Jones test in Montana

2006Though Benefis argues that our holding in Kadillak is “no longer good law” and that our decision in Jones v. County of Missoula, 2006 MT 2 , 330 Mont. 205 , 127 P.3d 406 (holding that Missoula County’s decision regarding the availability of health care benefits for same-sex domestic partners of county employees was of significant public interest), superseded Kadillak , we note that the Jones inquiry regarding “significant public interest” was fact-intensive, 4 making it particularly difficult, in the context of a request for a preliminary injunction, for this Court to find fault with the Distr

2006Though Benefis argues that our holding in Kadillak is “no longer good law” and that our decision in Jones v. County of Missoula, 2006 MT 2 , 330 Mont. 205 , 127 P.3d 406 (holding that Missoula County’s decision regarding the availability of health care benefits for same-sex domestic partners of county employees was of significant public interest), superseded Kadillak , we note that the Jones inquiry regarding “significant public interest” was fact-intensive, 4 making it particularly difficult, in the context of a request for a preliminary injunction, for this Court to find fault with the Distr

2003Jones, 279 Mont. at 347 , 927 P.2d at 12-13 .

2003Jones, 279 Mont. at 347 , 927 P.2d at 12-13 .

2002Such a contractual waiver " 'must be deliberately and understandingly made, and the language relied upon to constitute such a waiver must clearly, unequivocally and orthis right.' " May, 186 Mont. at 394 , 607 P.2d at 1138 - una~nbiguouslyexpress a ~vaiver 175 In this case, as already noted. there is no evidcnce tn the record before us that Kloss vo!uiltarily, knowingly and intelligently xvaived her fundamenrai constitutional rights to a jury bial and to access lo the courts when she signed Jones's standard-form contracts.

2002Such a contractual waiver “ ‘must be deliberately and understandingly made, and the language relied upon to constitute such a waiver must clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver of this right.’ ” May, 186 Mont. at 394 , 607 P.2d at 1138-39 . ¶75 In this case, as already noted, there is no evidence in the record before us that Kloss voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived her fundamental constitutional rights to a jury trial and to access to the courts when she signed Jones’s standard-form contracts.

2002Such a contractual waiver “ ‘must be deliberately and understandingly made, and the language relied upon to constitute such a waiver must clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver of this right.’ ” May, 186 Mont. at 394 , 607 P.2d at 1138-39 . ¶75 In this case, as already noted, there is no evidence in the record before us that Kloss voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived her fundamental constitutional rights to a jury trial and to access to the courts when she signed Jones’s standard-form contracts.

1982Rather, said the Court, the true test of whether a Fourth Amendment right has been violated is found in Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 , in which the Supreme Court said that the capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Fourth Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.

1982Rather, said the Court, the true test of whether a Fourth Amendment right has been violated is found in Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 , in which the Supreme Court said that the capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Fourth Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.

1982Upon such a showing, the exclusionary rule would be available to prevent the admission of the evidence against the defendant.” United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 87 , 100 S.Ct. at 2550 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 625 . *462 The Jones rule was seen as meeting two needs.

1982Upon such a showing, the exclusionary rule would be available to prevent the admission of the evidence against the defendant.” United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 87 , 100 S.Ct. at 2550 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 625 . *462 The Jones rule was seen as meeting two needs.