essence rule in Montana

2005With remarkable consistency, the Court has articulated the essence of this principle for 116 years. ¶23 In Brothers v. Brothers (1924), 71 Mont. 378 , 230 P. 60 , Justice Rankin remarked “[n]o great abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to set aside a default need be shown to warrant a reversal, for the courts universally favor a trial on the merits.” Brothers, 71 Mont. at 379 , 230 P. at 61 .

2005With remarkable consistency, the Court has articulated the essence of this principle for 116 years. ¶23 In Brothers v. Brothers (1924), 71 Mont. 378 , 230 P. 60 , Justice Rankin remarked “[n]o great abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to set aside a default need be shown to warrant a reversal, for the courts universally favor a trial on the merits.” Brothers, 71 Mont. at 379 , 230 P. at 61 .

2005This led to the later statement in Madson v. Petrie Tractor & Equipment Co. (1938), 106 Mont. 382, 388 , 77 P.2d 1038, 1040 , Tsjince courts universally favor trial on the merits, slight abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside a default judgment is sufficient to justify a reversal of the order.” Thus, a new standard was born and this Court has since said that a slight abuse of discretion is all that is required to reverse a District Court order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment.

2005This led to the later statement in Madson v. Petrie Tractor & Equipment Co. (1938), 106 Mont. 382, 388 , 77 P.2d 1038, 1040 , Tsjince courts universally favor trial on the merits, slight abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside a default judgment is sufficient to justify a reversal of the order.” Thus, a new standard was born and this Court has since said that a slight abuse of discretion is all that is required to reverse a District Court order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment.

1999“The choice of which statute of limitation should apply ultimately rests on a characterization of the essence of the claim.” Thiel, 218 Mont. at 210 , 710 P.2d at 38 .

1999“The choice of which statute of limitation should apply ultimately rests on a characterization of the essence of the claim.” Thiel, 218 Mont. at 210 , 710 P.2d at 38 .

1995Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. at 694-95 .

1995Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. at 694-95 .

1988We find the essence of a claim has been pleaded though not artfully described.” Morse, 696 P.2d at 430 .

1988We should look to our sister state of Idaho, which in Ranta v. Rake (1967), 91 Idaho 376 , 421 P.2d 747 , pointed out that the liberal policy of avoiding releases where there are unknown injuries is guided by the following factors: “(a) the peculiar dignity the law accords the human person as distinguished from articles of commerce; (b) the very real possibility of being mistaken about the long range effects of damage to human tissue; (c) the inequality of the bargaining positions of the contracting parties; and, (d) the amount of consideration received compared to the risk of the existence of

1988We should look to our sister state of Idaho, which in Ranta v. Rake (1967), 91 Idaho 376 , 421 P.2d 747 , pointed out that the liberal policy of avoiding releases where there are unknown injuries is guided by the following factors: “(a) the peculiar dignity the law accords the human person as distinguished from articles of commerce; (b) the very real possibility of being mistaken about the long range effects of damage to human tissue; (c) the inequality of the bargaining positions of the contracting parties; and, (d) the amount of consideration received compared to the risk of the existence of

1988The essence of the rule is that the wording of the release is not conclusive; it is a question of fact whether the parties to a release actually intended to discharge such liability . . .’ ” Finch v. Carlton (1974), 84 Wash.2d 140 , 524 P.2d 898, 900 .

1988The essence of the rule is that the wording of the release is not conclusive; it is a question of fact whether the parties to a release actually intended to discharge such liability . . .’ ” Finch v. Carlton (1974), 84 Wash.2d 140 , 524 P.2d 898, 900 .

1983If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached . . .” Michigan v. Long, - U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 3476, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1214 . “. . .

1980Considerations which lead us not to favor repeal of statutes by implication, United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-9 , [ 60 S.Ct. 182, 188 , 84 L.Ed. 181 ]; United States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 631 , [ 58 S.Ct. 390, 392 , 82 L.Ed. 488 ]; Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503-5 , [ 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 353 , 80 L.Ed. 351 ], should be at least as persuasive when the question is one of the nullification of state power by Congressional legislation. “. . .

1980Considerations which lead us not to favor repeal of statutes by implication, United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-9 , [ 60 S.Ct. 182, 188 , 84 L.Ed. 181 ]; United States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 631 , [ 58 S.Ct. 390, 392 , 82 L.Ed. 488 ]; Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503-5 , [ 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 353 , 80 L.Ed. 351 ], should be at least as persuasive when the question is one of the nullification of state power by Congressional legislation. “. . .

1980Considerations which lead us not to favor repeal of statutes by implication, United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-9 , [ 60 S.Ct. 182, 188 , 84 L.Ed. 181 ]; United States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 631 , [ 58 S.Ct. 390, 392 , 82 L.Ed. 488 ]; Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503-5 , [ 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 353 , 80 L.Ed. 351 ], should be at least as persuasive when the question is one of the nullification of state power by Congressional legislation. “. . .

1980Considerations which lead us not to favor repeal of statutes by implication, United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-9 , [ 60 S.Ct. 182, 188 , 84 L.Ed. 181 ]; United States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 631 , [ 58 S.Ct. 390, 392 , 82 L.Ed. 488 ]; Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503-5 , [ 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 353 , 80 L.Ed. 351 ], should be at least as persuasive when the question is one of the nullification of state power by Congressional legislation. “. . .

1980The essence of the rule upon which we rely here, and of the rule which we think inheres in any of the United States Supreme Court decisions on the subject is set out in Penn Dairies v. Milk Control *215 Comm’n (1943), 318 U.S. 261, 275 , 63 S.Ct. 617, 623-24 , 87 L.Ed. 748, 756-57 ; “An unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command, read in the light of its history, remains ambiguous.

1980The essence of the rule upon which we rely here, and of the rule which we think inheres in any of the United States Supreme Court decisions on the subject is set out in Penn Dairies v. Milk Control *215 Comm’n (1943), 318 U.S. 261, 275 , 63 S.Ct. 617, 623-24 , 87 L.Ed. 748, 756-57 ; “An unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command, read in the light of its history, remains ambiguous.

1978In further expanding the application of the Davis rule, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation (9th Cir. 1969), 409 F.2d 1263 , stated: “* * * Davis distills the essence of the rule to be that the manufacturer is under a duty to warn of dangers in ‘nondefective’ but potentially harmful products. * * * if the product is unreasonably dangerous and a warning should be given, but is not given, then the product is automatically ‘defective’ * * 409 F.2d 1271 .

1978In further expanding the application of the Davis rule, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation (9th Cir.1969), 409 F.2d 1263 , stated: "* * * Davis distills the essence of the rule to be that the manufacturer is under a duty to warn of dangers in `nondefective' but potentially harmful products. * * * if the product is unreasonably dangerous and a warning should be given, but is not given, then the product *719 is automatically `defective' * * *." 409 F.2d 1271 .

1961In the case of Clawson v. Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 494 , 208 P. 924, 926 , Mr. Justice Galen, in June of 1922, quoting from Babbitt, The Law Applied to Motor Vehicles by Blalcemore, and speaking for the court, stated: “ ‘The essence of the doctrine of respondeat superior is that of agency.

1961In the case of Clawson v. Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 494 , 208 P. 924, 926 , Mr. Justice Galen, in June of 1922, quoting from Babbitt, The Law Applied to Motor Vehicles by Blalcemore, and speaking for the court, stated: “ ‘The essence of the doctrine of respondeat superior is that of agency.

1916The very essence of this doctrine is that the party relying upon the estoppel was misled to his prejudice by reason of the silence of the other party, when in equity and good conscience he ought to have spoken, or by reason of the affirmative acts or conduct of such other party.” (Kennedy v. The Grand Fraternity, 36 Mont. 325 , 25 L.