hearsay rule in Delaware

2020The admissibility ruling is the same under D.R.E. 807.54 For a hearsay statement to be held as admissible under this exception, “there [must be] a guaranty of trustworthiness associated with the proffered hearsay statement. . . .”55 The self- 52 See D.R.E. 803(6). 53 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1152, 1162 (Del. 1997) (“If double hearsay is being offered into evidence, each aspect must qualify independently as an exception to the hearsay rule[.]”); see also Evidentiary Tr. at 8:9-13,16-21 (Trial counsel stated “I think the TASC Report itself is not admissible.

2020See D.R.E. 803(6). 2 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1152, 1162 (Del. 1997) (“If double hearsay is being offered into evidence, each aspect must qualify independently as an exception to the hearsay rule[.]”); see also Evidentiary Tr. at 8:9-13,16-21 (Trial counsel stated “I think the TASC Report itself is not admissible.

2019Therefore, because both statements met the requirements 62 Id. 63 Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 274 (Del. 1998). 26 for exceptions to the hearsay rule, Trial Counsel’s failure to object to the statement’s admission was professionally reasonable.64 Even if Trial Counsel’s failure to object to the statement’s admission was unreasonable, Defendant cannot establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on that basis because the statement did not prejudice Defendant.

2015Accordingly, Ms. Wilson’s hand-written letter, statements to her son, and statements to the police are admissible in consideration of D.R.E. 803(2) and Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED. 7 Id. at 490 . 8 Id. at 489-90 (citing Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 274 (Del. 1998)). 9 Id. at 490. 4 (b) D.R.E. 803(3) – Then-Existing State of Mind Statements offered to show the “present intention or an existing state of mind the deceased,” qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule. 10 According to the Delaware Supreme Court, there are five requirements to establish the necessary foundation to admit

2013See Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir.1985) ("[C]ircumstantial evidence of the declarant's personal perception must not be so scanty as to forfeit the 'guarantees of trustworthiness’ which form the hallmark of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.”).

2001Supr., 420 A.2d 170, 177 (1980); see also Miller v. Keating, 3rd Cir., 754 F.2d 507, 512 (1985)(stating that, under the analogous federal rule, “[t]he assumption underlying the hearsay exception of Rule 803(2) is that a person under the sway of excitement temporarily loses the capacity of reflection and thus produces statements free of fabrication”).

2018According to the State, when the context is considered—the victim was held up in the dark, by a man in a ski mask, pointing a gun, which led to a struggle, and a shot fired with the victim not knowing whether he had been hit—it was expected that the victim would still be in shock and scared when he spoke with the officer. (6) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.8 “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice to produce

2015Under the Delaware Rules of Evidence (“D.R.E.”), an out-of-court written or verbal statement by someone other than the declarant testifying offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted qualifies as hearsay. 4 Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless the statement is privy to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.5 There are three hearsay exceptions applicable to Ms. Wilson’s out-of-court statements. (a) D.R.E. 803(2) – Excited Utterance An excited utterance qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule because it is a spontaneous statement made in reaction to an exciting

2001Supr., 321 A.2d 497, 503 (1974) (observing that the state of mind exception is "a universally recognized exception to the hearsay rule").

2001Supr., 321 A.2d 497, 503 (1974) (observing that the state of mind exception is "a universally recognized exception to the hearsay rule”).

2020See also U.S. v. Stewart, 485 F. 3d 666, 670 (2nd Cir. 2007) which stated that forfeiture was a “matter of simple equity and common sense” when a defendant wrongfully procures a witness’ silence. 48 See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008). 22 the Court allowed the use of Pruitt’s statement49 but gave the defense the opportunity to research the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing as it related to this trial.50 For the reasons previously set forth in detail, Pruitt’s statement was admissible under the hearsay exception of forfeiture (of the right to confrontation) by wrongdoing

2017See also D.R.E. 804 cmt (“[D.R.E. 804(6)(6)] tracks F.R.E. 804(6)(6).”). 19 statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness” is “not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.”40 The “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay exception is “aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them_in other words, it is grounded in the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their pro

2007Cf. id. (”[A]ccom-plices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999)).

2007Cf. id. (”[A]ccom-plices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999)).

1997“The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 814 , 110 S.Ct. at 3146 (emphasis added).

1997“The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 814 , 110 S.Ct. at 3146 (emphasis added).

2023Accordingly, although the Superior Court did not specifically address hearsay before overruling Rosas-Jose’s objection, we conclude the court did not err by admitting the evidence. (17) Under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), a statement is not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party” and “[i]s one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.”28 Delaware’s rule is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B), and we accord the federal judiciary’s construction of identical rules “great persuasive weight” when we interpret our parallel Delaware rules.29 Federal courts addressi

2021Ct. Sept. 10, 2019). 76 Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083, 1088 (Del. 1994). 77 D.R.E. 803(2). 25 offered as evidence must have been made during the time period while the excitement of the event was continuing; and (3) the statement must be related to the startling event.”78 “Statements qualifying as excited utterances are deemed reliable because the person making the statement under these conditions ‘is not in a position to fabricate and will exclaim the truth.’”79 Put differently, “[t]he assumption underlying the hearsay exception of Rule 803(2) is that a person under the sway of excitement temp

2020She also told the dispatcher how to find 5 Abner v. State, 757 A.2d 1277 , 2000 WL 990973 , at *1 (Del. 2000) (TABLE). 6 Dixon v. State, 996 A.2d 1271 , 1276 n.5 (Del. 2010) (citing Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 253 (Del. 2001) to explain that “[c]ourts generally find statements admissible as a present sense exception to the hearsay rule, under D.R.E. 803(1), if the statements are made either immediately or within about ten or twenty minutes of the event.”). 7 See 2 McCormick on Evid. § 271 (8th ed.) (explaining that the “growing use of electronic communication devices, such as cell phones an

2010Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 253 (Del.2001). 6 .

2017See also D.R.E. 804 cmt (“[D.R.E. 804(6)(6)] tracks F.R.E. 804(6)(6).”). 19 statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness” is “not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.”40 The “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay exception is “aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them_in other words, it is grounded in the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their pro

2007Cf. id. (”[A]ccom-plices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999)).

2001See Gannon, 704 A.2d at 275-77 (holding that a statement admissible under the excited utterance exception does not violate the defendant's confrontation rights under the Delaware or federal constitution); Williamson v. State, Del.Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 355-56 (1998) (finding that recordings of 911 calls admitted under the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions were admitted under "firmly rooted exceptions”) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ("In White , for instance, we h

2001See Gannon, 704 A.2d at 275-77 (holding that a statement admissible under the excited utterance exception does not violate the defendant's confrontation rights under the Delaware or federal constitution); Williamson v. State, Del.Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 355-56 (1998) (finding that recordings of 911 calls admitted under the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions were admitted under "firmly rooted exceptions”) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ("In White , for instance, we h

2020Furthermore, although Pruitt’s out-of-court statement was hearsay, the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that this hearsay was an exception to 45 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) cited in U.S. v. Baskerville, 448 Fed.

2017Silence Comment Cured Clayon Green testified that he did not inform police investigators of everything he saw happen on July 8, 2012, but that he was “a hundred percent sure” 46 United States v. Baskervz`lle, 448 Fed.

2001See Gannon, 704 A.2d at 275-77 (holding that a statement admissible under the excited utterance exception does not violate the defendant's confrontation rights under the Delaware or federal constitution); Williamson v. State, Del.Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 355-56 (1998) (finding that recordings of 911 calls admitted under the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions were admitted under "firmly rooted exceptions”) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ("In White , for instance, we h

2001See Gannon, 704 A.2d at 275-77 (holding that a statement admissible under the excited utterance exception does not violate the defendant's confrontation rights under the Delaware or federal constitution); Williamson v. State, Del.Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 355-56 (1998) (finding that recordings of 911 calls admitted under the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions were admitted under "firmly rooted exceptions”) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ("In White , for instance, we h

2001Contrary to the defendant's assertions, we have long declined to follow Brown's strict rule.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 , 116 S.Ct. 1021 , 134 L.Ed.2d 100 (1996); State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278 , 406 S.E.2d 876, 895-97 (1991) (admitting taped statement by murder victim, including descriptions of specific incidents and threats, under state of mind exception); State v. Jones, 137 N.C.App. 221 , 527 S.E.2d 700, 704-05 (2000) ("These statements, although entirely factual, in effect showed the decedent's state of mind when she uttered them and were therefore admissible under R

1991Thus, Judge MacKinnon in United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C.Cir.1973) determined as follows: The rule then to be distilled from the better reasoned decisions is that a victim’s extra-judicial declarations of fear of the defendant are admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule with a limiting instruction only if there is a manifest need for such evidence, i.e., if it is relevant to a material issue in the case.

1975The right of confrontation is not absolute. “[M]erely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 , 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 495 (1970).

1975The right of confrontation is not absolute. “[M]erely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 , 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 495 (1970).

2025United States v. Hendricks, 143 F.App'x 168, 171 (11th Cir. 2005). 73 Id. at 172; see also United States v. Long, 578 F.2d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Johnson, 413 F.2d 1396, 1398 (5th Cir. 1969)) (same but also declining to reverse the conviction on that ground because the officer’s testimony as to the contents of the report was not prejudicial since it had not been admitted as direct evidence of a necessary element of the crime and in view of the plethora of other evidence that the truck had been stolen); Castillo-Salgado v. State, 2014 WL 3764492, at *3 (Tex. App. Jul.

2025Apr. 3, 2014) (TABLE) (calibration records “can be introduced through the business records exception to the hearsay rule.”). 105 See Maulo v. State, 27 A.3d 551 , 2011 WL 3849498, at *3 (Del.

2025According to the court, his responses contained “double and triple hearsay.”46 The court suspected that it was 43 In re Asbestos Litig., 228 A.3d at 681 (quoting Pitts v. White, 109 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. 1954)). 44 Stillwater Mining, 289 A.3d at 1282 (citing Harper, 970 A.2d at 201 ). 45 A3737–92 (Winter Submission, Aug. 14, 2020). 46 New Trial Op. at *3. 17 likely to “create a ripple effect of thorny evidentiary issues, for the very reasons that the hearsay rule was designed to prevent.”47 The court, “[a]gainst its better judgment,” allowed the parties to use the submission at trial.48 The Wint

2025Evid. 803(8)(B)). 70 Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 280 (Va. 1986). 17 trustworthiness, like the fact that the record was shown to be regularly prepared and routinely relied upon by the Virginia State Police in the regular course of business.71 By contrast, in United States v. Hendricks, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the admission an NCIC report in the context of a supervised release revocation proceeding (where the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply),72 but acknowledged that “an NCIC report is hearsay and does not fall within the Federal Business Records Act or any other recognized e

2025Evid. 803(8)(B)). 70 Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 280 (Va. 1986). 17 trustworthiness, like the fact that the record was shown to be regularly prepared and routinely relied upon by the Virginia State Police in the regular course of business.71 By contrast, in United States v. Hendricks, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the admission an NCIC report in the context of a supervised release revocation proceeding (where the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply),72 but acknowledged that “an NCIC report is hearsay and does not fall within the Federal Business Records Act or any other recognized e

2025Evid. 803(8)(B)). 70 Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 280 (Va. 1986). 17 trustworthiness, like the fact that the record was shown to be regularly prepared and routinely relied upon by the Virginia State Police in the regular course of business.71 By contrast, in United States v. Hendricks, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the admission an NCIC report in the context of a supervised release revocation proceeding (where the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply),72 but acknowledged that “an NCIC report is hearsay and does not fall within the Federal Business Records Act or any other recognized e