83 New York opinions name it 11 courts 1908–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County of Niagara v. Regangreen2 sentences2016The rationale of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet was reaffirmed with approval by the Second Department in Matter of State of New York v Ted B. ( 132 AD3d 28, 35-36 [2d Dept 2015]), wherein the following is stated: “The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). ‘[ 2015The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). “[K]nowledge and intent are essential ele merits” (People v Cox, 71 AD2d 798, 798 [1979]). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2016The rationale of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet was reaffirmed with approval by the Second Department in Matter of State of New York v Ted B. ( 132 AD3d 28, 35-36 [2d Dept 2015]), wherein the following is stated: “The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). ‘[ 2015The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). “[K]nowledge and intent are essential ele merits” (People v Cox, 71 AD2d 798, 798 [1979]). | 3 | 3 |
City of New York v. Stategreen2 sentences2016The rationale of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet was reaffirmed with approval by the Second Department in Matter of State of New York v Ted B. ( 132 AD3d 28, 35-36 [2d Dept 2015]), wherein the following is stated: “The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). ‘[ 2015The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). “[K]nowledge and intent are essential ele merits” (People v Cox, 71 AD2d 798, 798 [1979]). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2016The rationale of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet was reaffirmed with approval by the Second Department in Matter of State of New York v Ted B. ( 132 AD3d 28, 35-36 [2d Dept 2015]), wherein the following is stated: “The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). ‘[ 2015The essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it (see Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464-465 [1938]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]; City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet, 130 AD3d 99 [2d Dept 2015]). “[K]nowledge and intent are essential ele merits” (People v Cox, 71 AD2d 798, 798 [1979]). | 3 | 3 |
Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v. Ledetgreen2 sentences2025"Since the very essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, a waiver cannot be created via negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness" ( Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet , 130 AD3d 99, 105 [2015]; see Sunoce Props, Inc. v Bally Total Fitness of Greater NY, Inc. , 148 AD3d 751, 752 [2017]). 2025"Since the very essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, a waiver cannot be created via negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness" ( Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet , 130 AD3d 99, 105 [2015]; see Sunoce Props, Inc. v Bally Total Fitness of Greater NY, Inc. , 148 AD3d 751, 752 [2017]). | 2 | 5 |
Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valleygreen2 sentences2015“The essence of a violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is, of course, that all persons similarly situated must be treated alike” (Bower Assoc., 2 NY3d at 630 ). 2015“The essence of a violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is, of course, that all persons similarly situated must be treated alike” (Bower Assoc., 2 NY3d at 630). | 2 | 3 |
White Plains Coat & Apron Co. v. Cintas Corp.green2 sentences2013The fourth cause of action, asserted against all defendants, alleges tortious interference with plaintiff’s “contract with Boston University to deliver dental services to patients,” and her “prospective business relationship with Boston University and several dental patients in the Boston metropolitan area.” To establish a claim of tortious interference with contract, “the plaintiff must show the existence of its valid contract with a third party, defendant’s knowledge of that contract, defendant’s intentional and improper procuring of a breach, and damages” White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. 2013The fourth cause of action, asserted against all defendants, alleges tortious interference with plaintiff’s “contract with Boston University to deliver dental services to patients,” and her “prospective business relationship with Boston University and several dental patients in the Boston metropolitan area.” To establish a claim of tortious interference with contract, “the plaintiff must show the existence of its valid contract with a third party, defendant’s knowledge of that contract, defendant’s intentional and improper procuring of a breach, and damages” White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. | 2 | 2 |
Michelson v. Duncangreen2 sentences2010It is common sense that a transfer for no consideration amounts to a gift or waste of corporate assets.” (Michelson v Duncan, 407 A2d 211, 217 [Del 1979].) Where some consideration is given, “a waste claim must rest on the pleading of facts that show that the economics of the transaction were so flawed that no disinterested person of right mind and ordinary business judgment could think the transaction beneficial to the corporation.” (Harbor Fin. 1982The essence of a claim of gift is lack of consideration and the essence of waste is the diversion of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary purposes (Michelson v Duncan, 407 A2d 211, 217 [Del]). | 2 | 2 |
Meyer v. Shearson Lehman Bros.green2 sentences2010Although plaintiff does not allege an intentional tort, defendant asserts that “when applying a Statute of Limitations, courts look to the essence of the stated claim and not the label by which a plaintiff chooses to identify it” (Meyer v Shearson Lehman Bros., 211 AD2d 541, 542 [1st Dept 1995]). 1999When applying a Statute of Limitations, courts look to the essence of the stated claim and not the label by which a plaintiff chooses to identify it (Meyer v Shearson Lehman Bros., 211 AD2d 541, 542-543 ). | 1 | 2 |
State of NY v. Cortelle Corp.green2 sentences2007In applying a statute of limitations a court must look to the essence of the claim and not to the form in which it is pleaded (see State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 86 [1975]). 1998In applying a Statute of Limitations, it is basic that one look to the essence of the claim and not to the form in which it is pleaded (State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 86 ). | 1 | 2 |
Sunoce Properties, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc.green2 sentences2025"Since the very essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, a waiver cannot be created via negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness" ( Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet , 130 AD3d 99, 105 [2015]; see Sunoce Props, Inc. v Bally Total Fitness of Greater NY, Inc. , 148 AD3d 751, 752 [2017]). 2025"Since the very essence of a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, a waiver cannot be created via negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness" ( Matter of Georgetown Unsold Shares, LLC v Ledet , 130 AD3d 99, 105 [2015]; see Sunoce Props, Inc. v Bally Total Fitness of Greater NY, Inc. , 148 AD3d 751, 752 [2017]). | 1 | 1 |
Carvel Corp. v. Noonangreen1 sentence2021Nor do plaintiffs state a prima facie cause of action for tortious interference with business relations or economic advantage, as the essence of the claim involves actions directed not at plaintiffs but at third parties ( see Carvel Corp. v Noonan , 3 NY3d 182, 192 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Chaves v. Kornfeldgreen1 sentence2019It is well settled that "[a] party may waive timely performance even where the parties have agreed that time is of the essence" ( Allen v Kowalewski , 239 AD2d 879 , 879 [4th Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 806 [1997]; see Stefanelli v Vitale , 223 AD2d 361, 362 [1st Dept 1996]), and that such a waiver may be accomplished by the conduct of a party ( see Chaves v Kornfeld , 83 AD3d 522, 523 [1st Dept 2011]). | 1 | 1 |
Owen v. Kesslergreen2 sentences2019Mass. 1998) ("Parties to an agreement can ... insert a time is of the essence clause into an agreement and thereby make performance at the specified time essential to one's right to require performance of the other party." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Owen v. Kessler , 56 Mass.App.Ct. 466 , 469, 778 N.E.2d 953 (2002) ("Under Massachusetts law, parties will be held to the deadlines they have imposed upon themselves when they agree in writing that time is to be of the essence."). 2019Mass. 1998) ("Parties to an agreement can ... insert a time is of the essence clause into an agreement and thereby make performance at the specified time essential to one's right to require performance of the other party." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Owen v. Kessler , 56 Mass.App.Ct. 466 , 469, 778 N.E.2d 953 (2002) ("Under Massachusetts law, parties will be held to the deadlines they have imposed upon themselves when they agree in writing that time is to be of the essence."). | 1 | 1 |
Luo v. Main Street Associatesgreen2 sentences2019Cf. Lou v. Main Street Associates , 212 A.D.2d 675 , 675, 622 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1995) ("Delay in performance of a contract where time is not of the essence is not a material breach on which to base the equitable remedy of rescission."). 2019Cf. Lou v. Main Street Associates , 212 A.D.2d 675 , 675, 622 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1995) ("Delay in performance of a contract where time is not of the essence is not a material breach on which to base the equitable remedy of rescission."). | 1 | 1 |
| Stefanelli v. Vitalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ted B.green | 1 | 1 |
| Guzman v. 188-190 HDFCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martinez v. City of Schenectadygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fink v. Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Perryman v. Village of Saranac Lakegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cross v. Colengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weissman v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brusco v. Braungreen | 1 | 1 |
| 1029 Sixth, LLC v. Riniv Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Holodook v. Spencergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Saarinen v. Kerrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoag v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1972It is really the rule of res judicata applied" to criminal cases (see Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 200 , supra; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 471 ). 1964It is really the rule of res judicata applied to criminal cases (see Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 200 , supra; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 471 ). | 4 | 1962–1972 |
Abbate v. United States
green
2 sentences1972It is really the rule of res judicata applied" to criminal cases (see Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 200 , supra; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 471 ). 1964It is really the rule of res judicata applied to criminal cases (see Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 200 , supra; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 471 ). | 4 | 1962–1972 |
American Bridge Co. v. State
green
2 sentences1996The essence of a waiver is that it is "an intentional relinquishment of a known right” (American Bridge Co. v State of New York, 245 App Div 535, 541 ); the intent to waive a right must be unmistakably manifested, and is not to be inferred from a doubtful or equivocal act (see, Gilbert Frank Corp. v Federal Ins. 1975The essence of waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (American Bridge Co. v State of New York, 245 App Div 535 ). | 3 | 1974–1996 |
In re Adoption of Savon
green
2 sentences2012In Matter of Savon ( 26 AD3d 821 [4th Dept 2006]), the subject child was in the care and custody of the Department of Social Services, and when the child’s great aunt sought to adopt her, the agency refused to give its consent to her adoption. 2012In Matter of Savon ( 26 AD3d 821 [4th Dept 2006]), the subject child was in the care and custody of the Department of Social Services, and when the child’s great aunt sought to adopt her, the agency refused to give its consent to her adoption. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Messina v. Alan Matarasso, M.D., F.A.C.S., P. C.
green
2 sentences2009Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs argument that defendants waived the defense since they had notice of his intention to pursue a battery claim, the record shows that plaintiff consistently described his action as one for medical malpractice, not battery, and his allegations that defendants’ decision to perform a tenotomy resulted from their misdiagnosis of a torn biceps tendon as a superior labrum anterior-posterior tear, coupled with his consistent assertions that defendants treated him without his informed consent, are the essence of a claim for lack of informed consent (see Messina v Alan 2004The absence of consent is inconsistent with consent that is not sufficiently informed, and precludes a claim of lack of informed consent (cf. id. at 35 ). | 2 | 2004–2009 |
Green Bus Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1997“In applying the Statute of Limitations, courts must look to the essence of the claim, and not to the form in which it is pleaded” (Green Bus Lines v General Motors Corp., 169 AD2d 758, 759 ). 1992The essence of this claim is that defendant refused to pay the taxes due on the products it purchased, the same allegations that formed the basis for the first cause of action for breach of the parties’ sales contract (see, Green Bus Lines v General Motors Corp., 169 AD2d 758, 759 ; Iandoli v Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 57 AD2d 815, 816 , lv dismissed 42 NY2d 809 , 1011). | 2 | 1992–1997 |
Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co.
green
2 sentences1995The LAS Court also properly dismissed, as barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 215 (3), the seventh and eighth causes of action of the plaintiff’s complaint, seeking damages for an alleged battery in September of 1988, which is characterized by the plaintiff as defendant Shearson’s alleged failure to provide a "safe workplace”, since, when applying a Statute of Limitations, courts look to the essence of the stated claim and not the label by which a plaintiff chooses to identify it and plaintiff, therefore, cannot avoid the one-year Statute of Limitations for battery 1991In applying the Statute of Limitations, courts must look to the essence of the claim, and not to the form in which it is pleaded (see, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assocs., 43 NY2d 389 ; Brick v Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 NY 259 ). | 2 | 1991–1995 |
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.
green
2 sentences1962Corp., 349 U. S. 322 ; see, also, Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N Y 2d 116). “ The doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘ is essentially a rule of justice and fairness and the essence of the rule is 1 that a question once tried out should not be relitigated between the same parties or their privies ’ (Commissioners of State Ins. 1961Fund v. Low, 3 N Y 2d 590, 595).” (Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N Y 2d 287, 294.) Where the ultimate controlling issue has been decided in a prior proceeding the determination therein is dispositive of such issue (Partmar v. Paramount Corp., 347 U. S. 89 ; Lawlor v. National Screen Serv., 349 U. S. 322 ). | 2 | 1961–1962 |
De La Bouillerie v. De Vienne
green
2 sentences1960The essence of this doctrine is that the court may in its discretion and in accordance with the circumstances of each case take or refuse to take jurisdiction of an action when the parties plaintiff and defendant are not residents of this State and a cause of action arose outside the State (de la Bouillerie v. de Vienne, 300 N. Y. 60 ; Bata v. Bata, 304 N. Y. 51 ; Taylor v. Interstate Motor Frgt. 1958(Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 A D 2d 564, 569.) The essence of the doctrine is that the court may in its discretion and in accordance with the circumstances of each case take or refuse to take jurisdiction of an action when the parties, plaintiff and defendant, are not residents of the State and the cause of action arose outside the State (de la Bouillerie v. de Vienne, 300 N. Y. 60, 62 ; Bata v. Bata, 304 N. Y. 51, 56 ). | 2 | 1958–1960 |
Bata v. Bata
green
2 sentences1960The essence of this doctrine is that the court may in its discretion and in accordance with the circumstances of each case take or refuse to take jurisdiction of an action when the parties plaintiff and defendant are not residents of this State and a cause of action arose outside the State (de la Bouillerie v. de Vienne, 300 N. Y. 60 ; Bata v. Bata, 304 N. Y. 51 ; Taylor v. Interstate Motor Frgt. 1958(Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 A D 2d 564, 569.) The essence of the doctrine is that the court may in its discretion and in accordance with the circumstances of each case take or refuse to take jurisdiction of an action when the parties, plaintiff and defendant, are not residents of the State and the cause of action arose outside the State (de la Bouillerie v. de Vienne, 300 N. Y. 60, 62 ; Bata v. Bata, 304 N. Y. 51, 56 ). | 2 | 1958–1960 |
Clifford v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad
green
2 sentences1908Co., 188 N. Y. 349 , the court held that a voluntary disclosure of the privileged testimony was conclusive evidence of an intention to waive the privilege and that the intention to waive was the essence of a waiver. ■Since the witness, Eyan, in the most positive terms refused to waive the privilege which belonged to him, I am-of the opinion, in the light of the authorities cited, that the district attorney could not by a compulsory line of examination require the witness, against his will, to reveal the communication confided to his counsel. 1908Co., 188 N. Y. 349 . the court held that a voluntary disclosure of the rivileged testimony was conclusive evidence of an intention to waive the privilege and that the intention to waive was the essence of a waiver. | 2 | 1908–1908 |
Hellman v. Hoenig & Co.
green
1 sentence2025"In applying the Statute of Limitations, courts must look to the essence of the claim, and not to the form in which it is pleaded" ( Hellman v Hoenig & Co. , 244 AD2d at 530 ; see Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.
green
1 sentence2025Auth. , 31 NY3d 187, 196 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich
green
1 sentence2024Simply put, "not every annoyance constitutes a nuisance." See, Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich , 1 NY3d 117 (Court of Appeals 2003). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Allen v. Kowalewski
green
1 sentence2019It is well settled that "[a] party may waive timely performance even where the parties have agreed that time is of the essence" ( Allen v Kowalewski , 239 AD2d 879 , 879 [4th Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 806 [1997]; see Stefanelli v Vitale , 223 AD2d 361, 362 [1st Dept 1996]), and that such a waiver may be accomplished by the conduct of a party ( see Chaves v Kornfeld , 83 AD3d 522, 523 [1st Dept 2011]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Wrase v. Bosco green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Broughton v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Nachbaur v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Sheehy v. Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells LLP green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Lawrence v. Mountain neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| International Baptist Church, Inc. v. Fortini green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Murphy v. American Home Products Corp. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Saslow v. Cephas green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Cushman & Wakefield Inc. v. 214 East 49th Street Corp. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Insurance green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Pappalardo v. Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Oates v. Marino green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Pappalardo v. WESTCHESTER ROCKLAND NEWPAPERS, INC. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Bayer v. Golding neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. O'Connor green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Fentress green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Rivera v. Coughlin neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Figueroa green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Samuels green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Settles green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Greene v. Greene green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Iandoli v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Lusker v. Tannen green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Marshall neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.