Jones motion in Idaho

2021On appeal, Jones contends the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees and denying his motion for reconsideration and raises the same arguments made to the district court; namely, that when he tendered funds to the clerk, Safaris “was made whole” and was under “no obligation at that point to continue its efforts to win back the Litigation [sic].” Jones relies on Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 , 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), for the premise that “a motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority.” In response, Safaris maintains that while t

2021On appeal, Jones contends the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees and denying his motion for reconsideration and raises the same arguments made to the district court; namely, that when he tendered funds to the clerk, Safaris “was made whole” and was under “no obligation at that point to continue its efforts to win back the Litigation [sic].” Jones relies on Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 , 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), for the premise that “a motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority.” In response, Safaris maintains that while t

2025“Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.” Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790 , 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010); see also I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (requiring that the “argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.”).

2025“Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.” Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790 , 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010); see also I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (requiring that the “argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.”).

2003It is well established that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S.Ct. 495, 499 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971).

2003It is well established that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S.Ct. 495, 499 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971).

1999I.C. § 19-2522(1); I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Wolfe, 124 Idaho 724, 726-27 , 864 P.2d 170, 172-73 (Ct.App.1993).

1999I.C. § 19-2522(1); I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Wolfe, 124 Idaho 724, 726-27 , 864 P.2d 170, 172-73 (Ct.App.1993).

1995Applying the standard for reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion set out in State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’ motion.

1995Applying the standard for reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion set out in State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’ motion.

1995Cf. State v. Davis, 127 Idaho 62, 64 , 896 P.2d 970, 972 (1995) (no abuse of discretion in denial of new trial motion where grounds not provided for by statute).

1995Cf. State v. Davis, 127 Idaho 62, 64 , 896 P.2d 970, 972 (1995) (no abuse of discretion in denial of new trial motion where grounds not provided for by statute).

1983Section 3.3 of the plan provides that a five-member employee benefit committee, appointed by the Company’s board of directors, “shall determine conclusively for all parties all questions arising in the administration of the Plan.” Where a pension plan contains such a provision, “routine decisions about plan administration, including determination of eligibility, are conclusive if made in good faith and if not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.” Paterson v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 411 F.Supp. 79, 86 (E.D.Okl.1976).