs basis for seeking the relief. [Citation.] Where the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much for the service provided, the claim is for reparations. [Citation

1998In concluding that the ICC had original jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, the court stated: "In determining whether an action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to section 72 [now sections 9-252 and 9-252.1] or within the circuit court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 73 [now section 5-201], courts have consistently focused on the nature of the relief sought rather than on the plaintiff's basis for seeking the relief. [Citation.] Where the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much for the service provided, the claim is for reparations. [Citation.] W

1993App. 3d 494 , the court stated “the refusal of a tendered instruction is not error if the essence of the instruction is covered by other instructions which are given.” (Walker, 44 Ill.

1987The court stated that “the refusal of a tendered instruction is not error if the essence of the instruction is covered by other instructions which are given.” ( 44 Ill.

1979(Kingsley v. Roeder, 2 Ill. 2d 131 ; Davies v. Dayton, 298 Ill. 201 ; Smith v. Treat, 234 Ill. 552 .) When this has occurred, a vendor is prevented from treating a tardy payment as ground for forfeiture until he has first given vendee reasonable notice of his intention to thereafter demand strict compliance with the terms of the agreement.” (Lang v. Parks (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 223, 226 , 166 N.E.2d 10 .) The seller’s notice must definitely and specifically indicate to the purchaser that, contrary to past pattern, the time of the essence clause will be strictly enforced in the future.

1979(Kingsley v. Roeder, 2 Ill. 2d 131 ; Davies v. Dayton, 298 Ill. 201 ; Smith v. Treat, 234 Ill. 552 .) When this has occurred, a vendor is prevented from treating a tardy payment as ground for forfeiture until he has first given vendee reasonable notice of his intention to thereafter demand strict compliance with the terms of the agreement.” (Lang v. Parks (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 223, 226 , 166 N.E.2d 10 .) The seller’s notice must definitely and specifically indicate to the purchaser that, contrary to past pattern, the time of the essence clause will be strictly enforced in the future.

1978The requirements for res ipsa loquitur were set out by the supreme court in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 , as follows: “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.]

1978The requirements for res ipsa loquitur were set out by the supreme court in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 , as follows: “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.]