Jones motion in Texas

2022Otherwise, Ballesteros has waived her right to question any ground not challenged.”) (citations omitted); Herndon v. First Nat’l Bank of Tulia, 802 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1991, writ denied) (“[W]here the judgment of the trial court rests upon two or more independent grounds, the appellant must attack each ground on appeal or the judgment must be affirmed as resting upon a ground not brought forward as error.”); Monk v. Dallas Brake & Clutch Serv.

2010Otherwise, Ballesteros has waived her right to question any ground not challenged.") (citations omitted); Herndon v. First Nat'l Bank , 802 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, writ denied) ("[W]here the judgment of the trial court rests upon two or more independent grounds, the appellant must attack each ground on appeal or the judgment must be affirmed as resting upon a ground not brought forward as error."); Monk v. Dallas Brake & Clutch Serv.

2022See Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 498-99 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (“Jones’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict rested on several independent grounds.

2010See Ballesteros v. Jones , 985 S.W.2d 485, 498-99 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) ("Jones's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict rested on several independent grounds.

2010In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex.2003).

2010In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex. 2003).

2019There are a few very limited exceptions to this general rule, see Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.), but the trial court’s May 23 order dismissing Jones’ motion for want of jurisdiction does not fall within one of those exceptions.

2019There are a few very limited exceptions to this general rule, see Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.), but the trial court’s May 23 order dismissing Jones’ motion for want of jurisdiction does not fall within one of those exceptions.

2015See Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim.

2015See id. (noting that “an appellee need not be definitively identified until the appellant’s brief is filed”). 2 vexatious litigant, requiring her to post a bond as security, continuing abatement of the lawsuit, and prohibiting her from filing new pro se litigation without permission from a local administrative judge.

2015See id. (noting that "an appellee need not be definitively identified until the appellant's brief is filed"). vexatious litigant, requiring her to post a bond as security, continuing abatement of the lawsuit, and prohibiting her from filing new pro se litigation without permission from a local administrative judge.

2010See Palacios, 225 S.W.3d at 170 (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed against State and fourth factor weighed heavily against appellant); see also Russell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 865 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed in appellant’s favor and presumptive prejudice was rebutted by failure to demonstrate any prejudice); Guajardo, 999 S.W.2d at 571 (same).

2010See Palacios , 225 S.W.3d at 170 (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed against State and fourth factor weighed heavily against appellant); see also Russell v. State , 90 S.W.3d 865 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed in appellant’s favor and presumptive prejudice was rebutted by failure to demonstrate any prejudice); Guajardo , 999 S.W.2d at 571 (same).

2010See Palacios, 225 S.W.3d at 170 (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed against State and fourth factor weighed heavily against appellant); see also Russell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 865 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed in appellant’s favor and presumptive prejudice was rebutted by failure to demonstrate any prejudice); Guajardo, 999 S.W.2d at 571 (same).

2010See Palacios , 225 S.W.3d at 170 (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed against State and fourth factor weighed heavily against appellant); see also Russell v. State , 90 S.W.3d 865 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed in appellant’s favor and presumptive prejudice was rebutted by failure to demonstrate any prejudice); Guajardo , 999 S.W.2d at 571 (same).

2010See Palacios, 225 S.W.3d at 170 (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed against State and fourth factor weighed heavily against appellant); see also Russell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 865 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed in appellant’s favor and presumptive prejudice was rebutted by failure to demonstrate any prejudice); Guajardo, 999 S.W.2d at 571 (same).

2010See Palacios , 225 S.W.3d at 170 (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed against State and fourth factor weighed heavily against appellant); see also Russell v. State , 90 S.W.3d 865 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding no speedy trial violation when first three factors weighed in appellant’s favor and presumptive prejudice was rebutted by failure to demonstrate any prejudice); Guajardo , 999 S.W.2d at 571 (same).

2008In Geesa v. State , the court of criminal appeals determined that a defendant was entitled to "a full definitional instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt" and expressly adopted a six-paragraph instruction to be "submitted to the jury in all criminal cases, even in the absence of an objection or request by the State or the defendant." (2) 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim.

2008Before turning to Rodriguez and its bearing on the instant case, however, we will briefly address the context in which Jones’s issue arises. 3 In Geesa v. State, the court of criminal appeals determined that a defendant was entitled to “a full definitional instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt” and expressly adopted a six-paragraph instruction to be “submitted to the jury in all criminal cases, even in the absence of an objection or request by the State or the defendant.”2 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim. 2 The Geesa instruction states in its entirety: [1] All persons are presumed to be i

2020Here, as in Park, we conclude BGCCB met its burden to allege facts affirmatively showing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction, and that TWIA did not create a fact issue as to any “jurisdictional facts.” See id. at *7; see also Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 ; but see Jones, 512 S.W.3d at 549, 553 (stating, without analysis or reference to authority, that whether TWIA partially denied coverage for Jones’s claim is a “jurisdictional fact” and concluding that “jurisdiction does not exist because there is no denial of coverage upon which Jones may bring suit”).

2019We conclude that Park has met his burden to allege facts affirmatively showing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction, and TWIA did not create a fact issue as to any “jurisdictional facts.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 ; but see Jones, 512 S.W.3d at 549, 553 (stating, without analysis or reference to authority, that whether TWIA partially denied coverage for Jones’s claim is a “jurisdictional fact” and concluding that 2 If TWIA were in fact a governmental entity entitled to immunity from suit, it would also be entitled by statute to an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s

2020Here, as in Park, we conclude BGCCB met its burden to allege facts affirmatively showing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction, and that TWIA did not create a fact issue as to any “jurisdictional facts.” See id. at *7; see also Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 ; but see Jones, 512 S.W.3d at 549, 553 (stating, without analysis or reference to authority, that whether TWIA partially denied coverage for Jones’s claim is a “jurisdictional fact” and concluding that “jurisdiction does not exist because there is no denial of coverage upon which Jones may bring suit”).

2019The court held that the “Notice of Claim Acceptance” indicated that TWIA “accepted coverage in full for Jones’s claim for damage to his roof.” Id. at 551.

2026Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim.

2026See id. at 228; City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437 , 447 (Tex. 2024) (“[A] plaintiff need not anticipate and defeat every defense the government could conceivably raise” in plea to jurisdiction.); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (“It is well settled that a trial court cannot grant a summary judgment motion on grounds not presented in the motion.”); see, e.g., Jones v. Angelo State Univ., No. 03-14-00112-CV, 2016 WL 3228412 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin June 10, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Because the University did not move for summary judgment, traditional o

2026See id. at 228; City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437 , 447 (Tex. 2024) (“[A] plaintiff need not anticipate and defeat every defense the government could conceivably raise” in plea to jurisdiction.); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (“It is well settled that a trial court cannot grant a summary judgment motion on grounds not presented in the motion.”); see, e.g., Jones v. Angelo State Univ., No. 03-14-00112-CV, 2016 WL 3228412 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin June 10, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Because the University did not move for summary judgment, traditional o

2026See Badall v. Durgapersad, 454 S.W.3d 626, 636-37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (holding that plaintiff’s pleadings sufficiently pled Survival Act claim even though relevant statute was not cited).

2025See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585 , 587–88 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e liberally construe issues presented to obtain a just, fair, and equitable adjudication of the rights of the litigants.”).

2025Rather, it merely contains factual allegations as well as a recitation of the axiom that a “judgment is not final unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party.” One of these factual allegations—that MISD “is a non[]subscriber”—could conceivably be generously construed as an argument that Jones was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking judicial 4 The “[f]ailure to cite applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal.” Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); see also Tex. R.

2024See Thomas v. State, 571 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Ragston, 424 S.W.3d at 52 .

2023A. Article 11.072’s requirements “Article 11.072 does not require a hearing when the issues can be resolved without one.” Ex parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.); see also Ex parte Cummins, 169 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

2023A. Article 11.072’s requirements “Article 11.072 does not require a hearing when the issues can be resolved without one.” Ex parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.); see also Ex parte Cummins, 169 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

2023See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978); Light v. Vistra Energy, No. 10-18-00330-CV, 2021 WL 4777098 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).