essence claim in Kansas

2023The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that issues 'once finally determined . . . cannot afterwards be litigated.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, 901 , 326 P.3d 1083 (2014).

2023The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that issues 'once finally determined . . . cannot afterwards be litigated.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, 901 , 326 P.3d 1083 (2014).

2017State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18 , Syl. ¶ 2, 106 P.3d 39 (2005).

2017State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18 , Syl. ¶ 2, 106 P.3d 39 (2005).

2016See State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 750, 760-61 , 368 P.3d 1065 (2016) (noting that any reasonable doubt about the meaning of a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant); State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 97 , 273 P.3d 701 (2012) (where there are “two reasonable and sensible interpretations of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires the court to interpret its meaning in favor of the accused”).

2016See State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 750, 760-61 , 368 P.3d 1065 (2016) (noting that any reasonable doubt about the meaning of a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant); State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 97 , 273 P.3d 701 (2012) (where there are “two reasonable and sensible interpretations of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires the court to interpret its meaning in favor of the accused”).

2015Here, the panel correctly stated that the totality of the circumstances paradigm was applicable, and it appeared to grasp the essence of that test when it declared: “ ‘Quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’ See State v. Toothman, 267 Kan. 412 , Syl. ¶ 5, 985 P.2d 701 (1999).” Molitor, 46 Kan.

2015Here, the panel correctly stated that the totality of the circumstances paradigm was applicable, and it appeared to grasp the essence of that test when it declared: “ ‘Quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’ See State v. Toothman, 267 Kan. 412 , Syl. ¶ 5, 985 P.2d 701 (1999).” Molitor, 46 Kan.

2015Here, the panel correctly stated that the totality of the circumstances paradigm was applicable, and it appeared to grasp the essence of that test when it declared: “ ‘Quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’ See State v. Toothman, 267 Kan. 412 , Syl. ¶ 5, 985 P.2d 701 (1999).” Molitor, 46 Kan.

2015Here, the panel correctly stated that the totality of the circumstances paradigm was applicable, and it appeared to grasp the essence of that test when it declared: "'Quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.' See State v. Toothman, 267 Kan. 412 , Syl. ¶ 5, 985 P.2d 701 (1999)." Molitor, 46 Kan.

2014The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that issues “once finally determined... cannot afterwards be litigated.” Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 61 , 379 P.2d 342 (1963).

2014The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that issues “once finally determined... cannot afterwards be litigated.” Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 61 , 379 P.2d 342 (1963).

2006See generally Herthel v. Barth, 148 Kan. 308 , Syl. ¶ 1, 81 P.2d 19 (1938) (where the essence of a claim is to seek the imposition of a constructive trust because of the trustee’s fraudulent conduct, the 2-year statute of limitations applies). “[T]he statute [of limitations in such an action] begins to run from the date the trust is repudiated, Flitch v. Boyle, 147 Kan. 600 , 78 P.2d 9 ; Allbert v. Allbert, 148 Kan. 527 , 83 P.2d 795 , and cases therein cited, or [as] the rule is . . . sometimes stated, . . . the statute does not begin to run from the date of demand on the trustee and repudiat

2006See generally Herthel v. Barth, 148 Kan. 308 , Syl. ¶ 1, 81 P.2d 19 (1938) (where the essence of a claim is to seek the imposition of a constructive trust because of the trustee’s fraudulent conduct, the 2-year statute of limitations applies). “[T]he statute [of limitations in such an action] begins to run from the date the trust is repudiated, Flitch v. Boyle, 147 Kan. 600 , 78 P.2d 9 ; Allbert v. Allbert, 148 Kan. 527 , 83 P.2d 795 , and cases therein cited, or [as] the rule is . . . sometimes stated, . . . the statute does not begin to run from the date of demand on the trustee and repudiat

2006See generally Herthel v. Barth, 148 Kan. 308 , Syl. ¶ 1, 81 P.2d 19 (1938) (where the essence of a claim is to seek the imposition of a constructive trust because of the trustee’s fraudulent conduct, the 2-year statute of limitations applies). “[T]he statute [of limitations in such an action] begins to run from the date the trust is repudiated, Flitch v. Boyle, 147 Kan. 600 , 78 P.2d 9 ; Allbert v. Allbert, 148 Kan. 527 , 83 P.2d 795 , and cases therein cited, or [as] the rule is . . . sometimes stated, . . . the statute does not begin to run from the date of demand on the trustee and repudiat

2006See generally Herthel v. Barth, 148 Kan. 308 , Syl. ¶ 1, 81 P.2d 19 (1938) (where the essence of a claim is to seek the imposition of a constructive trust because of the trustee’s fraudulent conduct, the 2-year statute of limitations applies). “[T]he statute [of limitations in such an action] begins to run from the date the trust is repudiated, Flitch v. Boyle, 147 Kan. 600 , 78 P.2d 9 ; Allbert v. Allbert, 148 Kan. 527 , 83 P.2d 795 , and cases therein cited, or [as] the rule is . . . sometimes stated, . . . the statute does not begin to run from the date of demand on the trustee and repudiat

1994In Tuley v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 252 Kan. 205 , Syl. ¶¶ 1-7, 843 P.2d 248 (1992), we said: “The common-law assumption of risk doctrine is restricted to cases involving employer-employee relationships.” “Within its very restricted periphery of application, the common-law defense of assumption of risk has not been altered by the adoption of comparative fault, K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-258a, and continues to constitute an absolute bar to recovery.” “Under the doctrine of assumed risk, one who voluntarily exposes oneself ... to a known or appreciated danger due to tire negligence of another m

1994In Tuley v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 252 Kan. 205 , Syl. ¶¶ 1-7, 843 P.2d 248 (1992), we said: “The common-law assumption of risk doctrine is restricted to cases involving employer-employee relationships.” “Within its very restricted periphery of application, the common-law defense of assumption of risk has not been altered by the adoption of comparative fault, K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-258a, and continues to constitute an absolute bar to recovery.” “Under the doctrine of assumed risk, one who voluntarily exposes oneself ... to a known or appreciated danger due to tire negligence of another m

1991Chipp v. Murray, 191 Kan. 73, 76 , 379 P.2d 297 (1963).

1991Chipp v. Murray, 191 Kan. 73, 76 , 379 P.2d 297 (1963).

1951That this contention lacks merit and cannot be upheld is demonstrated by a statement, to be found in the opinion of Bailey v. Resner, 168 Kan. 439 , 214 P. 2d 323 , which reads: “The last allegations to the effect that defendants’ acts were committed purposely and wantonly adds little if anything to the petition because wanton acts cannot be pleaded by merely alleging that a certain act was wantonly or purposely committed.

1951That this contention lacks merit and cannot be upheld is demonstrated by a statement, to be found in the opinion of Bailey v. Resner, 168 Kan. 439 , 214 P. 2d 323 , which reads: “The last allegations to the effect that defendants’ acts were committed purposely and wantonly adds little if anything to the petition because wanton acts cannot be pleaded by merely alleging that a certain act was wantonly or purposely committed.

1934As indicated above, the essence of the doctrine of election of remedy is “choice between two inconsistent rights.” (Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308 , opinion by Cardozo, J.) In the case under decision two distinct duties to the bank were violated, one by one individual, and the other by another individual.