hearsay rule in Maryland

2026Specifically, he argues that the tacit admission exception does not apply because it is ambiguous whether the appellant adopted his mother’s statement that he “kill[ed] that boy.” 16 A. Standard of Review “[T]he trial court’s ultimate determination of whether particular evidence is hearsay or whether it is admissible under a hearsay exception is owed no deference on appeal, but the factual findings underpinning this legal conclusion necessitate a more deferential standard of review.” Gordon v. State, 431 Md. 527, 538 (2013).

2023It is well established that a “trial court’s ultimate determination of whether particular evidence is hearsay or whether it is admissible under a hearsay exception is owed no deference on appeal, but the factual findings underpinning this legal conclusion 40 necessitate a more deferential standard of review.” Gordon v. State, 431 Md. 527, 538 (2013).

2024That is not to say that no collateral statements can come in under the hearsay exception, but such collateral statements must be “so closely connected” with a statement against penal interest “as to be equally trustworthy[.]” State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 17 (1987).

2024After explaining the rationale of the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, we explained that “[i]nculpatory statements may be divided into collateral and noncollateral statements.” Id. at 15 .

2025Hearsay “must be excluded as evidence at trial, unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule excluding such evidence or is ‘permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes.’” Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 8 (quoting Md.

2025However, “[r]eview of the admissibility of evidence which is hearsay is different.” Id. at 7-8 . [T]he trial court’s ultimate determination of whether particular evidence is hearsay or whether it is admissible under a hearsay exception is owed no deference on appeal, but the factual findings underpinning this legal conclusion necessitate a more deferential standard of review.

2006Appellant next argues that the “trial court erred when it failed to consider the unreliable nature of [Darby’s hearsay statement] because reliability is required for any exception to the hearsay rule.” (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-57 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)).

2006Appellant next argues that the “trial court erred when it failed to consider the unreliable nature of [Darby’s hearsay statement] because reliability is required for any exception to the hearsay rule.” (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-57 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)).

2002See, e.g., diss. op. at 586 n. 1 (discussing the “firmly rooted” exceptions to the hearsay rule and admissibility for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause); diss. op. at 586 (citing Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 560 , 636 A.2d 463, 469 (1994), a Confrontation Clause case, and erroneously stating that “there must be a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” as the standard under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3)); diss. op. at 586 (proposing that the principles of the Confrontation Clause provide the basis for the additional guarantees of trustworthiness for inculpating statements)

2002See, e.g., diss. op. at 586 n. 1 (discussing the “firmly rooted” exceptions to the hearsay rule and admissibility for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause); diss. op. at 586 (citing Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 560 , 636 A.2d 463, 469 (1994), a Confrontation Clause case, and erroneously stating that “there must be a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” as the standard under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3)); diss. op. at 586 (proposing that the principles of the Confrontation Clause provide the basis for the additional guarantees of trustworthiness for inculpating statements)

2006The Court of Special Appeals relied upon Gregory v. State, 40 Md.App. 297 , 391 A.2d 437 (1978), quoted with approval in State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 220-21 , 545 A.2d 27, 32 (1988): “The mere fact that a document is part of a hospital record made in the ordinary course of the hospital’s business, and may therefore be admissible under the hearsay rule, does not ipso facto make its admission comply with the confrontation requirement....

2006The Court of Special Appeals relied upon Gregory v. State, 40 Md.App. 297 , 391 A.2d 437 (1978), quoted with approval in State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 220-21 , 545 A.2d 27, 32 (1988): “The mere fact that a document is part of a hospital record made in the ordinary course of the hospital’s business, and may therefore be admissible under the hearsay rule, does not ipso facto make its admission comply with the confrontation requirement....

2015Rule 5-802; see also Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 85, 96 , 55 A.3d 10 (2012) (“Generally, statements made out of court that are offered for their truth are inadmissible as hearsay, absent circumstances bringing the statements within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule”) (quoting Su v. Weaver, 313 Md. 370, 376 , 545 A.2d 692 (1988)).

2015Rule 5-802; see also Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 85, 96 , 55 A.3d 10 (2012) (“Generally, statements made out of court that are offered for their truth are inadmissible as hearsay, absent circumstances bringing the statements within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule”) (quoting Su v. Weaver, 313 Md. 370, 376 , 545 A.2d 692 (1988)).

2006See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 112-13 , 604 A.2d 47, 49 (1992) (holding that a trial judge “has the discretion to exclude a document that meets the technical requirements of a business record when the objecting party persuades the judge that the document lacks the degree of reliability and trustworthiness that business records are ordinarily assumed to possess.”) (footnote omitted); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 604-605 , 495 A.2d 348, 360 (1985) (applying the public records exception to the hearsay rule and differentiating between “fact” and “opinion”);

2006See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 112-13 , 604 A.2d 47, 49 (1992) (holding that a trial judge “has the discretion to exclude a document that meets the technical requirements of a business record when the objecting party persuades the judge that the document lacks the degree of reliability and trustworthiness that business records are ordinarily assumed to possess.”) (footnote omitted); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 604-605 , 495 A.2d 348, 360 (1985) (applying the public records exception to the hearsay rule and differentiating between “fact” and “opinion”);

2012On appeal, in Foster, id. at 202 , 464 A.2d 986 , the defendant contended that “the application of the hearsay rule, which prevented her from presenting a portion of her defense, rendered her trial fundamentally unfair and deprived her of due process of law.” Relying on Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), 24 and Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), 25 the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that “[r]egardless of whether the proffered testi mony [was] inadmissible because of Maryland’s hearsay rule, u

2012On appeal, in Foster, id. at 202 , 464 A.2d 986 , the defendant contended that “the application of the hearsay rule, which prevented her from presenting a portion of her defense, rendered her trial fundamentally unfair and deprived her of due process of law.” Relying on Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), 24 and Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), 25 the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that “[r]egardless of whether the proffered testi mony [was] inadmissible because of Maryland’s hearsay rule, u

2023Analysis We return to the case at bar and examine whether the trial court erred in admitting, under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, Ms. Day’s testimony that Ms. Hockaday told her that she was “afraid of her boyfriend.” In doing so, we examine the totality of the circumstances and consider the factors identified in our decisional law that 36 assist trial courts in determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance, such as the amount of time that has passed since the startling event, Morten, 242 Md. App. at 548-49; whether the statement was made in response t

2010See State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 81-82 , 702 A.2d 723, 729 (1997) (stating that in order to qualify under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the “declarant’s statement must have some connection with the startling event in order to relate to the startling event ....”) (emphasis added); Trimble v. BNSF Ry.

2023See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); West v. State, 124 Md. App. 147, 166-67 (1998); see also Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529 , 566- 67, 574-75 & n.4 (2002) (Raker, J., concurring) (explaining that “it is important to keep in mind that the standards for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause are stricter than under the hearsay exception, requiring independent corroboration, while the hearsay exception under the rule does not.”). 11 The apparent confusion is demonstrated, for example, by the State’s comments at the motions

2023See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); West v. State, 124 Md. App. 147, 166-67 (1998); see also Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529 , 566- 67, 574-75 & n.4 (2002) (Raker, J., concurring) (explaining that “it is important to keep in mind that the standards for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause are stricter than under the hearsay exception, requiring independent corroboration, while the hearsay exception under the rule does not.”). 11 The apparent confusion is demonstrated, for example, by the State’s comments at the motions

2012On appeal, in Foster, id. at 202 , 464 A.2d 986 , the defendant contended that “the application of the hearsay rule, which prevented her from presenting a portion of her defense, rendered her trial fundamentally unfair and deprived her of due process of law.” Relying on Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), 24 and Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), 25 the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that “[r]egardless of whether the proffered testi mony [was] inadmissible because of Maryland’s hearsay rule, u

2012On appeal, in Foster, id. at 202 , 464 A.2d 986 , the defendant contended that “the application of the hearsay rule, which prevented her from presenting a portion of her defense, rendered her trial fundamentally unfair and deprived her of due process of law.” Relying on Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), 24 and Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), 25 the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that “[r]egardless of whether the proffered testi mony [was] inadmissible because of Maryland’s hearsay rule, u

2005See Moore v. State, 26 Md.App. 556, 561-62 , 338 A.2d 344, 347 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 747 (1975) (excited utterance of three-and-a-half year old admitted); Jackson v. State, 31 Md.App. 332 , 356 A.2d 299 (1976) (excited utterance of four-year-old admitted); Johnson v. State, 63 Md.App. 485 , 492 A.2d 1343 (1985), cert. denied, 304 Md. 298 , 498 A.2d 1185 (1985) (excited utterance of insane person admitted); Annotation, Admissibility of testimony regarding spontaneous declarations m,ade by one incompetent to testify at trial, 15 A.L.R.4th 1043 (1982). 12 The general rule is that out-of-c

2005See Moore v. State, 26 Md.App. 556, 561-62 , 338 A.2d 344, 347 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 747 (1975) (excited utterance of three-and-a-half year old admitted); Jackson v. State, 31 Md.App. 332 , 356 A.2d 299 (1976) (excited utterance of four-year-old admitted); Johnson v. State, 63 Md.App. 485 , 492 A.2d 1343 (1985), cert. denied, 304 Md. 298 , 498 A.2d 1185 (1985) (excited utterance of insane person admitted); Annotation, Admissibility of testimony regarding spontaneous declarations m,ade by one incompetent to testify at trial, 15 A.L.R.4th 1043 (1982). 12 The general rule is that out-of-c

2023See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); West v. State, 124 Md. App. 147, 166-67 (1998); see also Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529 , 566- 67, 574-75 & n.4 (2002) (Raker, J., concurring) (explaining that “it is important to keep in mind that the standards for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause are stricter than under the hearsay exception, requiring independent corroboration, while the hearsay exception under the rule does not.”). 11 The apparent confusion is demonstrated, for example, by the State’s comments at the motions

2023See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); West v. State, 124 Md. App. 147, 166-67 (1998); see also Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529 , 566- 67, 574-75 & n.4 (2002) (Raker, J., concurring) (explaining that “it is important to keep in mind that the standards for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause are stricter than under the hearsay exception, requiring independent corroboration, while the hearsay exception under the rule does not.”). 11 The apparent confusion is demonstrated, for example, by the State’s comments at the motions

2007“A hearsay statement may be admissible, however, under an exception to the hearsay rule because circumstances provide the ‘requisite indicia of trustworthiness concerning the truthfulness of the statement.’ ” State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 76 , 702 A.2d 723 (1997) (quoting Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 304-05 , 550 A.2d 925 (1988)).

2007“A hearsay statement may be admissible, however, under an exception to the hearsay rule because circumstances provide the ‘requisite indicia of trustworthiness concerning the truthfulness of the statement.’ ” State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 76 , 702 A.2d 723 (1997) (quoting Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 304-05 , 550 A.2d 925 (1988)).

2018If a declaration is not "offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay and it will not be excluded under the hearsay rule." Stoddard v. State , 389 Md. 681 , 689, 887 A.2d 564 (2005).

2018If a declaration is not "offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay and it will not be excluded under the hearsay rule." Stoddard v. State , 389 Md. 681 , 689, 887 A.2d 564 (2005).

2014Indeed, we have explained that “[a]n out-of-court statement is admissible if it is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted or if it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Handy v. State, 201 Md.App. *583 521, 589, 30 A.8d 197 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132,158 , 729 A.2d 910 (1999)) (emphasis added).

2014Indeed, we have explained that “[a]n out-of-court statement is admissible if it is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted or if it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Handy v. State, 201 Md.App. *583 521, 589, 30 A.8d 197 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132,158 , 729 A.2d 910 (1999)) (emphasis added).

2008Candella, 277 Md. at 124 , 353 A.2d at 265 ; Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 571 , 168 A.2d 501, 505 (1961) (noting that a physician whose sole purpose was to testify in court does not come within the exception to the hearsay rule); see also Maryland Dep’t of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589 , 565 A.2d 1015, 1023 (1989) (determining that “as a general proposition, statements of medical history, made by a patient to a treating medical practitioner for the purpose of treatment, may be admitted as substantive evidence through the medical witness.

2008Candella, 277 Md. at 124 , 353 A.2d at 265 ; Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 571 , 168 A.2d 501, 505 (1961) (noting that a physician whose sole purpose was to testify in court does not come within the exception to the hearsay rule); see also Maryland Dep’t of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589 , 565 A.2d 1015, 1023 (1989) (determining that “as a general proposition, statements of medical history, made by a patient to a treating medical practitioner for the purpose of treatment, may be admitted as substantive evidence through the medical witness.

1998Spontaneity was no longer the guarantee. *419 The guarantee, rather, was that no one would willingly risk medical injury from improper treatment by withholding necessary data or furnishing false data to the physician who would determine the course of treatment on the basis of that data. 74 Md.App. at 26 , 536 A.2d 666 ; see also Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124 , 353 A.2d 263 (1976) (testimony by a treating physician as to the medical history of a patient “is admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule, the underlying rationale being that the patient’s statements to his

1998Spontaneity was no longer the guarantee. *419 The guarantee, rather, was that no one would willingly risk medical injury from improper treatment by withholding necessary data or furnishing false data to the physician who would determine the course of treatment on the basis of that data. 74 Md.App. at 26 , 536 A.2d 666 ; see also Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124 , 353 A.2d 263 (1976) (testimony by a treating physician as to the medical history of a patient “is admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule, the underlying rationale being that the patient’s statements to his

1991Examples of business records which have been found to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule are “payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like,” Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 , 63 S.Ct. 477, 480 , 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943); statements in a medical record which are “pathologically germane” to the physical condition which caused the patient to seek medical *711 assistance, Sarrio v. Reliable Contracts Co., 14 Md.App. 99, 101 , 286 A.2d 183 (1972); items in a police report which are within the personal observation of the investigating officer, Aet

1991Examples of business records which have been found to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule are “payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like,” Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 , 63 S.Ct. 477, 480 , 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943); statements in a medical record which are “pathologically germane” to the physical condition which caused the patient to seek medical *711 assistance, Sarrio v. Reliable Contracts Co., 14 Md.App. 99, 101 , 286 A.2d 183 (1972); items in a police report which are within the personal observation of the investigating officer, Aet

2012On appeal, in Foster, id. at 202 , 464 A.2d 986 , the defendant contended that “the application of the hearsay rule, which prevented her from presenting a portion of her defense, rendered her trial fundamentally unfair and deprived her of due process of law.” Relying on Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), 24 and Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), 25 the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that “[r]egardless of whether the proffered testi mony [was] inadmissible because of Maryland’s hearsay rule, u

2012On appeal, in Foster, id. at 202 , 464 A.2d 986 , the defendant contended that “the application of the hearsay rule, which prevented her from presenting a portion of her defense, rendered her trial fundamentally unfair and deprived her of due process of law.” Relying on Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), 24 and Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), 25 the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that “[r]egardless of whether the proffered testi mony [was] inadmissible because of Maryland’s hearsay rule, u