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18 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
General Motors Corp. v. Department of Treasurygreen2 sentences2017See Gen Motors Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 290 Mich App 355, 386 ; 803 NW2d 698 (2010) (stating that “[a]n issue is moot if an event has occurred that renders it 1 People v Jones, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 5, 2016 (Docket No. 330659). -1- impossible for the court to grant relief” or “when a judgment, if entered, cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy”). 2017See Gen Motors Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 290 Mich App 355, 386 ; 803 NW2d 698 (2010) (stating that “[a]n issue is moot if an event has occurred that renders it 1 People v Jones, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 5, 2016 (Docket No. 330659). -1- impossible for the court to grant relief” or “when a judgment, if entered, cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy”). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ericksengreen2 sentences2020See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201 ; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (holding that trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection). 2020See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201 ; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (holding that trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection). | 1 | 1 |
Lahti v. Fosterlinggreen2 sentences2019See Lahti, 357 Mich at 589 (“ ‘[N]o right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which had been lost.’ ”). 2019See Lahti, 357 Mich at 589 (“ ‘[N]o right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which had been lost.’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2014The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress the GPS evidence, finding that one “ ‘traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.’ ” Id. at _; 132 S Ct at 948 (citation omitted). 2014The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress the GPS evidence, finding that one “ ‘traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.’ ” Id. at _; 132 S Ct at 948 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Salvuccigreen2 sentences1984Under Salvucci , pp 92, 95, the test for standing is a "reasonable expectation of privacy.” Furthermore, Salvucci , p 85, expressly overruled the Jones test of "automatic standing.” This Court’s first inquiry must be whether there are any policy considerations which commend the "automatic standing” test over the "reasonable expectation of privacy” test, and whether anything in the differences in language between art 1, § 11 and Am IV requires us to choose one test over the other. 1984Under Salvucci , pp 92, 95, the test for standing is a "reasonable expectation of privacy.” Furthermore, Salvucci , p 85, expressly overruled the Jones test of "automatic standing.” This Court’s first inquiry must be whether there are any policy considerations which commend the "automatic standing” test over the "reasonable expectation of privacy” test, and whether anything in the differences in language between art 1, § 11 and Am IV requires us to choose one test over the other. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Citizens Ins. Co. v. Pro-Seal Service Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Because the policy does not define the term “deny,” the Court of Appeals turned to dictionary definitions to decipher its meaning. 27 The panel looked to Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997), which defines “deny” as “to refuse to agree or accede to” and as “to withhold something from, or refuse to grant a request[.]” In contrast, the same dictionary defines “rescind” as “to revoke, annul, or repeal.” The panel concluded that the contract only granted Meemic the right of subrogation if it paid CitiMortgage and denied Jones’s claim under the insurance policy—as opposed to rescinding 2022Because the policy does not define the term “deny,” the Court of Appeals turned to dictionary definitions to decipher its meaning. 27 The panel looked to Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997), which defines “deny” as “to refuse to agree or accede to” and as “to withhold something from, or refuse to grant a request[.]” In contrast, the same dictionary defines “rescind” as “to revoke, annul, or repeal.” The panel concluded that the contract only granted Meemic the right of subrogation if it paid CitiMortgage and denied Jones’s claim under the insurance policy—as opposed to rescinding | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann
green
2 sentences2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady 2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Brady v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady 2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady 2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady 2018Third, the trial court must be 4 MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor five or more years older than the victim). 5 Jones was also charged in LC No. 15-005721-01-FH with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), but that count was dismissed at trial on Jones’s motion for a directed verdict. 6 People v Campbell, 316 Mich App 279, 283 ; 894 NW2d 72 (2016). 7 People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640-641 ; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 8 Campbell, 316 Mich App at 283 . 9 Williams, 470 Mich at 641. 10 Id. at 641-642 (alterations in original), quoting Brady | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Rakas v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1982The Jones rule granting standing for anyone legitimately on the premises at the time of the search and seizure was struck down in Rakas, supra, 142 . 1982The Jones rule granting standing for anyone legitimately on the premises at the time of the search and seizure was struck down in Rakas, supra, 142 . | 2 | 1982–1984 |
Morris v. Clawson Tank Co.
green
2 sentences2026See MCR 2.517(A)(7); Morris v Clawson Tank Co, 459 Mich 256 , 275 n 13; 587 NW2d 253 (1998). 2026See MCR 2.517(A)(7); Morris v Clawson Tank Co, 459 Mich 256 , 275 n 13; 587 NW2d 253 (1998). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Cornell
green
2 sentences2020Cornell, 466 Mich at 354 . 2020Cornell, 466 Mich at 354 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Griswold Properties, LLC v. Lexington Insurance
green
2 sentences2019Thus, the Legislature’s reinstatement of the prior legal standard, which “had been lost through” application of the Jones doctrine and which, according to the Legislature in 2016 PA 419 , should have applied all along, works no unfairness and may 8 The dissent also states that the discussion in Brewer of the reinstatement rule is dicta. “[S]tatements concerning a principle of law not essential to determination of the case are obiter dictum and lack the force of an adjudication.” Griswold Props, LLC v Lexington Ins Co, 276 Mich App 551, 557-558 ; 741 NW2d 549 (2007) (quotation marks and citatio 2019Thus, the Legislature’s reinstatement of the prior legal standard, which “had been lost through” application of the Jones doctrine and which, according to the Legislature in 2016 PA 419 , should have applied all along, works no unfairness and may 8 The dissent also states that the discussion in Brewer of the reinstatement rule is dicta. “[S]tatements concerning a principle of law not essential to determination of the case are obiter dictum and lack the force of an adjudication.” Griswold Props, LLC v Lexington Ins Co, 276 Mich App 551, 557-558 ; 741 NW2d 549 (2007) (quotation marks and citatio | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Caminetti v. United States
green
2 sentences2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Williams v. United States
green
2 sentences2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cleveland v. United States
green
2 sentences2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Morton Salt Co.
green
2 sentences2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 2019See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale LJ 331, 424 (Appendix I), citing the following: PL 100-703, § 201; 102 Stat 4674, 4676 (1988), overruling United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632 ; 70 S Ct 357 ; 94 L Ed 401 (1950), after 38 years; PL 99-654, § 2; 100 Stat 3660, 3660-3663 (1986), overruling Williams v United States, 327 US 711 ; 66 S Ct 778 ; 90 L Ed 962 (1946), after 40 years; PL 99-628, § 5(b)(1); 100 Stat 3510-3511 (1986), overruling Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470 ; 37 S Ct 192 ; 61 L Ed 442 (1917), and Cleveland v United States, 3 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Adrian School District v. Michigan Public School Employees' Retirement System
green
2 sentences2019By so acting, the legislation also clarified the Legislature’s intent regarding the previous law and settled the 7 The dissent cites Adrian Sch Dist v Mich Pub Sch Employees Retirement Sys, 458 Mich 326, 337 ; 582 NW2d 767 (1998) (quotation marks and citations; emphasis added), for the proposition that the 2016 act cannot be construed to clarify the Legislature’s intent because only “when a legislative amendment is enacted soon after a controversy arises regarding the meaning of an act” is it “logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act . . . .” The diss 2019By so acting, the legislation also clarified the Legislature’s intent regarding the previous law and settled the 7 The dissent cites Adrian Sch Dist v Mich Pub Sch Employees Retirement Sys, 458 Mich 326, 337 ; 582 NW2d 767 (1998) (quotation marks and citations; emphasis added), for the proposition that the 2016 act cannot be construed to clarify the Legislature’s intent because only “when a legislative amendment is enacted soon after a controversy arises regarding the meaning of an act” is it “logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act . . . .” The diss | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hurd v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2019The dissent states that Brewer stands for the rule that “[e]ven if the Legislature acts to invalidate a prior decision of this Court, the amendment is limited to prospective application if it enacts a substantive change in the law.” Brewer, 486 Mich at 56 , citing Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 533 ; 377 NW2d 300 (1985) (emphasis added). 2019The dissent states that Brewer stands for the rule that “[e]ven if the Legislature acts to invalidate a prior decision of this Court, the amendment is limited to prospective application if it enacts a substantive change in the law.” Brewer, 486 Mich at 56 , citing Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 533 ; 377 NW2d 300 (1985) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Brewer v. a D Transport Express, Inc
green
2 sentences2019The dissent states that Brewer stands for the rule that “[e]ven if the Legislature acts to invalidate a prior decision of this Court, the amendment is limited to prospective application if it enacts a substantive change in the law.” Brewer, 486 Mich at 56 , citing Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 533 ; 377 NW2d 300 (1985) (emphasis added). 2019The dissent states that Brewer stands for the rule that “[e]ven if the Legislature acts to invalidate a prior decision of this Court, the amendment is limited to prospective application if it enacts a substantive change in the law.” Brewer, 486 Mich at 56 , citing Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 533 ; 377 NW2d 300 (1985) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
MICHIGAN COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY ASSOCIATION v. Michigan Public Service Commission
neutral
1 sentence2019There has been no miscarriage of justice. [People v Jones, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 1, 2007 (Docket No. 267111), p 1 (citations and quotation marks omitted).] The panel denied Jones’s motion for reconsideration, People v Jones, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 13, 2007 (Docket No. 267111), and our Supreme Court subsequently denied Jones’s application for leave to appeal, People v Jones, 480 Mich 953 (2007). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
O’connell v. Director of Elections
green
2 sentences2019As noted, the language of 2016 PA 419 , § 2a(5) provides, “In a civil action, a municipal corporation that has a duty to maintain a sidewalk under subsection (1) may assert, in addition to any other defense available to it, any defense available under the common law with respect to a premises liability claim, including, but not limited to, a defense that the condition was open and obvious.” Given the development of the law culminating in the Jones doctrine, it is readily apparent that the Legislature intended to abrogate that doctrine. “[A] general rule of statutory construction is that the Le 2019As noted, the language of 2016 PA 419 , § 2a(5) provides, “In a civil action, a municipal corporation that has a duty to maintain a sidewalk under subsection (1) may assert, in addition to any other defense available to it, any defense available under the common law with respect to a premises liability claim, including, but not limited to, a defense that the condition was open and obvious.” Given the development of the law culminating in the Jones doctrine, it is readily apparent that the Legislature intended to abrogate that doctrine. “[A] general rule of statutory construction is that the Le | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Brownell v. Garber
green
2 sentences2016With respect to Jones’s allegation of fraudulent concealment, it is not entirely clear whether he pursued the claim as a separate cause of action or as a basis to toll the statute of limitations under MCL 600.5855.5 In regard to fraudulent concealment as a cause of action, assuming that Jones’s claim was not actually a legal malpractice claim improperly characterized as fraud, Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich App 519, 532-533 ; 503 NW2d 81 (1993), he simply failed to adequately plead a cause of action, MCR 2.116(C)(8), and any fraud claim would also be time-barred considering the six-year statute o 2016With respect to Jones’s allegation of fraudulent concealment, it is not entirely clear whether he pursued the claim as a separate cause of action or as a basis to toll the statute of limitations under MCL 600.5855.5 In regard to fraudulent concealment as a cause of action, assuming that Jones’s claim was not actually a legal malpractice claim improperly characterized as fraud, Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich App 519, 532-533 ; 503 NW2d 81 (1993), he simply failed to adequately plead a cause of action, MCR 2.116(C)(8), and any fraud claim would also be time-barred considering the six-year statute o | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Stephens v. Worden Insurance Agency, LLC
green
2 sentences2016With respect to Jones’s allegation of fraudulent concealment, it is not entirely clear whether he pursued the claim as a separate cause of action or as a basis to toll the statute of limitations under MCL 600.5855.5 In regard to fraudulent concealment as a cause of action, assuming that Jones’s claim was not actually a legal malpractice claim improperly characterized as fraud, Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich App 519, 532-533 ; 503 NW2d 81 (1993), he simply failed to adequately plead a cause of action, MCR 2.116(C)(8), and any fraud claim would also be time-barred considering the six-year statute o 2016With respect to Jones’s allegation of fraudulent concealment, it is not entirely clear whether he pursued the claim as a separate cause of action or as a basis to toll the statute of limitations under MCL 600.5855.5 In regard to fraudulent concealment as a cause of action, assuming that Jones’s claim was not actually a legal malpractice claim improperly characterized as fraud, Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich App 519, 532-533 ; 503 NW2d 81 (1993), he simply failed to adequately plead a cause of action, MCR 2.116(C)(8), and any fraud claim would also be time-barred considering the six-year statute o | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Kreiner v. Fischer
red
1 sentence2008Kreiner, supra at 130 , 683 N.W.2d 611 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pomeroy v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Union Township v. City of Mount Pleasant
green
2 sentences1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Davis v. Chrysler Corp.
green
2 sentences1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Robinson Township v. Ottawa County Board of Road Commissioners
green
2 sentences1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 1994The cases cited by the township as establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the highways in issue in those cases do not address the distinction between the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel and the sidewalks running alongside, and thus do not preclude the application of the Jones Court’s jurisdictional analysis to this case. 12 Moreover, the analysis in Jones and its application to this case are supported by Union Twp v Mount Pleasant, 381 Mich 82 ; 158 NW2d 905 (1968), and by more recent decisions of this Court: Pomeroy v Dep’t of Transportation, 175 Mich App 556 ; 4 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.