16 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Flowersgreen2 sentences2015See Jones, 547 U.S. at 235 (“Following up with regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice.”); Snure, 234 Ariz. at 205-06, ¶ 10 (“[T]he estate had other reasonable options for notifying [the intended recipient], including sending the notice by regular mail.”); Amount of $2,390, 229 Ariz. at 518, ¶ 12 (“In the absence of any other knowledge of [the claimant’s] whereabouts, the state satisfied the Jones standard by sending notice of forfeiture by regular mail—in addition to the certified mailing that ultimately was returned unclaimed— to [the claimant’s] second address of recor 2012See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234-35 , 126 S.Ct. 1708 (when certified mail returned unclaimed, state could have satisfied due process by sending notice by regular mail, which required no signature for delivery). | 3 | 3 |
Lohmeier v. Hammergreen1 sentence2020State v. Haight-Gyuru, 218 Ariz. 356 , 358–59, ¶¶ 9–10 (App. 2008); see also Lohmeier v. Hammer, 214 Ariz. 57, 61, ¶ 8 (App. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Joel Randu Escalante-Orozcogreen1 sentence2018State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, 282, ¶ 104 (2017) (de novo review). ¶9 A defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal “if there is no substantial evidence to support a conviction.” Ariz. R. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Regenoldgreen1 sentence2017See State v. Regenold, 226 Ariz. 378, 379, ¶8 (2011) (sentence imposed in contested probation revocation proceeding is not entered pursuant to underlying plea agreement); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 288, ¶ 15 (App. 2003) (court of appeals may not overrule, modify or disregard decisions of Arizona Supreme Court). ¶7 The plea agreement recites that Jones pleaded guilty to “attempted child abuse, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children in the second degree, in viol. of A.R.S. secs. 13-3623(A) (B), 13-1001, 13-604.01, 13-701, 13-702, 13-801 and 13-812.”3 The crime to w | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sullivangreen1 sentence2017See State v. Regenold, 226 Ariz. 378, 379, ¶8 (2011) (sentence imposed in contested probation revocation proceeding is not entered pursuant to underlying plea agreement); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 288, ¶ 15 (App. 2003) (court of appeals may not overrule, modify or disregard decisions of Arizona Supreme Court). ¶7 The plea agreement recites that Jones pleaded guilty to “attempted child abuse, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children in the second degree, in viol. of A.R.S. secs. 13-3623(A) (B), 13-1001, 13-604.01, 13-701, 13-702, 13-801 and 13-812.”3 The crime to w | 1 | 1 |
Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc.green2 sentences2016The trial court denied Jones’s motion, finding that the protection afforded to insurers under § 20-259.01 does not insulate an agent “giving ... bad advice.” After the conclusion of the Murrays’ case and again following the verdict, Jones moved for judgment as a matter of law on the same grounds, but both motions were denied. ¶ 51 Although an order denying summary judgment is generally not appealable, to avoid piecemeal litigation we may consider the merits of the motion and direct entry of summary judgment in Jones’s favor if he is “entitled to that as a matter of law and there are no genuine 2016The trial court denied Jones’s motion, finding that the protection afforded to insurers under § 20-259.01 does not insulate an agent “giving ... bad advice.” After the conclusion of the Murrays’ case and again following the verdict, Jones moved for judgment as a matter of law on the same grounds, but both motions were denied. ¶ 51 Although an order denying summary judgment is generally not appealable, to avoid piecemeal litigation we may consider the merits of the motion and direct entry of summary judgment in Jones’s favor if he is “entitled to that as a matter of law and there are no genuine | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nicholas J. McWeeneygreen2 sentences2015He relies on United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.2006), to argue “subjective” factors such as age, intelligence, and length of detention should not be considered in determining voluntariness. 2015He relies on United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.2006), to argue “subjective” factors such as age, intelligence, and length of detention should not be considered in determining voluntariness. | 1 | 1 |
In Re U.S. Currency in the Amount of $2,390green1 sentence2015See Jones, 547 U.S. at 235 (“Following up with regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice.”); Snure, 234 Ariz. at 205-06, ¶ 10 (“[T]he estate had other reasonable options for notifying [the intended recipient], including sending the notice by regular mail.”); Amount of $2,390, 229 Ariz. at 518, ¶ 12 (“In the absence of any other knowledge of [the claimant’s] whereabouts, the state satisfied the Jones standard by sending notice of forfeiture by regular mail—in addition to the certified mailing that ultimately was returned unclaimed— to [the claimant’s] second address of recor | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Richard R. Snuregreen1 sentence2015See Jones, 547 U.S. at 235 (“Following up with regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice.”); Snure, 234 Ariz. at 205-06, ¶ 10 (“[T]he estate had other reasonable options for notifying [the intended recipient], including sending the notice by regular mail.”); Amount of $2,390, 229 Ariz. at 518, ¶ 12 (“In the absence of any other knowledge of [the claimant’s] whereabouts, the state satisfied the Jones standard by sending notice of forfeiture by regular mail—in addition to the certified mailing that ultimately was returned unclaimed— to [the claimant’s] second address of recor | 1 | 1 |
Kaibab Industries v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2007It urges us to impose these proof requirements on any person seeking to reopen a claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1061(H). ¶ 15 As noted above, an employee is entitled to reopen a claim upon proof of a “new, additional or previously undiscovered temporary or permanent condition,” A.R.S. § 23-1061(H), which has a causal connection to the initial injury, Kaibab Indus., 196 Ariz. at 608, ¶ 22 , 2 P.3d at 698 . 2007It urges us to impose these proof requirements on any person seeking to reopen a claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1061(H). ¶ 15 As noted above, an employee is entitled to reopen a claim upon proof of a “new, additional or previously undiscovered temporary or permanent condition,” A.R.S. § 23-1061(H), which has a causal connection to the initial injury, Kaibab Indus., 196 Ariz. at 608, ¶ 22 , 2 P.3d at 698 . | 1 | 1 |
Local No. 207, International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Union v. Perkogreen2 sentences1995Id. at 683 , 103 S.Ct. at 1462-63 ; see also, e.g., Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 , 83 S.Ct. 1429 , 10 L.Ed.2d 646 (1963) (common law tort action for interference with contract preempted because it focused on conduct arguably within the reach of the Act); Lumber Prod. 1995Id. at 683 , 103 S.Ct. at 1462-63 ; see also, e.g., Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 , 83 S.Ct. 1429 , 10 L.Ed.2d 646 (1963) (common law tort action for interference with contract preempted because it focused on conduct arguably within the reach of the Act); Lumber Prod. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Haight-Gyuro
green
1 sentence2020State v. Haight-Gyuru, 218 Ariz. 356 , 358–59, ¶¶ 9–10 (App. 2008); see also Lohmeier v. Hammer, 214 Ariz. 57, 61, ¶ 8 (App. 2006). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Anders v. California
green
1 sentence2017Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2017State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464 (App. 1980). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Leon
green
1 sentence2017Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. LeFlore
green
2 sentences2014The court then synthesized various standing decisions from other jurisdictions and determined that the common denominator under Jones’ progeny is that lawful possession at the time of the trespass is sufficient to confer standing. 374 Ill.Dee. 983, 996 N.E.2d at 686 . 2014“Thus, if the defendant borrows a vehicle with the owner’s consent and is in lawful possession of the vehicle when the GPS device is installed, the defendant has standing ... to challenge the installation.” Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jones v. United States
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 231 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 . 2008Id. at 231 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 683 , 103 S.Ct. at 1462-63 ; see also, e.g., Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 , 83 S.Ct. 1429 , 10 L.Ed.2d 646 (1963) (common law tort action for interference with contract preempted because it focused on conduct arguably within the reach of the Act); Lumber Prod. 1995Id. at 683 , 103 S.Ct. at 1462-63 ; see also, e.g., Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 , 83 S.Ct. 1429 , 10 L.Ed.2d 646 (1963) (common law tort action for interference with contract preempted because it focused on conduct arguably within the reach of the Act); Lumber Prod. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Eastin v. Broomfield
green
2 sentences1980(Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576 , 570 P.2d 744 (1977), and was then pending before the Supreme Court.) Her subsequent motion to compel discovery was heard by a special court commissioner who denied Jones’ motion for protective order and granted Barclay’s motion to compel. 1980(Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576 , 570 P.2d 744 (1977), and was then pending before the Supreme Court.) Her subsequent motion to compel discovery was heard by a special court commissioner who denied Jones’ motion for protective order and granted Barclay’s motion to compel. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. James Andrew Colbert and Michael Beryl Reese
green
2 sentences1978In regard to the Jones rule of “automatic” standing, it was stated: “[W]e do not think the Jones rule of standing was intended to prevent the government from showing voluntary presearch abandonment, if it can, or to apply to a possession prosecution when such abandonment is shown.” 474 F.2d at 177 . 1978In regard to the Jones rule of “automatic” standing, it was stated: “[W]e do not think the Jones rule of standing was intended to prevent the government from showing voluntary presearch abandonment, if it can, or to apply to a possession prosecution when such abandonment is shown.” 474 F.2d at 177 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.