essence claim in Alaska

1983Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975); see also Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 584 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1978) (adversity is the essence of the requirement of standing); Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 25 (Alaska 1976) (the only relevant inquiry in determining the question of standing is adversity).

1978In decisions following Coghill, we held that there would have to exist adversity 2 in a proceeding in court which is capable of judicial resolution, that this is the essence of the requirement that a party have standing to invoke the judicial power, and that the question as to whether the necessary adversity exists would be decided by the court in the exercise of an appropriate rule of judicial self-restraint. 3 As we stated in Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8 , 23-24 n. 25 (Alaska 1976): [T]he only relevant inquiry in determining questions of standing is adversity, .

1983Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975); see also Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 584 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1978) (adversity is the essence of the requirement of standing); Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 25 (Alaska 1976) (the only relevant inquiry in determining the question of standing is adversity).

1983Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975); see also Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 584 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1978) (adversity is the essence of the requirement of standing); Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 25 (Alaska 1976) (the only relevant inquiry in determining the question of standing is adversity).

1981See, e. g., Carson v. Brauer, 234 Or. 333 , 382 P.2d 79, 86 (1963); State v. Gardner, 230 Or. 569 , 371 P.2d 558, 562 (1962).

1981See, e. g., Carson v. Brauer, 234 Or. 333 , 382 P.2d 79, 86 (1963); State v. Gardner, 230 Or. 569 , 371 P.2d 558, 562 (1962).

1981See, e. g., Carson v. Brauer, 234 Or. 333 , 382 P.2d 79, 86 (1963); State v. Gardner, 230 Or. 569 , 371 P.2d 558, 562 (1962).

1981See, e. g., Carson v. Brauer, 234 Or. 333 , 382 P.2d 79, 86 (1963); State v. Gardner, 230 Or. 569 , 371 P.2d 558, 562 (1962).

1980Judges are not business experts, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 , 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919), a fact which has become expressed in the so-called “business judgment rule.” The essence of that doctrine is that courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the board of directors unless the board’s decisions are unreasonable.

1980Judges are not business experts, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 , 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919), a fact which has become expressed in the so-called “business judgment rule.” The essence of that doctrine is that courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the board of directors unless the board’s decisions are unreasonable.

1980No proof was presented that the alleged acts were unreasonable in the sense that they would not have been taken by “an ordinarily prudent man ... in the management of his own affairs of like magnitude and importance.” Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F.Supp. 240, 244 (D.Neb.1972).