132 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Browngreen2 sentences2026The majority quotes the cautionary language that the residual hearsay exception “was not intended to throw open a wide door for the entry of judicially created exceptions to the hearsay rule” and is instead “to be narrowly construed.” See Hill v. Brown, 283 Ark. 185, 188 , 672 S.W.2d 330, 332 (1984). 2026The majority quotes the cautionary language that the residual hearsay exception “was not intended to throw open a wide door for the entry of judicially created exceptions to the hearsay rule” and is instead “to be narrowly construed.” See Hill v. Brown, 283 Ark. 185, 188 , 672 S.W.2d 330, 332 (1984). | 2 | 6 |
Hawkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See generally Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384 , 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002). 2025See generally Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384 , 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002). | 2 | 4 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1996The United States Supreme Court discussed the Confrontation Clause and exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990): In Ohio v. Roberts, we set forth a “general approach” for determining when incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 448 U.S., at 65. 1996The United States Supreme Court discussed the Confrontation Clause and exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990): In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), we set forth a "general approach" for determining when incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 448 U.S., at 65 , 100 S.Ct. at 2538-39 . | 2 | 4 |
Bragg v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Bragg v. State, 328 Ark. 613, 623 , 946 S.W.2d 654, 660 (1997). 2025Bragg v. State, 328 Ark. 613, 623 , 946 S.W.2d 654, 660 (1997). | 2 | 3 |
Branscomb v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Branscomb v. State, 299 Ark. 482, 489 , 774 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1989). 2022Branscomb v. State, 299 Ark. 482, 489 , 774 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1989). | 2 | 2 |
Ouachita Mining & Exploration, Inc. v. Wigleygreen2 sentences2009Thus, the presentation of Nelson’s deposition testimony during Dr. Stubblefield’s case-in-chief was a “perfectly permissible practice.” Arthur v. Zearley, 337 Ark. 125, 139 , 992 S.W.2d 67, 75 (1999) (Zearleys entitled to present the deposition testimony of Arthur irrespective of his availability to testify at trial); see also Ouachita Mining & Exploration, Inc. v. Wigley, 318 Ark. 750 , 887 S.W.2d 526 (1994) (Ouachita Mining was entitled to present the deposition of Wigley irrespective of the hearsay rule and irrespective of his availability at trial). 1999See Ouachita Mining & Exp., Inc. v. Wigley, 318 Ark. 750 , 887 S.W.2d 526 (1994) (holding that Ouachita Mining was entitled to use the deposition of the defendant as part of its case irrespective of the hearsay rule and irrespective of whether the defendant was available or unavailable at trial). | 2 | 2 |
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc.green2 sentences1983See also Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, etc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978); Process Control v. Tullahoma Hot Mix Paving Co., 79 F.R.D. 223 (E.D. 1983See also Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, etc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir.1978); Process Control v. Tullahoma Hot Mix Paving Co., 79 F.R.D. 223 (E.D.Tenn.1977); and Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Seely v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 145 , 282 S.W.3d 778, 782 (2008). 2023Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 145 , 282 S.W.3d 778, 782 (2008). | 1 | 4 |
Peterson v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Peterson, 349 Ark. 195 , 76 S.W.3d 845 ; Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392 , 836 S.W.2d 380 (1992). 2005Peterson, 349 Ark. 195 , 76 S.W.3d 845 ; Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392 , 836 S.W.2d 380 (1992). | 1 | 3 |
Killcrease v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Peterson, 349 Ark. 195 , 76 S.W.3d 845 ; Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392 , 836 S.W.2d 380 (1992). 2005Peterson, 349 Ark. 195 , 76 S.W.3d 845 ; Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392 , 836 S.W.2d 380 (1992). | 1 | 3 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Taylor v. State, 88 Ark. 2017See Taylor v. State, 88 Ark. | 1 | 2 |
Elliott v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Flores, supra. In other cases, our supreme court has expressly held that “the medical- treatment exception to the hearsay rule permits hearsay identifying the perpetrator in the special case of a child-abuse victim where the abuser is a member of the child’s immediate household and the statement is made in the course of a medical examination for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment.” Elliott v. State, 2010 Ark. 2021App. 809, at 6 , 379 S.W.3d 101, 105 (citing Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384 , 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
McClellan v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Terry v. State, 309 Ark. 64, 69 , 826 S.W.2d 817, 820 (1992); see also McClellan v. State, 81 Ark. 2010McClellan v. State, 81 Ark. | 1 | 2 |
Carton v. Missouri Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences1997In Carton, 303 Ark. 568 , 798 S.W.2d 674 , this court held that a portion of the plaintiff s statement to a doctor concerning the cause of her injury should have been excluded as it did not fall within the hearsay exception in Rule 803(4). 1997In Carton, 303 Ark. 568 , 798 S.W.2d 674 , this court held that a portion of the plaintiff s statement to a doctor concerning the cause of her injury should have been excluded as it did not fall within the hearsay exception in Rule 803(4). | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1992See White v. Illinois, supra. Also see Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524 , 798 S.W.2d 94 (1990), for the time period for an excited utterance by a child. 1992See White v. Illinois, supra. Also see Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524 , 798 S.W.2d 94 (1990), for the time period for an excited utterance by a child. | 1 | 2 |
Goins v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Goins v. State, 2019 Ark. | 1 | 1 |
| Tracy v. Denniegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dirickson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Terry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ashley v. Ashleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weber v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dougan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greenwood v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arthur v. Zearleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hodge v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Piercy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ward v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 746487green | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. Stillsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Luedemann v. Wadegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences2015Rule 804(b)(7)’s requirement that a child’s hearsay statement “possess[ ] sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness” to be admissible as a hearsay exception when the declarant was unavailable was in line with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), until the 2004 case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). 2015Rule 804(b)(7)’s requirement that a child’s hearsay statement “possess[ ] sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness” to be admissible as a hearsay exception when the declarant was unavailable was in line with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), until the 2004 case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). | 6 | 1987–2015 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 400–01 (1965), provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Rayborn cites Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), for the proposition that Dantzler’s out-of-court accusation that he “killed my baby” was a testimonial statement and should 8 Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that an excited utterance, w 2015Rule 804(b)(7)’s requirement that a child’s hearsay statement “possess[ ] sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness” to be admissible as a hearsay exception when the declarant was unavailable was in line with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), until the 2004 case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). | 4 | 2015–2020 |
Caswell v. State
green
2 sentences2024Caswell v. State, 63 Ark. 2021Caswell v. State, 63 Ark. | 3 | 2016–2024 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2015Jones v. State, 31 Ark. 2014Jones v. State, 31 Ark.App. 23 , 786 S.W.2d 851 (1990). | 3 | 1998–2015 |
Wildwood Contractors v. Thompson-Holloway Real Estate Agency
green
2 sentences2009Wildwood Contractors v. Thompson-Holloway Real Estate Agency, 17 Ark.App. 169 , 705 S.W.2d 897 (1986). 2009Wildwood Contractors v. Thompson-Holloway Real Estate Agency, 17 Ark.App. 169 , 705 S.W.2d 897 (1986). | 3 | 2000–2009 |
United States v. John Louis Iron Shell, Jr.
green
2 sentences1994Borrowing from United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), we stated the factors to consider in determining whether a statement is an excited utterance include (1) the age of the declarant, (2) the physical and mental condition of the declarant, (3) the characteristics of the event, and (4) the subject matter of the statement, and we noted that the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, although relevant, is not dispositive of the application of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 1992Borrowing from United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), we stated the factors to consider in determining whether a statement is an excited utterance include (1) the age of the declarant, (2) the physical and mental condition of the declarant, (3) the characteristics of the event, and (4) the subject matter of the statement, and we noted that the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, although relevant, is not dispositive of the application of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. | 3 | 1992–2001 |
Cates v. State
green
2 sentences1989Cates v. State, 267 Ark. 726 , 589 S.W.2d 598 (1979). 1989Cates v. State, 267 Ark. 726 , 589 S.W.2d 598 (1979). | 3 | 1986–1989 |
Redman v. State
green
2 sentences1986Stat. Ann. § 28-1001 (Repl. 1979), Uniform Rules of Evidence 1002; Redman v. State, 265 Ark. 774 , 580 S.W.2d 945 (1979), nor does it violate the hearsay rule for a witness to testify about a physical object not presented in court. 1986Stat. Ann. § 28-1001 (Repl. 1979), Uniform Rules of Evidence 1002; Redman v. State, 265 Ark. 774 , 580 S.W.2d 945 (1979), nor does it violate the hearsay rule for a witness to testify about a physical object not presented in court. | 2 | 1986–2004 |
Nard v. State
green
2 sentences1996Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159 , 801 S.W.2d 634 (1990). 1996Nard v. State, 304 Ark. 159 , 801 S.W.2d 634 (1990). | 2 | 1992–1996 |
United States v. Harvey M. Renville
green
2 sentences1989As stated in United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), the crucial question under the rule is whether the out-of-court statement of the declarant was “reasonably pertinent” to diagnosis or treatment. 1986In United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), the defendant also argued that the hearsay exception embodied in Fed. | 2 | 1986–1989 |
Krulewitch v. United States
green
2 sentences1985App. 228 , 640 S.W.2d 805 (1982) and Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) which hold that statements by co-conspirators made after the conspiracy has ended are not admissible because the hearsay exception applies only to acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and “does not extend to concerted efforts to conceal the crime.” This reliance is misplaced. 1982That argument was clearly rejected in Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440 (1949), which held that a statement made by a co-conspirator after the central aim of the conspiracy is made is not admissible and that the exception to the hearsay rule does not extend to concerted action to conceal the crime. | 2 | 1982–1985 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1985App. 228 , 640 S.W.2d 805 (1982) and Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) which hold that statements by co-conspirators made after the conspiracy has ended are not admissible because the hearsay exception applies only to acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and “does not extend to concerted efforts to conceal the crime.” This reliance is misplaced. 1983App. 228 , 640 S. W.2d 805 (1982), where we said it held that this exception to the hearsay rule does not “extend to concerted action to conceal the crime.” In United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975), a "casual admission of culpability” was found in no way to have furthered the conspiracy. | 2 | 1983–1985 |
Process Control Corp. v. Tullahoma Hot Mix Paving Co.
green
2 sentences1983See also Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, etc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978); Process Control v. Tullahoma Hot Mix Paving Co., 79 F.R.D. 223 (E.D. 1983See also Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, etc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir.1978); Process Control v. Tullahoma Hot Mix Paving Co., 79 F.R.D. 223 (E.D.Tenn.1977); and Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. | 2 | 1980–1983 |
| Grant v. State green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sir Jeffery McNeil-lewis v. State of Arkansas
green
2 sentences2025McNeil-Lewis v. State, 2023 Ark. 54 , 661 S.W.3d 195 . 2025McNeil-Lewis v. State, 2023 Ark. 54 , 661 S.W.3d 195 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| United States v. Jeffrey Thomas green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Cook v. State green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Davis v. State neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Davis v. Washington green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Pointer v. Texas green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Embry v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Eichelberger v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Hensley v. State neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Hicks v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Howard v. State neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Robert Joseph Satterfield green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Heath v. State neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Friar v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Edison v. State neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Cox v. State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wyles v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Chambers v. Mississippi green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Green v. Georgia green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Rodriguez v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Hinzman v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Byrum v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Callaway v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Burkett v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Dednam v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.