essence doctrine in Alabama

1973Co., 206 Ala. 368 , 89 So. 518 (1921), the court wrote that: “The essence of the inquiry of abandonment vel non of an easement by the owner is his intention.

1973Co., 206 Ala. 368 , 89 So. 518 (1921), the court wrote that: “The essence of the inquiry of abandonment vel non of an easement by the owner is his intention.

1982The element of continuity is as essential as any other of adverse possession: “Indeed, ‘the continuity of the adverse possession is the very essence of the doctrine and policy of the statutes of limitation,’ for ‘whenever a party quits the possession the seisin of the true owner is restored, and a subsequent wrongful entry constitutes a new disseisin.’ ” (Snow v. Bray, 198 Ala. 398 , 73 So. 542 , quoting from Henry v. Brown, 143 Ala. 446 , 39 So. 325 .) And in Hoyle v. Mann, 144 Ala. 516, 522 , 41 So. 835 (1905), this Court, writing to the element of continuity, stated: “The very gist of the c

1963Indeed, ‘the continuity of the adverse possession is the very essence of the doctrine and policy of the statutes of limitation,’ for ‘whenever a party quits the possession the seisin of the true owner is restored, and a subsequent wrongful entry constitutes a new disseisin.’ Henry v. Brown, 143 Ala. 446 , 39 South. 325 .” The Court continued: that a temporary absence of actual possession may not necessarily destroy continuity; but generally it is a question for the jury.

1983Mandlebaum v. McDonell , 29 Mich. 78 , 18 Am.Rep. 61 , 73, et seq., contains a discriminative and instructive treatment of the subject. 1 . . .

1922Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 , 18 Am.

1916It is familiar doctrine, too, that, while the fact that at times there may be no actual possession does not necessarily destroy continuity, the inference of continuity must be rested upon proof of acts of possession naturally indicating continuity of claim (Hollingsworth v. Walker, 98 Ala. 543 , 13 South. 6 ), considered in connection with the lapse of time allowed to intervene between successive acts (Farley v. Smith, 39 Ala. 38 ), and is generally a question for the jury.

1904“Moreover, the continuity of the adverse possession is the very essence of the doctrine and policy of the statutes of limitation.” The doctrine of continuity rests upon the principle that, “"Whenever a party quits the possession the seisin of the true owner is restored, and a subsequent wrongful entry constitutes a new disseisin.” — Farley v. Smith, 39 Ala. 38 .

2004"Nevertheless, the owner of an easement may terminate it by abandonment, and the essence of the inquiry is the owner's intention, and `lapse of time and nonuser are evidentiary of an intention to abandon, and, when considered with other evidence of such intention, may be entitled to great weight according to the circumstances.'" Alabama Power Co. v. Daily , 31 Ala.App. 441 , 443 , 18 So.2d 142 , 143-44 (1944) (quoting Western Union Tel.

2004"Nevertheless, the owner of an easement may terminate it by abandonment, and the essence of the inquiry is the owner's intention, and `lapse of time and nonuser are evidentiary of an intention to abandon, and, when considered with other evidence of such intention, may be entitled to great weight according to the circumstances.'" Alabama Power Co. v. Daily , 31 Ala.App. 441 , 443 , 18 So.2d 142 , 143-44 (1944) (quoting Western Union Tel.

1986Barry v. Thomas, 273 Ala. 527 , 142 So. 918 (1962).

1986Barry v. Thomas, 273 Ala. 527 , 142 So. 918 (1962).

1982The element of continuity is as essential as any other of adverse possession: “Indeed, ‘the continuity of the adverse possession is the very essence of the doctrine and policy of the statutes of limitation,’ for ‘whenever a party quits the possession the seisin of the true owner is restored, and a subsequent wrongful entry constitutes a new disseisin.’ ” (Snow v. Bray, 198 Ala. 398 , 73 So. 542 , quoting from Henry v. Brown, 143 Ala. 446 , 39 So. 325 .) And in Hoyle v. Mann, 144 Ala. 516, 522 , 41 So. 835 (1905), this Court, writing to the element of continuity, stated: “The very gist of the c

1982The element of continuity is as essential as any other of adverse possession: “Indeed, ‘the continuity of the adverse possession is the very essence of the doctrine and policy of the statutes of limitation,’ for ‘whenever a party quits the possession the seisin of the true owner is restored, and a subsequent wrongful entry constitutes a new disseisin.’ ” (Snow v. Bray, 198 Ala. 398 , 73 So. 542 , quoting from Henry v. Brown, 143 Ala. 446 , 39 So. 325 .) And in Hoyle v. Mann, 144 Ala. 516, 522 , 41 So. 835 (1905), this Court, writing to the element of continuity, stated: “The very gist of the c

1982It would be a strange principle then, which would allow a man to go on the land, set up adverse possession, and then leave it, and claim that his possession remained adverse, merely because he intended to return.” The Court went on to require that one leaving the land must “keep his flag flying and present a hostile front to adverse pretensions” leaving “under circumstances in dicating that he has not left possession.” If a person evacuated a place, “leaving no indicia of a continuing possession,” observed this Court in Perry v. Lawson, 112 Ala. 480, 484 , 20 So. 611 (1895), “this would be an

1982It would be a strange principle then, which would allow a man to go on the land, set up adverse possession, and then leave it, and claim that his possession remained adverse, merely because he intended to return.” The Court went on to require that one leaving the land must “keep his flag flying and present a hostile front to adverse pretensions” leaving “under circumstances in dicating that he has not left possession.” If a person evacuated a place, “leaving no indicia of a continuing possession,” observed this Court in Perry v. Lawson, 112 Ala. 480, 484 , 20 So. 611 (1895), “this would be an

1982The element of continuity is as essential as any other of adverse possession: “Indeed, ‘the continuity of the adverse possession is the very essence of the doctrine and policy of the statutes of limitation,’ for ‘whenever a party quits the possession the seisin of the true owner is restored, and a subsequent wrongful entry constitutes a new disseisin.’ ” (Snow v. Bray, 198 Ala. 398 , 73 So. 542 , quoting from Henry v. Brown, 143 Ala. 446 , 39 So. 325 .) And in Hoyle v. Mann, 144 Ala. 516, 522 , 41 So. 835 (1905), this Court, writing to the element of continuity, stated: “The very gist of the c

1982The element of continuity is as essential as any other of adverse possession: “Indeed, ‘the continuity of the adverse possession is the very essence of the doctrine and policy of the statutes of limitation,’ for ‘whenever a party quits the possession the seisin of the true owner is restored, and a subsequent wrongful entry constitutes a new disseisin.’ ” (Snow v. Bray, 198 Ala. 398 , 73 So. 542 , quoting from Henry v. Brown, 143 Ala. 446 , 39 So. 325 .) And in Hoyle v. Mann, 144 Ala. 516, 522 , 41 So. 835 (1905), this Court, writing to the element of continuity, stated: “The very gist of the c

1982It would be a strange principle then, which would allow a man to go on the land, set up adverse possession, and then leave it, and claim that his possession remained adverse, merely because he intended to return.” The Court went on to require that one leaving the land must “keep his flag flying and present a hostile front to adverse pretensions” leaving “under circumstances in dicating that he has not left possession.” If a person evacuated a place, “leaving no indicia of a continuing possession,” observed this Court in Perry v. Lawson, 112 Ala. 480, 484 , 20 So. 611 (1895), “this would be an

1979Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Union Trust Co., 207 Ala. 138 , 92 So. 254 (1922); Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517 , 161 So. 526 (1935).

1979Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Union Trust Co., 207 Ala. 138 , 92 So. 254 (1922); Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517 , 161 So. 526 (1935).

1979Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Union Trust Co., 207 Ala. 138 , 92 So. 254 (1922); Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517 , 161 So. 526 (1935).

1979Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Union Trust Co., 207 Ala. 138 , 92 So. 254 (1922); Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517 , 161 So. 526 (1935).

1961Wetzel v. Hobbs, 249 Ala. 434 , 31 So.2d 639 .

1961Wetzel v. Hobbs, 249 Ala. 434 , 31 So.2d 639 .

1955In Epstein v. United States, 6 Cir., 174 F.2d 754, 764 , it is said: “ * * * There can be no doubt that directors are fiduciaries. ‘Their powers are powers in trust. * * * Their dealings * * * are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director * * * not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. * * * The essence of the test is whether or not under all of the circumstances the transaction

1955We proceed to refer to some of the authorities which we consider applicable. *412 In Epstein v. United States, 6 Cir., 174 F.2d 754, 764 , it is said: "* * * There can be no doubt that directors are fiduciaries. `Their powers are powers in trust. * * * Their dealings * * * are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director * * * not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. * * * The ess

1955In Epstein v. United States, 6 Cir., 174 F.2d 754, 764 , it is said: “ * * * There can be no doubt that directors are fiduciaries. ‘Their powers are powers in trust. * * * Their dealings * * * are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director * * * not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. * * * The essence of the test is whether or not under all of the circumstances the transaction

1955In Epstein v. United States, 6 Cir., 174 F.2d 754, 764 , it is said: “ * * * There can be no doubt that directors are fiduciaries. ‘Their powers are powers in trust. * * * Their dealings * * * are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director * * * not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. * * * The essence of the test is whether or not under all of the circumstances the transaction

1955In Epstein v. United States, 6 Cir., 174 F.2d 754, 764 , it is said: “ * * * There can be no doubt that directors are fiduciaries. ‘Their powers are powers in trust. * * * Their dealings * * * are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director * * * not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. * * * The essence of the test is whether or not under all of the circumstances the transaction

1955In Epstein v. United States, 6 Cir., 174 F.2d 754, 764 , it is said: “ * * * There can be no doubt that directors are fiduciaries. ‘Their powers are powers in trust. * * * Their dealings * * * are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director * * * not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. * * * The essence of the test is whether or not under all of the circumstances the transaction

1930Knaus v. Dreher, 84 Ala. 320 , 4 So. 287 ; Martin v. Martin, 123 Ala. 191 , 26 So. 525 ; Everett v. Estes, 189 Ala. 60 , 66 So. 615 ; Lewis v. Davis, 198 Ala. 81 , 73 So. 419 .

1930Knaus v. Dreher, 84 Ala. 320 , 4 So. 287 ; Martin v. Martin, 123 Ala. 191 , 26 So. 525 ; Everett v. Estes, 189 Ala. 60 , 66 So. 615 ; Lewis v. Davis, 198 Ala. 81 , 73 So. 419 .

1930Knaus v. Dreher, 84 Ala. 320 , 4 So. 287 ; Martin v. Martin, 123 Ala. 191 , 26 So. 525 ; Everett v. Estes, 189 Ala. 60 , 66 So. 615 ; Lewis v. Davis, 198 Ala. 81 , 73 So. 419 .

1930Knaus v. Dreher, 84 Ala. 320 , 4 So. 287 ; Martin v. Martin, 123 Ala. 191 , 26 So. 525 ; Everett v. Estes, 189 Ala. 60 , 66 So. 615 ; Lewis v. Davis, 198 Ala. 81 , 73 So. 419 .

1930Knaus v. Dreher, 84 Ala. 320 , 4 So. 287 ; Martin v. Martin, 123 Ala. 191 , 26 So. 525 ; Everett v. Estes, 189 Ala. 60 , 66 So. 615 ; Lewis v. Davis, 198 Ala. 81 , 73 So. 419 .

1916It is familiar doctrine, too, that, while the fact that at times there may be no actual possession does not necessarily destroy continuity, the inference of continuity must be rested upon proof of acts of possession naturally indicating continuity of claim (Hollingsworth v. Walker, 98 Ala. 543 , 13 South. 6 ), considered in connection with the lapse of time allowed to intervene between successive acts (Farley v. Smith, 39 Ala. 38 ), and is generally a question for the jury.