Jones factors in Colorado

2025Because Shive did not contest the first three Jones factors, the court focused on the fourth Jones factor — “whether the intention of the parties” to “insulate a party from liability from his own negligence” was expressed in “clear and unambiguous language.” Id. ¶ 10 The court concluded that the exculpatory clause in Shive’s membership agreement was “clear, broad[,] and mostly free of legalese,” and it found that, through the clause, Shive released 24 Hour from “liability for all injuries, regardless of whether the injury was related to exercise.” The court said that, because “entry and exit o

2025“The determination of the sufficiency and validity of an exculpatory agreement is a question of law for the court to determine.” Id. ¶ 30 We conclude that the exculpatory provision does not clearly and unambiguously preclude borrowers’ claims that lender negligently misrepresented information about builder before the loan agreements were executed, so we need not address the first three Jones factors.

2024Id. ¶53 Here, the releases that Miller signed expressly stated that the pass holder assumes the risk of “using the lifts” and of “misloading, entanglements, or falls from ski lifts and the negligence of ski area employees.” In our view, such language expressed the parties’ intentions in clear and unambiguous language and therefore satisfied the fourth Jones factor. ¶54 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the four Jones factors were satisfied in this case and that therefore the releases at issue were enforceable and barred Miller’s cause of action fo

2010See Chadwick v. Colt Ross Owifitters, Inc., 100 P.8d 465, 468 (00102004); B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136 ; Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.1989).

2025See id. at 1095 (holding that an “apparent necessity” instruction satisfied the Jones rule because it “accurately informed the jury that it should consider the ‘totality of the circumstances, including 11 the number of persons reasonably appearing to be threatening the accused’”) (citation omitted). ¶ 21 We are thus not convinced by the People’s argument that the jury was adequately instructed simply because it was told to assess the “reasonableness” of Villegas-Ortega’s self-defense claim and directed generally to consider “all of the testimony given,” “all facts and circumstances shown by th

2025See id. at 1095 (holding that an “apparent necessity” instruction satisfied the Jones rule because it “accurately informed the jury that it should consider the ‘totality of the circumstances, including 11 the number of persons reasonably appearing to be threatening the accused’”) (citation omitted). ¶ 21 We are thus not convinced by the People’s argument that the jury was adequately instructed simply because it was told to assess the “reasonableness” of Villegas-Ortega’s self-defense claim and directed generally to consider “all of the testimony given,” “all facts and circumstances shown by th

2011The General Assembly required that the consent to waiver by a parent be "voluntary and informed." Wycoff 251 P.3d at --; Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 822 , 827 (Colo.2004); Boles v. Sun Ergoline, Inc., 228 P.3d 724, 725 (Colo.2010) (noting that the supreme court invalidated an exeulpatory agreement without regard to the Jones factors in Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1236 ). 2 A parent's decision is informed when the parent has sufficient information to assess the potential degree of risks involved, and the extent of possible injury.

2011The General Assembly required that the consent to waiver by a parent be "voluntary and informed." Wycoff 251 P.3d at --; Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 822 , 827 (Colo.2004); Boles v. Sun Ergoline, Inc., 228 P.3d 724, 725 (Colo.2010) (noting that the supreme court invalidated an exeulpatory agreement without regard to the Jones factors in Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1236 ). 2 A parent's decision is informed when the parent has sufficient information to assess the potential degree of risks involved, and the extent of possible injury.

2025See id. at 1095 (holding that an “apparent necessity” instruction satisfied the Jones rule because it “accurately informed the jury that it should consider the ‘totality of the circumstances, including 11 the number of persons reasonably appearing to be threatening the accused’”) (citation omitted). ¶ 21 We are thus not convinced by the People’s argument that the jury was adequately instructed simply because it was told to assess the “reasonableness” of Villegas-Ortega’s self-defense claim and directed generally to consider “all of the testimony given,” “all facts and circumstances shown by th

2025See id. at 1095 (holding that an “apparent necessity” instruction satisfied the Jones rule because it “accurately informed the jury that it should consider the ‘totality of the circumstances, including 11 the number of persons reasonably appearing to be threatening the accused’”) (citation omitted). ¶ 21 We are thus not convinced by the People’s argument that the jury was adequately instructed simply because it was told to assess the “reasonableness” of Villegas-Ortega’s self-defense claim and directed generally to consider “all of the testimony given,” “all facts and circumstances shown by th

2021Colo. 1992) (applying Jones); accord Patterson v. PowderMonarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 639 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding skiing satisfies the first two Jones factors); Brigance v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 883 F.3d 1243, 1250-53 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Raup v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 734 F. App’x 543 , 546 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Rumpf v. Sunlight, Inc., No. 14-CV-03328- WYD-KLM, 2016 WL 4275386 , at *1-4 (D.

2021Colo. 1992) (applying Jones); accord Patterson v. PowderMonarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 639 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding skiing satisfies the first two Jones factors); Brigance v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 883 F.3d 1243, 1250-53 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Raup v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 734 F. App’x 543 , 546 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Rumpf v. Sunlight, Inc., No. 14-CV-03328- WYD-KLM, 2016 WL 4275386 , at *1-4 (D.

2021The First Two Jones Factors ¶ 18 For good reason Redden does not contest the district court’s conclusion that the exculpatory agreements were not objectionable based on the first two Jones factors: “Although skiing is a recreational activity enjoyed by many, by definition and common sense, it is neither a matter of great public importance nor a matter of practical necessity.” Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 8 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.

2021Colo. Aug. 3, 2016) (unpublished opinion) (applying Jones); Squires v. Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1073 (D.

2021Colo. 1992) (applying Jones); accord Patterson v. PowderMonarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 639 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding skiing satisfies the first two Jones factors); Brigance v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 883 F.3d 1243, 1250-53 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Raup v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 734 F. App’x 543 , 546 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Rumpf v. Sunlight, Inc., No. 14-CV-03328- WYD-KLM, 2016 WL 4275386 , at *1-4 (D.

2021Colo. 1992) (applying Jones); accord Patterson v. PowderMonarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 639 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding skiing satisfies the first two Jones factors); Brigance v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 883 F.3d 1243, 1250-53 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Raup v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 734 F. App’x 543 , 546 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); Rumpf v. Sunlight, Inc., No. 14-CV-03328- WYD-KLM, 2016 WL 4275386 , at *1-4 (D.

2016Wycoff , 251 P.3d at 1263 (applying the Jones factors to a PLA claim).

2016Wycoff , 251 P.3d at 1263 (applying the Jones factors to a PLA claim).

2011We assume that the General Assembly was aware of the Jones test when it enacted section 18-22-107(1)(a)(V), Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo.1997), but required something more for the waiver of a minor's prospective negligence claims.

2011We assume that the General Assembly was aware of the Jones test when it enacted section 18-22-107(1)(a)(V), Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo.1997), but required something more for the waiver of a minor's prospective negligence claims.