hearsay rule in Georgia

1997“The two underlying reasons for any exception to the hearsay rule are a necessity for the exception and a circumstantial guaranty of the trustworthiness of the offered evidence — that is, there must be something present which the law considers a substitute for the oath of the declarant and his cross examination by the party against whom the hearsay is offered.” Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221, 224 ( 173 SE2d 691 ) (1970).

1997“The two underlying reasons for any exception to the hearsay rule are a necessity for the exception and a circumstantial guaranty of the trustworthiness of the offered evidence — that is, there must be something present which the law considers a substitute for the oath of the declarant and his cross examination by the party against whom the hearsay is offered.” Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221, 224 ( 173 SE2d 691 ) (1970).

2012See generally Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151, 154-155 (4) ( 510 SE2d 802 ) (1998) (describing circumstances under which a statement made by a deceased person may be admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule).

2012See generally Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151, 154-155 (4) ( 510 SE2d 802 ) (1998) (describing circumstances under which a statement made by a deceased person may be admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule).

2014But see Yancey, 275 Ga. at 553 (2) (a) (explaining that former OCGA § 24-3-1 (b), the so-called “necessity exception,” had been interpreted “as creating a residual exception to the hearsay rule”); Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 607 (3) ( 351 SE2d 448 ) (1987) (suggesting that former OCGA §§ 24-3-3 to 24-3-14, which enumerated 12 types of hearsay exceptions, were not exhaustive); Williams, 19 Ga. at 403 (discussing the common-law forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception).

2014But see Yancey, 275 Ga. at 553 (2) (a) (explaining that former OCGA § 24-3-1 (b), the so-called “necessity exception,” had been interpreted “as creating a residual exception to the hearsay rule”); Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 607 (3) ( 351 SE2d 448 ) (1987) (suggesting that former OCGA §§ 24-3-3 to 24-3-14, which enumerated 12 types of hearsay exceptions, were not exhaustive); Williams, 19 Ga. at 403 (discussing the common-law forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception).

2009“There is a distinct difference between a challenge to the admission of evidence based upon the Confrontation Clause and that based upon an exception to the hearsay rule.” Walton v. State, 278 Ga. 432, 434 (1) ( 603 SE2d 263 ) (2004).

2009“There is a distinct difference between a challenge to the admission of evidence based upon the Confrontation Clause and that based upon an exception to the hearsay rule.” Walton v. State, 278 Ga. 432, 434 (1) ( 603 SE2d 263 ) (2004).

2014See, e.g., Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 33-36 ( 549 SE2d 107 ) (2001) (explaining that the narrative portion of a police report “does not have the reliability inherent in other documents that courts have traditionally considered to be business records,” and concluding that “the narratives contained in police reports generated in connection with police investigations are not the appropriate subject of an exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2014See, e.g., Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 33-36 ( 549 SE2d 107 ) (2001) (explaining that the narrative portion of a police report “does not have the reliability inherent in other documents that courts have traditionally considered to be business records,” and concluding that “the narratives contained in police reports generated in connection with police investigations are not the appropriate subject of an exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2004More specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the wife's statement under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. "[A] trial judge's determination that evidence offered as part of the res gestae is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant being considered by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous." Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 228 , 290 S.E.2d 71 (1982).

2004More specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the wife's statement under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. "[A] trial judge's determination that evidence offered as part of the res gestae is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant being considered by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous." Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 228 , 290 S.E.2d 71 (1982).

2021See Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 553 (2) (a) ( 570 SE2d 269 ) (2002) (“To be admissible under [the necessity] exception, the party presenting the evidence must prove that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, the declarant’s out-of-court statement is relevant to a material fact and more probative on that fact than other available evidence, and the statement shows particular guarantees of the trustworthiness.”). 7 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court in the instant case admitted the product label under the hearsay exception contained in OCGA § 24-8- 803 (17).5 (

2021See Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 553 (2) (a) ( 570 SE2d 269 ) (2002) (“To be admissible under [the necessity] exception, the party presenting the evidence must prove that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, the declarant’s out-of-court statement is relevant to a material fact and more probative on that fact than other available evidence, and the statement shows particular guarantees of the trustworthiness.”). 7 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court in the instant case admitted the product label under the hearsay exception contained in OCGA § 24-8- 803 (17).5 (

2023When the statement at issue is non-testimonial in nature, however, the State’s normal rules regarding the admission of hearsay apply.” (footnote omitted)). 12 McCord, 305 Ga. at 322 (2) (a) (i) (punctuation omitted); accord Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 356 (II) ( 131 SCt 1143 , 179 LE2d 93) (2011). 13 See McCord, 305 Ga. at 324 (2) (a) (ii) (holding that the trial court did not err when, after concluding there was no Confrontation Clause violation, the trial court then determined whether the statements were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule); Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540,

2023When the statement at issue is non-testimonial in nature, however, the State’s normal rules regarding the admission of hearsay apply.” (footnote omitted)). 12 McCord, 305 Ga. at 322 (2) (a) (i) (punctuation omitted); accord Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 356 (II) ( 131 SCt 1143 , 179 LE2d 93) (2011). 13 See McCord, 305 Ga. at 324 (2) (a) (ii) (holding that the trial court did not err when, after concluding there was no Confrontation Clause violation, the trial court then determined whether the statements were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule); Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540,

2019See Clark v. State , 271 Ga. 6 , 10-11, 515 S.E.2d 155 (1999).

2019See Clark v. State , 271 Ga. 6 , 10-11, 515 S.E.2d 155 (1999).

2012Pretermitting whether this testimony was sufficient to lay a foundation generally for the admission of the three money orders under the business records exception, 4 it is well settled that “[t]hose portions of business records which contain conclusions, opinions, estimates and impressions of third parties who are not before the court are not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 370 (3) ( 434 SE2d 479 ) (1993).

2012Pretermitting whether this testimony was sufficient to lay a foundation generally for the admission of the three money orders under the business records exception, 4 it is well settled that “[t]hose portions of business records which contain conclusions, opinions, estimates and impressions of third parties who are not before the court are not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 370 (3) ( 434 SE2d 479 ) (1993).

2018As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the basis for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. [Cits.] Idaho v. Wright , 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990).

2018As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the basis for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. [Cits.] Idaho v. Wright , 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990).

2006Our Supreme Court rejected this argument in Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76 ( 485 SE2d 486 ) (1997). 3 In that case, the court held that breath-testing device certificates were records made within the regular course of business within the meaning of OCGA§ 24-3-14 and may, upon the proper foundation being laid, be introduced into evidence under the business record exception to the hearsay rule.

2006Our Supreme Court rejected this argument in Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76 ( 485 SE2d 486 ) (1997). 3 In that case, the court held that breath-testing device certificates were records made within the regular course of business within the meaning of OCGA§ 24-3-14 and may, upon the proper foundation being laid, be introduced into evidence under the business record exception to the hearsay rule.

2008In Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga. 844 (2a), 607 S.E.2d 569 (2005), this Court rejected an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 24-3-18(a), which creates a hearsay exception applicable in "the trial of any civil case involving injury or disease," observing that the plaintiff could not show he was treated differently than similarly situated persons because he was "treated no differently than any other party in a civil action involving injury or disease. . . ." Thus, just as defendants in criminal cases are situated similarly only to others charged with the same offense, civil litigants are considered s

2008In Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga. 844 (2a), 607 S.E.2d 569 (2005), this Court rejected an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 24-3-18(a), which creates a hearsay exception applicable in "the trial of any civil case involving injury or disease," observing that the plaintiff could not show he was treated differently than similarly situated persons because he was "treated no differently than any other party in a civil action involving injury or disease. . . ." Thus, just as defendants in criminal cases are situated similarly only to others charged with the same offense, civil litigants are considered s

2021See Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 121-122 (3) ( 702 SE2d 151 ) (2010).7 7 We note that Young’s trial was not governed by Georgia’s current Evidence Code, which took effect on January 1, 2013.

2021See Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 121-122 (3) ( 702 SE2d 151 ) (2010).7 7 We note that Young’s trial was not governed by Georgia’s current Evidence Code, which took effect on January 1, 2013.

2021Rule 807 “applies only when certain exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and necessity are present.” Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414, 421 ( 788 SE2d 442 ) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020If those three requirements are met, we may remedy the error if it “‘seriously affect(s) the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (citation omitted). (a) Rule 807 says, in pertinent part: A statement not specifically covered by any law but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that: (1) The statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (2) The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure

1990However, contrary to Miller's assertions, we conclude that the testimony was not admissible under either the business-records exception, see Suarez v. Suarez, 257 Ga. 102, 103-104 (2) ( 355 SE2d 649 ) (1987), or the medical-diagnosis exception, see Dunn v. McIntyre, 146 Ga. App. 362, 363 (2) ( 246 SE2d 398 ) (1978), to the hearsay rule. 8.

1990However, contrary to Miller's assertions, we conclude that the testimony was not admissible under either the business-records exception, see Suarez v. Suarez, 257 Ga. 102, 103-104 (2) ( 355 SE2d 649 ) (1987), or the medical-diagnosis exception, see Dunn v. McIntyre, 146 Ga. App. 362, 363 (2) ( 246 SE2d 398 ) (1978), to the hearsay rule. 8.

1990In Teague , this court held that rarely will the “conduct” of an investigating officer need to be “explained,” as in practically every case, the motive, intent or state of mind of such an officer will not be “matters concerning which the truth must be found.” The hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-2, must be kept within its limits to avoid the admission of “rumor, gossip, or speculation.” Teague v. State, supra, 252 Ga. at 536 .

1990In Teague , this court held that rarely will the "conduct" of an investigating officer need to be "explained," as in practically every case, the motive, intent or state of mind of such an officer will not be "matters concerning which the truth must be found." The hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-2, must be kept within its limits to avoid the admission of "rumor, gossip, or speculation." Teague v. State, supra, 252 Ga. at 536 .

2008See also Height v. State, 278 Ga. 592, 595-596 (1) ( 604 SE2d 796 ) (2004) (holding that unstipulated polygraph test results, while not admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of a death penalty trial, may be admissible in the sentencing phase if the trial court determines that they are sufficiently reliable); Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95, 97 (99 SC 2150, 60 LE2d 738) (1979) (holding that the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically in the sentencing phase of a capital trial); Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, 649 (3) ( 220 SE2d 922 ) (1975) (holding that a defendant does not have to forfe

2004See also Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95, 97 (99 SC 2150, 60 LE2d 738) (1979) (the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically in the sentencing phase of a capital trial to “defeat the ends of justice”); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 567 (11) ( 261 SE2d 364 ) (1979) (mitigation evidence that is ordinarily inadmissible under an evidentiary rule must not be excluded automatically in the sentencing phase).

2017However, “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice when the rejected testimony b[ears] persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and [i]s critical to (the) defense.” Grell v. State, 291 Ga. 615, 618 (2) ( 732 SE2d 741 ) (2012), quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 ( 93 SCt 1038 , 35 LE2d 297) (1973).

2017However, “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice when the rejected testimony b[ears] persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and [i]s critical to (the) defense.” Grell v. State, 291 Ga. 615, 618 (2) ( 732 SE2d 741 ) (2012), quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 ( 93 SCt 1038 , 35 LE2d 297) (1973).

2012The admission of the co-defendant’s statement to the neighbor did not violate the Confrontation Clause because, as the Supreme Court stated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 56 (124 SC 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004), statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not “testimonial.” The admission of the neighbor’s testimony repeating what co-defendant Satterfield told him during the concealment phase of the conspiracy about appellant’s participation in the crimes did not violate appellant’s right to confront th

2007Turner asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay in the form of (a) testimony from six witnesses regarding statements allegedly made by Glenn prior to his death, (b) testimonial statements made by Glenn to two police officers that were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (124 SC 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004), and (c) Randy Thompson’s diary. (a) Hearsay statements are admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule when the evidence is both necessary and *650 accompanied by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

2009In Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 862 ( 286 SE2d 717 ) (1982), the Supreme Court held that although [heretofore, the use of prior inconsistent statements in Georgia has been restricted to impeachment, except in cases where they come under some other exception to the hearsay rule[, henceforth] ... a prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes.

2009In Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 862 ( 286 SE2d 717 ) (1982), the Supreme Court held that although [heretofore, the use of prior inconsistent statements in Georgia has been restricted to impeachment, except in cases where they come under some other exception to the hearsay rule[, henceforth] ... a prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes.

2025As we have previously cautioned, “because the residual exception applies only to statements not specifically covered by any law, trial courts should consider whether a specific exception to the hearsay rule applies before applying Rule 807.” State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116 , 124 n.10 ( 839 SE2d 560 ) (2020) (noting that “Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception is designed to be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.”) (cleaned up).

2025As we have previously cautioned, “because the residual exception applies only to statements not specifically covered by any law, trial courts should consider whether a specific exception to the hearsay rule applies before applying Rule 807.” State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116 , 124 n.10 ( 839 SE2d 560 ) (2020) (noting that “Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception is designed to be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.”) (cleaned up).

2013After all, we found in Allen that the statements attributed to Brown “were made during the pendency of [a] conspiracy and were admissible... under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.” 288 Ga. at 266-267 (4) (citations omitted).

2011See Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263 (4) ( 702 SE2d 869 ) (2010) (statements made by co-defendant during concealment phase of conspiracy are admissible against defendant under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule).

1999Cook claimed that Hurt told Agent Mansfield that John Weigand had admitted committing the murders to him, and that Hurt had seen Michele Cartagena's driver's license (which was missing from the crime scene) at Weigand's home. [5] "To qualify as a necessity exception to the hearsay rule, there must be a necessity for the exception and a circumstantial guaranty of the testimony's trustworthiness." Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 795 (4), 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998); see also McKissick v. State, 263 Ga. 188, 189 (3), 429 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

1999Cook claimed that Hurt told Agent Mansfield that John Weigand had admitted committing the murders to him, and that Hurt had seen Michele Cartagena's driver's license (which was missing from the crime scene) at Weigand's home. [5] "To qualify as a necessity exception to the hearsay rule, there must be a necessity for the exception and a circumstantial guaranty of the testimony's trustworthiness." Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 795 (4), 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998); see also McKissick v. State, 263 Ga. 188, 189 (3), 429 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

1998Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 249 (4) ( 260 SE2d 11 ) (1979); Dennis v. Adcock, supra; see also McGaha v. State, 221 Ga. App. 440, 441 ( 471 SE2d 533 ) (1996) (statutes merely pertaining to evidentiary authentication of documents do not affect hearsay considerations).

1998Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 249 (4) ( 260 SE2d 11 ) (1979); Dennis v. Adcock, supra; see also McGaha v. State, 221 Ga. App. 440, 441 ( 471 SE2d 533 ) (1996) (statutes merely pertaining to evidentiary authentication of documents do not affect hearsay considerations).

2004See also Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680 , 571 S.E.2d 806 (2002). [2] See In the Interest of C.W., 227 Ga.App. 763, 767-768 (3), 490 S.E.2d 442 (1997). [3] Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 856 , 472 S.E.2d 74 (1996) (unconstitutional to introduce a sworn affidavit into evidence against a criminal defendant, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional guaranty that he be confronted with the witnesses against him). [4] Shapiro v. State, 233 Ga.App. 620, 622 (3), 504 S.E.2d 719 (1998) (DPS records at issue "are public records which allow a court to `infer reliability when the hearsay falls withi

2004See also Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680 , 571 S.E.2d 806 (2002). [2] See In the Interest of C.W., 227 Ga.App. 763, 767-768 (3), 490 S.E.2d 442 (1997). [3] Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 856 , 472 S.E.2d 74 (1996) (unconstitutional to introduce a sworn affidavit into evidence against a criminal defendant, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional guaranty that he be confronted with the witnesses against him). [4] Shapiro v. State, 233 Ga.App. 620, 622 (3), 504 S.E.2d 719 (1998) (DPS records at issue "are public records which allow a court to `infer reliability when the hearsay falls withi