essence inquiry in New Jersey

2026R. 4:46-2 outlines the circumstances under which summary judgment should be granted: if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. [R. 4:46-2(c).] In Brill, our Supreme Court explained that “the essence of the inquiry [is] whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one- sided that one party must prevail as a

2026Navatta and Jack Navatta Trust by Roseann Abrahamsen, Executrix/Trustee v. Dir., Div. of Taxation Docket No. 003279-2023 Page -10- In Brill, our Supreme Court explained that “the essence of the inquiry [is] whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one- sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 142 N.J. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).

2026R. 4:46-2 outlines the circumstances under which summary judgment should be granted: if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. [R. 4:46-2(c).] In Brill, our Supreme Court explained that “the essence of the inquiry [is] whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one- sided that one party must prevail as a

2026Navatta and Jack Navatta Trust by Roseann Abrahamsen, Executrix/Trustee v. Dir., Div. of Taxation Docket No. 003279-2023 Page -10- In Brill, our Supreme Court explained that “the essence of the inquiry [is] whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one- sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 142 N.J. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).

2024"The essence of this standard is 'that the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture—must be taken into account." Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

2024"The essence of this standard is 'that the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture—must be taken into account." Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

1995Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. at 417 , 101 S.Ct. at 695 , 66 L.Ed. 2d at 629 ; accord State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 [ 517 A. 2d 859 ] (1986) (adopting totality-of-circumstances standard announced in Cortez ). [ Thomas, supra, 110 N.J. at 678 , 542 A. 2d 912 .] Vause's observations, considered in light of his training and experience, supported a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaging in a drug transaction.

1995Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. at 417 , 101 S.Ct. at 695 , 66 L.Ed. 2d at 629 ; accord State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 [ 517 A. 2d 859 ] (1986) (adopting totality-of-circumstances standard announced in Cortez ). [ Thomas, supra, 110 N.J. at 678 , 542 A. 2d 912 .] Vause's observations, considered in light of his training and experience, supported a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaging in a drug transaction.

2024"The essence of this standard is 'that the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture—must be taken into account." Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

2024"The essence of this standard is 'that the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture—must be taken into account." Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

2018The essence of the doctrine is that "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings." Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 (1949)).

2012In Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 , 777 A. 2d 19 (2001), the Supreme Court described the doctrine of unclean hands as follows: The essence of that doctrine, which is "discretionary on the part of the court," Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 238 [ 704 A. 2d 913 ] (1998), is that "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings." A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 [ 66 A. 2d 319 ] (1949).

2018The doctrine "gives expression to the equitable principle that a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit." Ibid. (quoting Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 511 (1981)).

2012"In simple parlance, it merely gives expression to the equitable principle that a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit." Faustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 511 [ 427 A. 2d 1105 ] (1981).

2020Super. at 113 (quoting Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 345 (2009)).

2016The essence of the doctrine of unclean hands, "'which is discretionary on the part of the court, is that a suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings.'" Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 345 (2009) (citations omitted). 19 A-2649-13T4 Defendant argues that plaintiff initiated the foreclosure action with unclean hands when it engaged in the practice of "dual tracking." Dual tracking is the practice of a mortgagor initiating foreclosure proceedings while also negotiating a mortgage modification.

2001Finally, we reject appellant's argument that retroactive application of Chapter 73 imposes a "manifest injustice." "The essence of the inquiry is whether the affected party relied, to his or her prejudice, on the law that is now to be changed as a result of the retroactive application of the statute, and whether the consequences of this reliance are so deleterious and irrevocable that it would be unfair to apply the statute retroactively." Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 523-24 , 432 A. 2d 80 .

2001Finally, we reject appellant's argument that retroactive application of Chapter 73 imposes a "manifest injustice." "The essence of the inquiry is whether the affected party relied, to his or her prejudice, on the law that is now to be changed as a result of the retroactive application of the statute, and whether the consequences of this reliance are so deleterious and irrevocable that it would be unfair to apply the statute retroactively." Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 523-24 , 432 A. 2d 80 .

2014The language of the applicable statute is couched in terms similar to those used to describe the doctrine of forum non conveniens, requiring that the current forum be “inconvenient” and the other forum “appropriate.” Compare D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 225 N.J.Super. 250, 259, 542 A.2d 44 (App.Div.1988), affd, 115 N.J. 491 , 559 A.2d 420 (1989) (describing “the essence of the doctrine” of forum non conveniens as allowing a court to “decline jurisdiction whenever the ends of justice” demonstrate the chosen forum “would be inappropriate”) with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-71(b) (requiring that “[bj

2014The language of the applicable statute is couched in terms similar to those used to describe the doctrine of forum non conveniens, requiring that the current forum be “inconvenient” and the other forum “appropriate.” Compare D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 225 N.J.Super. 250, 259, 542 A.2d 44 (App.Div.1988), affd, 115 N.J. 491 , 559 A.2d 420 (1989) (describing “the essence of the doctrine” of forum non conveniens as allowing a court to “decline jurisdiction whenever the ends of justice” demonstrate the chosen forum “would be inappropriate”) with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-71(b) (requiring that “[bj

2018The essence of the doctrine is that "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings." Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 (1949)).

2012In Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 , 777 A. 2d 19 (2001), the Supreme Court described the doctrine of unclean hands as follows: The essence of that doctrine, which is "discretionary on the part of the court," Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 238 [ 704 A. 2d 913 ] (1998), is that "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings." A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 [ 66 A. 2d 319 ] (1949).

2012In Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 , 777 A. 2d 19 (2001), the Supreme Court described the doctrine of unclean hands as follows: The essence of that doctrine, which is "discretionary on the part of the court," Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 238 [ 704 A. 2d 913 ] (1998), is that "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings." A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 [ 66 A. 2d 319 ] (1949).

2012In Borough of Princeton v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 , 777 A. 2d 19 (2001), the Supreme Court described the doctrine of unclean hands as follows: The essence of that doctrine, which is "discretionary on the part of the court," Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 238 [ 704 A. 2d 913 ] (1998), is that "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings." A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 [ 66 A. 2d 319 ] (1949).

2000Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, [ ] 330 U.S. 501 , 67 S.Ct. 839 , 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947) [footnote omitted], the Appellate Division held: Although phrased in a variety of ways, the essence of the doctrine is that a court may decline jurisdiction whenever the ends of justice indicate a trial in the forum selected by the plaintiff would be inappropriate.

2000Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, [ ] 330 U.S. 501 , 67 S.Ct. 839 , 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947) [footnote omitted], the Appellate Division held: Although phrased in a variety of ways, the essence of the doctrine is that a court may decline jurisdiction whenever the ends of justice indicate a trial in the forum selected by the plaintiff would be inappropriate.

2020"The essence of the doctrine of unclean hands, 'which is discretionary on the part of the court, is that a suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings.'" Curcio, 444 N.J.

2018We address these arguments in turn. i. "The essence of the doctrine of unclean hands, '. . . is that a suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings.'" U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Curcio, 444 N.J.

1992The essence of this inquiry is whether the affected party relied, to his or her prejudice, on the law that is now to be changed as a result of the retroactive application of the statute, and whether the consequences of this reliance are so deleterious and irrevocable that it would be unfair to apply the statute retroactively. [Ibid, (quoting Gibbons, supra, 86 N.J. at 523-24 , 432 A2d 80 ).] We noted in Edgewater that the “manifest-injustice” standard involved a “weighing process” similar to the due-process analysis espoused in Rothman, supra, 65 N.J. at 225-26 , 320 A 2d 496.

1992The essence of this inquiry is whether the affected party relied, to his or her prejudice, on the law that is now to be changed as a result of the retroactive application of the statute, and whether the consequences of this reliance are so deleterious and irrevocable that it would be unfair to apply the statute retroactively. [ Ibid. (quoting Gibbons, supra, 86 N.J. at 523-24 , 432 A. 2d 80 ).] We noted in Edgewater that the "manifest-injustice" standard involved a "weighing process" similar to the due-process analysis espoused in Rothman, supra, 65 N.J. at 225-26 , 320 A. 2d 496 .

1953The essence of the inquiry is whether in obtaining the confession there was observance of “that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,” for “the aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether, true or false.” Lisenba v. People of the State of California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 , 62 S. Ct. 280, 290 , 86 L.

1953The essence of the inquiry is whether in obtaining the confession there was observance of “that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,” for “the aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether, true or false.” Lisenba v. People of the State of California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 , 62 S. Ct. 280, 290 , 86 L.

1953As stated in State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99 (1953): "The essence of the inquiry is whether in obtaining the confession there was observance of `that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,' for `the aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false,' Lisenba v. People of the State of California, 314 U.S. 219 , 62 S.Ct. 280 , 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941)." "Whether a statement or confession is, in fact, voluntary depends on the facts of the individual case and the

1953And "Whether a statement or confession is, in fact, voluntary, depends on the facts of the individual case and the determination of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal where the evidence is adequate to sustain it." State v. Cooper, supra, 10 N.J., at 550 .

2024Paradiso v. Mazejy, 3 N.J. 110, 114-15 (1949).

2023Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678 . "[T]he validity of the pat-down [is] an independent inquiry from the order to step out of the vehicle." State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 609 (1994) (citing PA. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)).

2023Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678 . "[T]he validity of the pat-down [is] an independent inquiry from the order to step out of the vehicle." State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 609 (1994) (citing PA. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)).