Jones test in Florida

2019Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).

2019Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).

2013Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570-71 (Fla.2001): see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”).

2013Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570-71 (Fla.2001): see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”).

2024“Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’” Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 158 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526 ).

2024“Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’” Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 158 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526 ).

1992The court reasoned that our decisions in State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1984), and Paul v. State, 385 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1980), mandated severance where "the only connection between the two criminal episodes was the use of a stolen car and the accused's alleged participation." Jones, 497 So.2d at 1272 .

1987The court held it was error to deny Jones' motion for severance of the charges growing out of the criminal episode involving Morrison and that involving Daugherty, stating: The supreme court held in State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824, 825 (Fla. 1984) (citing Paul v. State, 365 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Smith, J., dissenting)), "that consolidation [of offenses] is improper when `based on similar but separate episodes, separated in time, which are "connected" only by similar circumstances and the accused's alleged guilt in both and all instances.' 365 So.2d at 1065-66 , adopted 385 So.

2024Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016) (adapting test announced in Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998) and Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2004) and applying same in the context of a plea, holding: “We likewise establish a similar two-prong test for determining postconviction claims for newly discovered evidence relating to guilty pleas which adopts the first prong of the Jones test and the second prong from Grosvenor.

2024Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016) (adapting test announced in Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998) and Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2004) and applying same in the context of a plea, holding: “We likewise establish a similar two-prong test for determining postconviction claims for newly discovered evidence relating to guilty pleas which adopts the first prong of the Jones test and the second prong from Grosvenor.

2024“Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’” Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 158 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526 ).

2024“Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’” Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 158 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526 ).

2013Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570-71 (Fla.2001): see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”).

2013Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570-71 (Fla.2001): see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”).

2013Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570-71 (Fla.2001): see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”).

2013Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570-71 (Fla.2001): see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (“[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (“The Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.”).

1987The court held it was error to deny Jones' motion for severance of the charges growing out of the criminal episode involving Morrison and that involving Daugherty, stating: The supreme court held in State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824, 825 (Fla. 1984) (citing Paul v. State, 365 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Smith, J., dissenting)), "that consolidation [of offenses] is improper when `based on similar but separate episodes, separated in time, which are "connected" only by similar circumstances and the accused's alleged guilt in both and all instances.' 365 So.2d at 1065-66 , adopted 385 So.

1987The court held it was error to deny Jones' motion for severance of the charges growing out of the criminal episode involving Morrison and that involving Daugherty, stating: The supreme court held in State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824, 825 (Fla. 1984) (citing Paul v. State, 365 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Smith, J., dissenting)), "that consolidation [of offenses] is improper when `based on similar but separate episodes, separated in time, which are "connected" only by similar circumstances and the accused's alleged guilt in both and all instances.' 365 So.2d at 1065-66 , adopted 385 So.

1981Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence. [2] Salvucci implies that the Jones rule was effectively repudiated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).

1981Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence. [2] Salvucci implies that the Jones rule was effectively repudiated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).

1992The court reasoned that our decisions in State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1984), and Paul v. State, 385 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1980), mandated severance where "the only connection between the two criminal episodes was the use of a stolen car and the accused's alleged participation." Jones, 497 So.2d at 1272 .

1987The court held it was error to deny Jones' motion for severance of the charges growing out of the criminal episode involving Morrison and that involving Daugherty, stating: The supreme court held in State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824, 825 (Fla. 1984) (citing Paul v. State, 365 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Smith, J., dissenting)), "that consolidation [of offenses] is improper when `based on similar but separate episodes, separated in time, which are "connected" only by similar circumstances and the accused's alleged guilt in both and all instances.' 365 So.2d at 1065-66 , adopted 385 So.

2025The Jones test for a facially sufficient claim “proceeds in two parts.” Stein, 406 So. 3d at 175.

2025The Jones test for a facially sufficient claim “proceeds in two parts.” Stein, 406 So. 3d at 175.

2017In Swafford, 125 So.3d at 775-76 , we explained the Jones analysis further as follows: The Jones standard requires that, in considering the effect of the newly discovered evidence, we consider all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial.

2017In Swafford, 125 So.3d at 775-76 , we explained the Jones analysis further as follows: The Jones standard requires that, in considering the effect of the newly discovered evidence, we consider all of the admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial.

2025See Gorham v. Lavine, 376 So. 3d 781 , 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“Because this order merely grants a motion and does not contain final language actually dismissing the claims, it is not appealable.” (first citing Johnson v. First City Bank of Gainesville, 491 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); then citing Fla. R.

2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 100 (Fla. 2023) (stating that to obtain relief based on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish “(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably . . . yield a less severe sentence on retrial.” (omission in original) (quoting Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280 , 1285 (Fla. 2021))).

2025See Andrews, 390 So. 3d at 237.

2025See Gorham v. Lavine, 376 So. 3d 781 , 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“Because this order merely grants a motion and does not contain final language actually dismissing the claims, it is not appealable.” (first citing Johnson v. First City Bank of Gainesville, 491 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); then citing Fla. R.

2025See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 100 (Fla. 2023) (stating that to obtain relief based on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish “(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably . . . yield a less severe sentence on retrial.” (omission in original) (quoting Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280 , 1285 (Fla. 2021))).