essence claim in California

1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the

1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the

1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the

1985(Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 405, 419 [ 241 P.2d 66 ].) Well-established principles of corporations law hold that a “director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent.” (Id., at p. 418.) “[Directors’] dealings with the corporation are *32 subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director . . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the

2023Each member of the conspiracy becomes liable for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all damages caused thereby.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823 (Berg & Berg).) Civil conspiracy claims are subject to the principle “known as the ‘agent’s immunity rule,’ which establishes that ‘an agent is not liable for conspiring with the principal when the agent is acting in an official capacity on behalf of the principal.’ ” (Berg & Berg, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 ; see also Black v. Bank of America (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th

2023Each member of the conspiracy becomes liable for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all damages caused thereby.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823 (Berg & Berg).) Civil conspiracy claims are subject to the principle “known as the ‘agent’s immunity rule,’ which establishes that ‘an agent is not liable for conspiring with the principal when the agent is acting in an official capacity on behalf of the principal.’ ” (Berg & Berg, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 ; see also Black v. Bank of America (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th

2017Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as 'the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.' [Citations.] Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.' [Citations.]" ( Masson v. New Yorker Magazine (1991) 501 U.S. 496 , 516-517, 111 S.Ct. 2419 , 115 L.Ed.2d 447 ; see also Summit Bank v. Rogers, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 697 , 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 .) Cosby would have us conclude, as a matter of law, that the gist or sting of th

2017Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as 'the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.' [Citations.] Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.' [Citations.]" ( Masson v. New Yorker Magazine (1991) 501 U.S. 496 , 516-517, 111 S.Ct. 2419 , 115 L.Ed.2d 447 ; see also Summit Bank v. Rogers, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 697 , 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 .) Cosby would have us conclude, as a matter of law, that the gist or sting of th

2014(See Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 463 [noting fees denied in Goldstein because attorney sought compensation from a attorney-client relationship that professional rules prohibited].) Here, in contrast, the essence of Stanton’s representation of Don was proper – only his efforts to ensure his payment of his contingency fee were wrongful.

2013(See Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 463 [noting fees denied in Goldstein because attorney sought compensation from a attorney-client relationship that professional rules prohibited].) Here, in contrast, the essence of Stanton’s representation of Don was proper – only his efforts to ensure his payment of his contingency fee were wrongful.

1983Tt is *702 obviously critically important that a defendant and his attorney be permitted to participate in decisions as to what testimony is to be reread to the jury; the essence of the error in this action is its tendency to deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at this critical stage of the proceedings. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-849 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ]; see also People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 128 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 96 ]; People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 ]

1983Tt is *702 obviously critically important that a defendant and his attorney be permitted to participate in decisions as to what testimony is to be reread to the jury; the essence of the error in this action is its tendency to deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at this critical stage of the proceedings. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-849 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ]; see also People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 128 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 96 ]; People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 ]

1945(Reiniger v. Hassell, 216 Cal. 209, 211 [ 13 P.2d 737 ]; Tuso v. Green, 194 Cal. 574, 582 [ 229 P. 327 ].) The essence of the rule denying recovery for losses which could have been prevented by the reasonable efforts and expenditures of plaintiff is that his conduct rather than that of defendants proximately caused such losses." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, in the instant case the findings made, included by necessary implication, a finding that there were no other substitute machines available to plaintiff, otherwise the damages found to have been suffered would not have been the direct and pro

1945(Reiniger v. Hassell, 216 Cal. 209, 211 [ 13 P.2d 737 ]; Tuso v. Green, 194 Cal. 574, 582 [ 229 P. 327 ].) The essence of the rule denying recovery for losses which could have been prevented by the reasonable efforts and expenditures of plaintiff is that his conduct rather than that of defendants proximately caused such losses." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, in the instant case the findings made, included by necessary implication, a finding that there were no other substitute machines available to plaintiff, otherwise the damages found to have been suffered would not have been the direct and pro

1945(Reiniger v. Hassell, 216 Cal. 209, 211 [ 13 P.2d 737 ]; Tuso v. Green, 194 Cal. 574, 582 [ 229 P. 327 ].) The essence of the rule denying recovery for losses which could have been prevented by the reasonable efforts and expenditures of plaintiff is that his conduct rather than that of defendants proximately caused such losses." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, in the instant case the findings made, included by necessary implication, a finding that there were no other substitute machines available to plaintiff, otherwise the damages found to have been suffered would not have been the direct and pro

1945(Reiniger v. Hassell, 216 Cal. 209, 211 [ 13 P.2d 737 ]; Tuso v. Green, 194 Cal. 574, 582 [ 229 P. 327 ].) The essence of the rule denying recovery for losses which could have been prevented by the reasonable efforts and expenditures of plaintiff is that his conduct rather than that of defendants proximately caused such losses." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, in the instant case the findings made, included by necessary implication, a finding that there were no other substitute machines available to plaintiff, otherwise the damages found to have been suffered would not have been the direct and pro

1983Tt is *702 obviously critically important that a defendant and his attorney be permitted to participate in decisions as to what testimony is to be reread to the jury; the essence of the error in this action is its tendency to deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at this critical stage of the proceedings. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-849 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ]; see also People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 128 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 96 ]; People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 ]

1983Tt is *702 obviously critically important that a defendant and his attorney be permitted to participate in decisions as to what testimony is to be reread to the jury; the essence of the error in this action is its tendency to deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at this critical stage of the proceedings. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-849 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ]; see also People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 128 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 96 ]; People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 ]

2022Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 487 [“The essence of waiver . . . is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.”].) And, as noted, waiver is a question of fact and is based on intent.

2008Similarly, the jury’s implicit finding that Hoopes did not waive his exclusive parking rights by making no objection to Dolan’s assertion of shared parking did not resolve the question whether Hoopes should be estopped from claiming exclusive parking. “[W]aiver and estoppel are separate and distinct doctrines.” (DRG, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 .) “The essence of waiver ... is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, which may be effective as a matter of law without any demonstration that the other party was caused by the waiver to expose himself to any harm. [In contrast,] [s]uch cau

1989In People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ], we stated the long-standing rule that communications from the jury should be entertained in open court, with notification of counsel. “ ‘It is obviously critically important that a defendant and his attorney be permitted to participate in decisions as to what testimony is to be reread to the jury; the essence of the error in this action is its tendency to deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at this critical stage of the proceedings.’” ( 31 Cal.3d at p. 849 .) We f

1989In People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 647 P.2d 93 ], we stated the long-standing rule that communications from the jury should be entertained in open court, with notification of counsel. “ ‘It is obviously critically important that a defendant and his attorney be permitted to participate in decisions as to what testimony is to be reread to the jury; the essence of the error in this action is its tendency to deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at this critical stage of the proceedings.’” ( 31 Cal.3d at p. 849 .) We f

2023Each member of the conspiracy becomes liable for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all damages caused thereby.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823 (Berg & Berg).) Civil conspiracy claims are subject to the principle “known as the ‘agent’s immunity rule,’ which establishes that ‘an agent is not liable for conspiring with the principal when the agent is acting in an official capacity on behalf of the principal.’ ” (Berg & Berg, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 ; see also Black v. Bank of America (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th

2022It argues that the trial court failed to determine the extent of section 5975’s applicability to each cause of action before it awarded fees. 41 To determine whether an action is one to enforce the governing documents, we give less weight to the form of the complaint “than to the substance of the claims asserted and relief sought . . . .” (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 260 .) A plaintiff “cannot avoid the attorney fees provisions if the essence of the claim falls within the enforcement of the governing documents.” (Salawy v. Ocean Towers

2022Acuna contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by not including defense counsel’s proposed language that a burglary is complete if a place of temporary safety is reached “even momentarily.” According to Acuna, the trial court erred in refusing the requested language because “the requested pinpoint instruction on momentary safety was a legally correct statement of black letter law that was directly relevant to the very essence of the defense case.” Acuna explains that “the ‘defense theory of the case’ was that the four people in [Acuna’s] car had reached a place of temporary safety for