Jones motion in Georgia

2019Under both the old and the new Evidence Code, " '[a] prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes.' " Robbins v. State , 300 Ga. 387 , 391, 793 S.E.2d 62 (2016) (quoting Gibbons v. State , 248 Ga. 858 , 862, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982) ).

2019Under both the old and the new Evidence Code, " '[a] prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes.' " Robbins v. State , 300 Ga. 387 , 391, 793 S.E.2d 62 (2016) (quoting Gibbons v. State , 248 Ga. 858 , 862, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982) ).

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2026See OCGA § 16-3-21(a); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 79 (2025) (concluding that the evidence, which allowed the jury to infer that the defendant shot the victim while he was retreating, was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the defendant’s justification defense and to authorize the jury to find him guilty of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); Williams, 316 Ga. at 150–51 (holding that the evidence, which included a video recording showing that the victim was walking away from the defendant when the defendant shot, auth

2022Here, the trial court neither cited Jackson nor relied on the Jackson standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence when ruling on Jones’s motion for new trial on the general grounds. 17 below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense such that a reasonable probability exists that the trial results would have been different but for counsel’s performance.” Bragg v. State, 295 Ga. 676, 678 (4) (763 SE2d 476) (2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (II) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2022Here, the trial court neither cited Jackson nor relied on the Jackson standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence when ruling on Jones’s motion for new trial on the general grounds. 17 below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense such that a reasonable probability exists that the trial results would have been different but for counsel’s performance.” Bragg v. State, 295 Ga. 676, 678 (4) (763 SE2d 476) (2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (II) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2019See Brown , 302 Ga. at 457 , 807 S.E.2d 369 . (c) We begin by addressing Esprit's argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek admission of Jones's plea-hearing statements as impeachment evidence after Robateau testified at trial.

2019See Brown , 302 Ga. at 457 , 807 S.E.2d 369 . (c) We begin by addressing Esprit's argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek admission of Jones's plea-hearing statements as impeachment evidence after Robateau testified at trial.

2018To the extent that Jones’s motion could be construed as a motion to vacate his conviction, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010).

2018To the extent that Jones’s motion could be construed as a motion to vacate his conviction, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) ( 686 SE2d 786 ) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010).

2016Bowman v. State, 332 Ga. App. 407, 409 (2) ( 773 SE2d 33 ) (2015). 4.

2016Bowman v. State, 332 Ga. App. 407, 409 (2) ( 773 SE2d 33 ) (2015). 4.

2016Palmer, 285 Ga. at 77-78 (“Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.”) (citation omitted); Henson v. State, 314 Ga.App. 152, 154 ( 723 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (when issuing a warrant a magistrate properly considers “all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit” to determine whether probable cause exists). 2.

2016Palmer, 285 Ga. at 77-78 (“Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.”) (citation omitted); Henson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 152, 154 (723 SE2d methamphetamine.

2016Palmer, 285 Ga. at 77-78 (“Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.”) (citation omitted); Henson v. State, 314 Ga.App. 152, 154 ( 723 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (when issuing a warrant a magistrate properly considers “all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit” to determine whether probable cause exists). 2.

2016Palmer, 285 Ga. at 77-78 (“Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.”) (citation omitted); Henson v. State, 314 Ga.App. 152, 154 ( 723 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (when issuing a warrant a magistrate properly considers “all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit” to determine whether probable cause exists). 2.

2015“Counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection did not amount to ineffective assistance.” Bun v. State, 296 Ga. 549, 553 (3) ( 769 SE2d 381 ) (2015) (citation and footnote omitted). (b) Failure to challenge the indictment.

2015“Counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection did not amount to ineffective assistance.” Bun v. State, 296 Ga. 549, 553 (3) ( 769 SE2d 381 ) (2015) (citation and footnote omitted). (b) Failure to challenge the indictment.

2012See, e.g., Grant v. State, 257 Ga. App. 275, 277 (2) ( 570 SE2d 597 ) (2002).

2012See, e.g., Grant v. State, 257 Ga. App. 275, 277 (2) ( 570 SE2d 597 ) (2002).

2012See Neal, 290 Ga. at 564 (2); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 359 (3) ( 647 SE2d 70 ) (2007); Kelley, 308 Ga. App. at 422 (2). 3.

2012See Neal, 290 Ga. at 564 (2); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 359 (3) ( 647 SE2d 70 ) (2007); Kelley, 308 Ga. App. at 422 (2). 2.

2012See Neal, 290 Ga. at 564 (2); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 359 (3) ( 647 SE2d 70 ) (2007); Kelley, 308 Ga. App. at 422 (2). 3.

2012See Neal, 290 Ga. at 564 (2); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 359 (3) ( 647 SE2d 70 ) (2007); Kelley, 308 Ga. App. at 422 (2). 3.

2012See Neal, 290 Ga. at 564 (2); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 359 (3) ( 647 SE2d 70 ) (2007); Kelley, 308 Ga. App. at 422 (2). 3.

2012See Neal, 290 Ga. at 564 (2); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 359 (3) ( 647 SE2d 70 ) (2007); Kelley, 308 Ga. App. at 422 (2). 2.

2021See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2021See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2019In addition, to seek admission of Jones's plea-hearing statements, Esprit's trial counsel would have had to overcome "the long-standing rule in this state [under the old Evidence Code] that declarations to third persons against the declarant's penal interest, to the effect that the declarant, and not the accused, was the actual perpetrator of the offense, are not admissible in favor of the accused at his trial." Grell v. State , 291 Ga. 615 , 617, 732 S.E.2d 741 (2012).

2019In addition, to seek admission of Jones's plea-hearing statements, Esprit's trial counsel would have had to overcome "the long-standing rule in this state [under the old Evidence Code] that declarations to third persons against the declarant's penal interest, to the effect that the declarant, and not the accused, was the actual perpetrator of the offense, are not admissible in favor of the accused at his trial." Grell v. State , 291 Ga. 615 , 617, 732 S.E.2d 741 (2012).

2019Under both the old and the new Evidence Code, " '[a] prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes.' " Robbins v. State , 300 Ga. 387 , 391, 793 S.E.2d 62 (2016) (quoting Gibbons v. State , 248 Ga. 858 , 862, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982) ).

2019Under both the old and the new Evidence Code, " '[a] prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes.' " Robbins v. State , 300 Ga. 387 , 391, 793 S.E.2d 62 (2016) (quoting Gibbons v. State , 248 Ga. 858 , 862, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982) ).

2019See, e.g., id. ; Walker v. State , 294 Ga. 752 , 757, 755 S.E.2d 790 (2014). (d) As for Esprit's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to seek the admission of Jones's plea-hearing statements under the due process rationale of Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), we conclude that an argument based on **439 Chambers 's reasoning would have been meritless.

2019See, e.g., id. ; Walker v. State , 294 Ga. 752 , 757, 755 S.E.2d 790 (2014). (d) As for Esprit's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to seek the admission of Jones's plea-hearing statements under the due process rationale of Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), we conclude that an argument based on **439 Chambers 's reasoning would have been meritless.

2025See Holt v. Ebinger, 303 Ga. 804, 808 n.3 (814 SE2d 298) (2018) (“This Court is not bound by the litigating position of the [State], and we have an obligation to decide for ourselves whether the judgment of the [lower] court is legally sound.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025See Holt v. Ebinger, 303 Ga. 804 , 808 n.3 ( 814 SE2d 298 ) (2018) (“This Court is not bound by the litigating position of the [State], and we have an obligation to decide for ourselves whether the judgment of the [lower] court is legally sound.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025See Holt v. Ebinger, 303 Ga. 804, 808 n.3 (814 SE2d 298) (2018) (“This Court is not bound by the litigating position of the [State], and we have an obligation to decide for ourselves whether the judgment of the [lower] court is legally sound.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025See Holt v. Ebinger, 303 Ga. 804 , 808 n.3 ( 814 SE2d 298 ) (2018) (“This Court is not bound by the litigating position of the [State], and we have an obligation to decide for ourselves whether the judgment of the [lower] court is legally sound.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025The trial court further found that Jones had not proven Strickland prejudice because he failed to point to anything in the trial transcript indicating that “a new trial would have been granted on the general grounds had the trial judge heard and ruled on the motion for new trial.” In advancing this claim on appeal, Jones asserts that the trial court’s finding of deficient performance “satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test.” Though counsel’s handling of Jones’s motion for new trial evinces a concerning lack of diligence,2 we disagree that the particular theory Jones advances here sup

2025The trial court further found that Jones had not proven Strickland prejudice because he failed to point to anything in the trial transcript indicating that “a new trial would have been granted on the general grounds had the trial judge heard and ruled on the motion for new trial.” In advancing this claim on appeal, Jones asserts that the trial court’s finding of deficient performance “satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test.” Though counsel’s handling of Jones’s motion for new trial evinces a concerning lack of diligence,2 we disagree that the particular theory Jones advances here sup

2024See Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876, 890-891 (4) ( 885 SE2d 725 ) (2023).

2024See Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876, 890-891 (4) ( 885 SE2d 725 ) (2023).

2024Concerning the contempt ruling, “if there is any evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that its order had been violated, we are without power to disturb the judgment absent an abuse of discretion.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Murphy v. Murphy, 330 Ga. App. 169, 177 (6) (b) (ii) ( 767 SE2d 789 ) (2014).

2024Concerning the contempt ruling, “if there is any evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that its order had been violated, we are without power to disturb the judgment absent an abuse of discretion.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Murphy v. Murphy, 330 Ga. App. 169, 177 (6) (b) (ii) ( 767 SE2d 789 ) (2014).

2023“In order to preserve an objection for [ordinary] appellate review, the specific ground of the objection must be made at the time the challenged evidence is offered.” Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546, 549 (II) (807 SE2d 891) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); Similarly, “[a] motion for mistrial must be promptly made as soon as the party is aware of the matter giving rise to the motion.” Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted) (motion for mistrial untimely when motion was made after State concluded direct examination of witness during w

2023“In order to preserve an objection for [ordinary] appellate review, the specific ground of the objection must be made at the time the challenged evidence is offered.” Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546, 549 (II) (807 SE2d 891) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); Similarly, “[a] motion for mistrial must be promptly made as soon as the party is aware of the matter giving rise to the motion.” Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted) (motion for mistrial untimely when motion was made after State concluded direct examination of witness during w

2023“In order to preserve an objection for [ordinary] appellate review, the specific ground of the objection must be made at the time the challenged evidence is offered.” Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546, 549 (II) (807 SE2d 891) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); Similarly, “[a] motion for mistrial must be promptly made as soon as the party is aware of the matter giving rise to the motion.” Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted) (motion for mistrial untimely when motion was made after State concluded direct examination of witness during w

2023“In order to preserve an objection for [ordinary] appellate review, the specific ground of the objection must be made at the time the challenged evidence is offered.” Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546, 549 (II) (807 SE2d 891) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); Similarly, “[a] motion for mistrial must be promptly made as soon as the party is aware of the matter giving rise to the motion.” Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted) (motion for mistrial untimely when motion was made after State concluded direct examination of witness during w

2023See Ward, 316 Ga. at 300 (4) (where the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions, the trial court did not err in denying his motion for directed verdict). (c) General Grounds: In the third of these arguments, Jones argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for new 10 trial on the general grounds under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.7 But this argument is “not properly addressed to this Court as such a decision is one that is solely within the discretion of the trial court.” Boles v. State, 316 Ga. 209, 215 (2) n.8 (887 SE2d 304) (2023) (citation and punc

2023See Ward, 316 Ga. at 300 (4) (where the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions, the trial court did not err in denying his motion for directed verdict). (c) General Grounds: In the third of these arguments, Jones argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for new 10 trial on the general grounds under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.7 But this argument is “not properly addressed to this Court as such a decision is one that is solely within the discretion of the trial court.” Boles v. State, 316 Ga. 209, 215 (2) n.8 (887 SE2d 304) (2023) (citation and punc