hearsay rule in Vermont

2020See State v. Voorheis, 2004 VT 10, ¶ 24 , 176 Vt. 265 , 844 A.2d 794 (recognizing that “trial court determines the admissibility of evidence, including preliminary questions of whether statements fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule,” and Supreme Court reviews decision only for abuse of discretion). ¶ 37.

2020See State v. Voorheis, 2004 VT 10, ¶ 24 , 176 Vt. 265 , 844 A.2d 794 (recognizing that “trial court determines the admissibility of evidence, including preliminary questions of whether statements fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule,” and Supreme Court reviews decision only for abuse of discretion). ¶ 37.

2014As one court has explained, the hearsay rule, which “ensure[s] that parties can test all the testimony against them through cross-examination[,] is not relevant when the testimony is the party’s own.” In re V.N.W. , 292 P.3d 548, 554 (Or. 2012) (en banc).

2014As one court has explained, the hearsay rule, which “ensure[s] that parties can test all the testimony against them through cross-examination[,] is not relevant when the testimony is the party’s own.” In re V.N.W., 292 P.3d 548, 554 (Or. 2012) (en banc).

1994Recor, 150 Vt. at 47 , 549 A.2d at 1387 .

1991State v. Recor, 150 Vt. 40, 49 , 549 A.2d 1382,1389 (1988) (objection on one ground does not preserve appeal on other grounds).

2024This exception to the hearsay rule was created “because child victims are often unable to repeat the facts of the abuse in court because of the intimidation of the process.” State v. Gallagher, 150 Vt. 341, 346 (1988) (quotation and alteration omitted).

2004See In re C.K., 164 Vt. 462, 466 , 671 A.2d 1270, 1273 (1995) (“The rule’s requirement that the child be available to testify is to allow for cross-examination, to ensure the reliability of the hearsay statements.”); Gallagher, 150 Vt. at 344 , 554 A.2d at 223 (“The hearsay exception under [Rule 804a] is specifically aimed at preventing [a Confrontation Clause] violation by guaranteeing that the putative child victim will be available for the defendant’s cross-examination.”). ¶ 20.

2020See Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (recognizing “that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” and “co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that . . . a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements” (quotation omitted)). 13 addressing defendant’s arguments, there is ample authority interpreting the analogous federal rule that squarely refutes defendant’s arguments.

2020See Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (recognizing “that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” and “co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that . . . a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements” (quotation omitted)). 13 addressing defendant’s arguments, there is ample authority interpreting the analogous federal rule that squarely refutes defendant’s arguments.

2015See, e.g., Brown , 883 P.2d at 950 (noting that “generally applicable evidentiary standards” adequately serve goal of ascertaining truth); Browne v. State , 132 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. Dist.

2015See, e.g., Brown, 883 P.2d at 950 (noting that “generally applicable evidentiary standards” adequately serve goal of ascertaining truth); Browne v. State, 132 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. Dist.

2014See, e.g., State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 246 (1982) (quoting Dupona v. Benny, 130 Vt. 281, 287 (1972) (expert may not “‘act[] as a conduit’ for the other doctor’s opinion . . . one expert may not put in evidence the opinion of a nontestifying expert without running afoul of the hearsay rule”); see also Todd v. Williams, 18 F.3d 1132, 1143-44 (4th Cir. 1994) (medical expert could not testify that his opinions were “essentially the same” as another non-testifying expert); Todd v. Williams, 242 Va. 178 (1991) (error to allow expert witness to bolster or corroborate witness’s opinion by telling jur

1994See Bryan, 566 F.2d at 547 (reversible error where opinions of nontestifying experts contained in written reports were “argued *8 substantively, violating the hearsay rule”); State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 247 , 453 A.2d 1133, 1136 (1982) (reversible error where “jury was asked to base its decision upon the testimony of a witness never brought before the trier of fact and never cross-examined”); Kim v. Nazarian, 576 N.E.2d 427, 435 (Ill.

1996See United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 1978) (“touchstone for admission of evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule has been the existence of circumstances which attest to its trustworthiness”); see also State v. Discher, 597 A.2d 1336, 1341 (Me. 1991) (past recollection recorded exception does not spell out method for establishing initial knowledge or contemporaneity and accuracy of record, but leaves determination to circumstances of particular case).

1996See United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344, 350 (6th Cir.1978) ("touchstone for admission of evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule has been the existence of circumstances which attest to its trustworthiness"); see also State v. Discher, 597 A.2d 1336, 1341 (Me.1991) (past recollection recorded exception does not spell out method for establishing initial knowledge or contemporaneity and accuracy of record, but leaves determination to circumstances of particular case). *81 III.

2026Dec. 9, 2003); compare State v. Austin, 165 Vt. 389, 397 (1996) (noting that “the Vermont Rules of Evidence specifically exclude ‘investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel’ from the public-records exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2015Id. at 397, 685 A.2d at 1082 (citing V.R.E. 803(8)(B)(i)).

2026Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “checks . . . are not hearsay” but instead “are legally operative documents with a meaning independent of the truth of the words they display,” and as “ ‘verbal acts,’ their significance ‘lies solely in the fact that [they were] made, [so] no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted’ ” (quoting Advisory Committee Notes—1972 Proposed Rules Note to Subdivision (c), F.R.E. 801)); United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Checks fall squarely in [the] category of legally-operative verbal acts that are not barred by the hearsay rule.”); se

2026Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “checks . . . are not hearsay” but instead “are legally operative documents with a meaning independent of the truth of the words they display,” and as “ ‘verbal acts,’ their significance ‘lies solely in the fact that [they were] made, [so] no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted’ ” (quoting Advisory Committee Notes—1972 Proposed Rules Note to Subdivision (c), F.R.E. 801)); United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Checks fall squarely in [the] category of legally-operative verbal acts that are not barred by the hearsay rule.”); se

2025As one court has observed, “[w]e perceive events with our ears as much as with our eyes.” United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 323 (4th Cir. 1982).

2020Hearsay within hearsay is permitted “if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule.” V.R.E. 805; see also State v. Godfrey, 2010 VT 29, ¶ 38 , 187 Vt. 495 , 996 A.2d 237 (noting “evidentiary problems” with string of hearsay statements where “defendant does not argue that each level of hearsay falls under an exception”). the four puppies, two guinea pigs, and a hamster.

2020Hearsay within hearsay is permitted “if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule.” V.R.E. 805; see also State v. Godfrey, 2010 VT 29, ¶ 38 , 187 Vt. 495 , 996 A.2d 237 (noting “evidentiary problems” with string of hearsay statements where “defendant does not argue that each level of hearsay falls under an exception”). the four puppies, two guinea pigs, and a hamster.

2016Under the exception, the contents of an excited utterance are considered trustworthy because a “person’s powers of reflection and fabrication will be suspended when she is subject to the excitement of a startling event.” In re Peters, 171 Vt. 381, 391 , 765 A.2d 468, 476 (2000).

2016Under the exception, the contents of an excited utterance are considered trustworthy because a “person’s powers of reflection and fabrication will be suspended when she is subject to the excitement of a startling event.” In re Peters, 171 Vt. 381, 391 , 765 A.2d 468, 476 (2000).

2015E.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1099, 1101-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (victim’s statements to strangers and to emergency-room staff were excited utterance and statement for purposes of medical treatment, respectively); State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (victim’s statements admitted under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471, 473-75 (Nev. 2006) (victim’s statement to neighbor was excited utterance); State v. Stahlnecker, 690 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (S.C. 2010) (victim’s statement t

2015E.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1099, 1101-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (victim’s statements to strangers and to emergency-room staff were excited utterance and statement for purposes of medical treatment, respectively); State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (victim’s statements admitted under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471, 473-75 (Nev. 2006) (victim’s statement to neighbor was excited utterance); State v. Stahlnecker, 690 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (S.C. 2010) (victim’s statement t

2015E.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1099, 1101-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (victim’s statements to strangers and to emergency-room staff were excited utterance and statement for purposes of medical treatment, respectively); State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (victim’s statements admitted under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471, 473-75 (Nev. 2006) (victim’s statement to neighbor was excited utterance); State v. Stahlnecker, 690 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (S.C. 2010) (victim’s statement t

2015E.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1099, 1101-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (victim’s statements to strangers and to emergency-room staff were excited utterance and statement for purposes of medical treatment, respectively); State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (victim’s statements admitted under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471, 473-75 (Nev. 2006) (victim’s statement to neighbor was excited utterance); State v. Stahlnecker, 690 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (S.C. 2010) (victim’s statement t

2015Cf. State v. Cagley, 638 N.W.2d 678, 680-82 (Iowa 2002), People v. Hackney, 455 N.W.2d 358, 360-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (both evaluating victims’ statements and finding that hearsay exceptions did not apply under facts of case).

2015E.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1099, 1101-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (victim’s statements to strangers and to emergency-room staff were excited utterance and statement for purposes of medical treatment, respectively); State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (victim’s statements admitted under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471, 473-75 (Nev. 2006) (victim’s statement to neighbor was excited utterance); State v. Stahlnecker, 690 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (S.C. 2010) (victim’s statement t

2015E.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1099, 1101-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (victim’s statements to strangers and to emergency-room staff were excited utterance and statement for purposes of medical treatment, respectively); State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (victim’s statements admitted under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471, 473-75 (Nev. 2006) (victim’s statement to neighbor was excited utterance); State v. Stahlnecker, 690 S.E.2d 665, 672-73 (S.C. 2010) (victim’s statement t