Jones rule in New York

2022These facts were within the Jones defendant's knowledge, and, once the communication to the arresting officer was disclosed, would have been directly relevant to the defendant's assertions that the description "either (1) did not fit [*2]defendant's own physical description or (2) failed to exclude other possible persons present at the scene and time of the arrest who also might have fit an overly generalized description" ( id. at 727 ).

2022These facts were within the Jones defendant's knowledge, and, once the communication to the arresting officer was disclosed, would have been directly relevant to the defendant's assertions that the description "either (1) did not fit [*2]defendant's own physical description or (2) failed to exclude other possible persons present at the scene and time of the arrest who also might have fit an overly generalized description" ( id. at 727 ).

2021Inc. v Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC , 146 AD3d 1, 12 [1st Dept 2016], affd 31 NY3d 1002 [2018]).

2021Inc. v Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC , 146 AD3d 1, 12 [1st Dept 2016], affd 31 NY3d 1002 [2018]).

2025Jones' claim that the forfeited vehicle is worth $40,000 demonstrates that the statute at issue here provides for forfeiture of property that may have "dramatic variations in the value," calling into question whether its forfeiture serves a purely remedial purpose or is at least partly punitive ( id. at 621 ).

2025Moreover, since the statute already provides that the City may charge the unlicensed food vendor whose property has been seized "reasonable costs for removal and storage payable prior to the release of such food, vehicle or pushcart" (Administrative Code § 17-321[c][iii]), forfeiture of the vehicle appears to have little, if any, correlation to the cost of enforcement ( see Austin , 509 US at 621 ; Canavan , 108 AD3d at 120 ).

2025Moreover, since the statute already provides that the City may charge the unlicensed food vendor whose property has been seized "reasonable costs for removal and storage payable prior to the release of such food, vehicle or pushcart" (Administrative Code § 17-321[c][iii]), forfeiture of the vehicle appears to have little, if any, correlation to the cost of enforcement ( see Austin , 509 US at 621 ; Canavan , 108 AD3d at 120 ).

2016It requires that prisoners cannot have financial obligations deferred “except in the most unusual and exceptional of circumstances where a defendant’s sources of income support a judicial finding of inability to pay any portion of the surcharge.” ( 26 NY3d at 740 .) The “inability to pay any portion of the surcharge,” however, is more than “unusual and exceptional” in the confined offender population.

2016It requires that prisoners cannot have financial obligations deferred “except in the most unusual and exceptional of circumstances where a defendant’s sources of income support a judicial finding of inability to pay any portion of the surcharge.” ( 26 NY3d at 740 .) The “inability to pay any portion of the surcharge,” however, is more than “unusual and exceptional” in the confined offender population.

2016Applying that rule, we held that the 1971 conviction met neither criteria, noting that the court's closure of the courtroom in 1971 had complied, at that time, with the existing legal requirements for a public trial (see id. at 645 ), and, - 15 - - 16 - Nos. 149 & 150 while this Court had eventually declared a similar procedure unconstitutional, it did not make the Jones rule retroactive, nor did it require a finding that the predicate conviction had been "unconstitutionally obtained" (id. at 645-646).

2016Applying that rule, we held that the 1971 conviction met neither criteria, noting that the court's closure of the courtroom in 1971 had complied, at that time, with the existing legal requirements for a public trial (see id. at 645 ), and, - 15 - - 16 - Nos. 149 & 150 while this Court had eventually declared a similar procedure unconstitutional, it did not make the Jones rule retroactive, nor did it require a finding that the predicate conviction had been "unconstitutionally obtained" (id. at 645-646).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A review of case law discloses that appellate courts have applied the common-law doctrine of retroactivity and have given the Jones rule retroactive application to all cases on direct review at the time Jones was decided (see, People v Brown, 79 AD2d 659 ; People v Gonzalez, 74 AD2d 928 ; People v Cousart, 74 AD2d 877 ; People v McNa mee, 71 AD2d 559 ).

1988A conviction obtained in violation of one’s constitutional rights may not be used to enhance punishment for a later offense (Burgett v Texas, 389 US 109, 115 ).

1988A conviction obtained in violation of one’s constitutional rights may not be used to enhance punishment for a later offense (Burgett v Texas, 389 US 109, 115 ).

1988Whether the sentencing court, in adjudicating the defendant a second felony offender, correctly concluded that the defendant was collaterally estopped from contending that his prior conviction was violative of his constitutional right to a public trial in a proceeding pursuant to CPL 400.21 (7) (b), is dependent upon the degree of retroactivity to be accorded the Jones rule. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires [that] retrospective effect” be given to any new constitutional rule (Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618, 629 ; see, United States v Johnson, 457 US 537, 542 ).

1988Whether the sentencing court, in adjudicating the defendant a second felony offender, correctly concluded that the defendant was collaterally estopped from contending that his prior conviction was violative of his constitutional right to a public trial in a proceeding pursuant to CPL 400.21 (7) (b), is dependent upon the degree of retroactivity to be accorded the Jones rule. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires [that] retrospective effect” be given to any new constitutional rule (Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618, 629 ; see, United States v Johnson, 457 US 537, 542 ).

1988Absent manifest injustice, the defendant is not entitled to benefit from the change in the law (see, People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213 , cert denied 454 US 967 ).

1988Absent manifest injustice, the defendant is not entitled to benefit from the change in the law (see, People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213 , cert denied 454 US 967 ).

1988Under the historic common-law doctrine, "a case decided on direct appeal always received the benefit, or detriment, of any decisional law 'pronounced’ before its judgment became final * * * However, once a judgment had become final, it was not affected by law freshly 'pronounced’ thereafter” (People v Morales, 37 NY2d 262, 268 ; People ex rel.

1988Under the historic common-law doctrine, "a case decided on direct appeal always received the benefit, or detriment, of any decisional law 'pronounced’ before its judgment became final * * * However, once a judgment had become final, it was not affected by law freshly 'pronounced’ thereafter” (People v Morales, 37 NY2d 262, 268 ; People ex rel.

1988Absent manifest injustice, the defendant is not entitled to benefit from the change in the law (see, People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213 , cert denied 454 US 967 ).

1988Absent manifest injustice, the defendant is not entitled to benefit from the change in the law (see, People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213 , cert denied 454 US 967 ).

1988That we subsequently declared a similar procedure unconstitutional in People v Jones ( 47 NY2d 409 , supra) does not, as defendant concedes, make the Jones rule retroactive to prior convictions that have survived direct appeal, nor does it, in view of the plain language of the statute, require a finding that the predicate conviction "was unconstitutionally obtained”.

1988That we subsequently declared a similar procedure unconstitutional in People v Jones ( 47 NY2d 409 , supra) does not, as defendant concedes, make the Jones rule retroactive to prior convictions that have survived direct appeal, nor does it, in view of the plain language of the statute, require a finding that the predicate conviction "was unconstitutionally obtained”.

1987Jones (supra) prevents the conviction of people where the jury may feel that the particular charges were not proven, but that, since the defendant had cash in his possession he must have sold drugs on some other occasion.

1987Jones (supra) prevents the conviction of people where the jury may feel that the particular charges were not proven, but that, since the defendant had cash in his possession he must have sold drugs on some other occasion.

1987At this point Jones was justified in pursuing the minimally intrusive course of escorting the defendant 2 V2 blocks to where other officers had stopped Murphy, since the defendant was not handcuffed, there was no showing of force, the defendant was not taken to the police station, the total time and distance involved were brief and no information was asked of the defendant after the initial inquiry (see, People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234 ).