Jones rule in California

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2021At the third stage of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “Credibility may be gauged by examining factors including but not limited to ‘ “the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 .) We thus focus our inquiry “ ‘on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given fo

2019It noted that in Jones it had stated that "the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether there has been some significant change in the defendant's mental state," particularly if the defendant has "actively participated in the trial" and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe and converse with the defendant. ( Jones , at p. 1153, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ; Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234 , 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 , 429 P.3d 1122 .) That said, it then went on to explain the limitations of what it would call "the Jones rule"

2019It noted that in Jones it had stated that "the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether there has been some significant change in the defendant's mental state," particularly if the defendant has "actively participated in the trial" and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe and converse with the defendant. ( Jones , at p. 1153, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ; Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234 , 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 , 429 P.3d 1122 .) That said, it then went on to explain the limitations of what it would call "the Jones rule"

2019It noted that in Jones it had stated that "the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether there has been some significant change in the defendant's mental state," particularly if the defendant has "actively participated in the trial" and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe and converse with the defendant. ( Jones , at p. 1153, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ; Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234 , 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 , 429 P.3d 1122 .) That said, it then went on to explain the limitations of what it would call "the Jones rule"

2019It noted that in Jones it had stated that "the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether there has been some significant change in the defendant's mental state," particularly if the defendant has "actively participated in the trial" and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe and converse with the defendant. ( Jones , at p. 1153, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ; Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 234 , 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 , 429 P.3d 1122 .) That said, it then went on to explain the limitations of what it would call "the Jones rule"

2016But the court's remarks, just like the arguments of counsel, "must be judged in the context in which they are made." (Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 385 ; see People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1224, fn. 21 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 691 .) As for the prosecutor's statements, they were plainly directed at the "certainty" language, not the notion of "abiding conviction." In any event, with respect to the prosecutor's remarks, we apply the principle that " '[w]hen [closing] argument runs counter to instructions give

2015But the court's remarks, just like the arguments of counsel, "must be judged in the context in which they are made." (Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 385 ; see People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1224, fn. 21 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 691 .) As for the prosecutor's statements, they were plainly directed at the "certainty" language, not the notion of "abiding conviction." In any event, with respect to the prosecutor's remarks, we apply the principle that " '[w]hen [closing] argument runs counter to instructions give

2016It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.' " 12 words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. [Citation.] Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.' " (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 5 .) The essence of Jones's challenge is that the trial court's remark, "Not to a certainty," somehow modified the pattern

2015It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.' " 12 words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. [Citation.] Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.' " (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 5 .) The essence of Jones's challenge is that the trial court's remark, "Not to a certainty," somehow modified the pattern

2002Jones's violation of section 12021 was complete the instant Jones had the firearm within his control prior to the shooting. ( People v. Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1410 , 273 Cal.Rptr. 253 .) The evidence likewise supported an inference that Jones harbored separate intents in the two crimes.

2002Jones's violation of section 12021 was complete the instant Jones had the firearm within his control prior to the shooting. ( People v. Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1410 , 273 Cal.Rptr. 253 .) The evidence likewise supported an inference that Jones harbored separate intents in the two crimes.

2026(See Jones, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 860 .) At her second sentencing, Jones confirmed she (1) reviewed the probation conditions with her attorney, and (2) understood and accepted them.

2026Under the Jones standard (see Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 315–316), his convictions for counts 1 and 2 are supported by substantial evidence. 3.

2026Under the Jones standard (see Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 315–316), his convictions for counts 1 and 2 are supported by substantial evidence. 3.

2025(Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543 .) Jones’s brief in this court does not satisfy his duty to fairly summarize all the evidence bearing on whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with his use of the property as collateral for loan obligations he assumed.15 The brief includes only a very brief description of the facts regarding the loss of the family home, and it provides no discussion of the evidence favorable to Kuperschmit.

2025(People v. Downey, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 910 ; accord People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 683 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 92, fn. 6 .) Contrary to Larkins’s and Jones’s claim, the court’s decision does not exceed the bounds of reason, and we will therefore uphold it on appeal.

2024Nearly every time thereafter, when Jones’s counsel made a section 352 objection to testimony or evidence, he simply stated “352” or “Evidence Code section 352.” Because the section 352 objection made no mention of undue prejudice from racial bias or speculation, it did not “fairly inform” (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435 ) the court or defense counsel of this evidentiary dispute. 10 Had Jones alerted the trial court, the court would have had the opportunity to consider whether the evidence tended to evoke a racial bias against him or lead the jury to speculate on the meaning of certain te

2024(People v. Lee 14 Having found no prosecutorial misconduct or instructional error, we also reject Jones’s claim of cumulative prejudice from these two issues. 24 (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636 .) “ ‘However, these factors are not exclusive, nor are they invariably determinative.’ ” (Ibid.) Instead, they simply guide our “ ‘ “ ‘ “assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Our review of this issue is subject to the substantial evidence standard, under which we consi

2024In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ] the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a state from mandating the imposition of a life without the option of parole (LWOP) sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.

2024In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ] the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a state from mandating the imposition of a life without the option of parole (LWOP) sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.

2024(People v. Lee 14 Having found no prosecutorial misconduct or instructional error, we also reject Jones’s claim of cumulative prejudice from these two issues. 24 (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636 .) “ ‘However, these factors are not exclusive, nor are they invariably determinative.’ ” (Ibid.) Instead, they simply guide our “ ‘ “ ‘ “assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Our review of this issue is subject to the substantial evidence standard, under which we consi

2024As we are bound to follow our high court’s 41 decision in Franklin (see Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 ), we must reject Jones’ claim.

2024Moreover, “ ‘ “ ‘to obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.’ ” [Citation.] When, however, there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1081 .) Lewis has failed to show that Lewis’ defense was so irreconc

2024Moreover, “ ‘ “ ‘to obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.’ ” [Citation.] When, however, there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1081 .) Lewis has failed to show that Lewis’ defense was so irreconc

2024(People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) Consequently, as our high court has held that Jones’ sentence of 50 years to life does not function as an LWOP sentence under Franklin, and thus is not subject to Miller, we accordingly reject Jones’ claim.