Jones claim in Kansas

2016Specifically determining whether the State is immune also presents a solely legal question, see Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority, 23 Kan.

2016Specifically determining whether the State is immune also presents a solely legal question, see Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority, 23 Kan.

2008State v. Jones, 27 Kan.

2001App. 2d 476 , 5 P.3d 1012 (2000), considered whether the district court should have granted Jones’ motion to suppress the evidence and affirmed the conviction.

2003Language in the Jones decision such as “Jones’ claim against AAA should be calculated as the difference between her pro rata share *139 of the settlement and the total value of her damages” and language from the Jones syllabus that “[u]nder the facts of this case that involves a group settlement with the tortfeasor, the underinsured motorist provider is responsible for paying the difference between the insured’s pro rata share of the settlement and the total amount of damages up to the insured’s underinsured liability limits,” 26 Kan.

2002Jones' claim against AAA should be calculated as the difference between her pro rata share of the settlement and the total value of her damages." (Emphasis added.) 26 Kan.

2021State v. Rizo, 304 Kan. 974, 979-80 , 377 P.3d 419 (2016).

2021State v. Rizo, 304 Kan. 974, 979-80 , 377 P.3d 419 (2016).

2020Although we could decline to consider the merits of Jones' claim, see State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1085 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014); Godfrey, 301 Kan. at 1044 , we choose to reach its merits because this issue presents a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and review may be necessary to prevent the denial of Jones' fundamental right to due process of law.

2020Although we could decline to consider the merits of Jones' claim, see State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1085 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014); Godfrey, 301 Kan. at 1044 , we choose to reach its merits because this issue presents a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and review may be necessary to prevent the denial of Jones' fundamental right to due process of law.

2020Although we could decline to consider the merits of Jones' claim, see State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1085 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014); Godfrey, 301 Kan. at 1044 , we choose to reach its merits because this issue presents a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and review may be necessary to prevent the denial of Jones' fundamental right to due process of law.

2020State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 1183 , 1231, 427 P.3d 865 (2018).

2020Using Tannahill as guidance, we deny Jones' claim. "'No harm will be found from a technical defect in the charging document unless it prejudiced the defendant's ability to prepare a defense, impaired the defendant's ability to plead the conviction in some later proceeding, or limited the defendant's substantial rights to a fair trial.'" Tannahill, 2010 WL 198484, at *2 (citing State v. Edwards, 39 Kan.

2020App. 2d 300 , Syl. ¶ 5, 179 P.3d 472 [2008]).

2019Our Supreme Court explained that the only inquiry that mattered was whether Jones made a knowing and intelligent waiver. 290 Kan. at 378 .

2018On August 17, 2016, on Jones' motion for summary disposition, this court issued an order finding that a sentence is effective when pronounced from the bench, citing Abasolo v. State , 284 Kan. 299 , Syl. ¶ 3, 160 P.3d 471 (2007).

2018On August 17, 2016, on Jones' motion for summary disposition, this court issued an order finding that a sentence is effective when pronounced from the bench, citing Abasolo v. State , 284 Kan. 299 , Syl. ¶ 3, 160 P.3d 471 (2007).

2012State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 318-19 , 160 P.3d 457 (2007).

2012State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 318-19 , 160 P.3d 457 (2007).

2005Stated another way, a criminal defendant has a right to an instruction on all lesser included offenses as long as ‘(1) the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant’s theory, would justify a jury verdict in accord with the defendant’s theory and (2) the evidence at trial does not exclude a theory of guilt on the lesser offense.’ State v. Williams, 268 Kan. 1, 15 , 988 P.2d 722 (1999).” In short, Jones has a right to an instruction on second-degree intentional murder as long as the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, would reasonably justify a jury

2005Stated another way, a criminal defendant has a right to an instruction on all lesser included offenses as long as ‘(1) the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant’s theory, would justify a jury verdict in accord with the defendant’s theory and (2) the evidence at trial does not exclude a theory of guilt on the lesser offense.’ State v. Williams, 268 Kan. 1, 15 , 988 P.2d 722 (1999).” In short, Jones has a right to an instruction on second-degree intentional murder as long as the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, would reasonably justify a jury

1981A rate design fair on its face, with substantial evidence to support it, may be approved without a cost of service study absent a convincing showing of a Jones violation.” 3 Kan.

1981A rate design fair on its face, with substantial evidence to support it, may be approved without a cost of service study absent a convincing showing of a Jones violation.” 3 Kan.