hearsay rule in Idaho

2013In State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 705 , 889 P.2d 729, 734 (Ct.App.1994), this Court held that “where it appears that a question directed to the witness may call for hearsay, the appropriate response is for the trial court to sustain [a hearsay] objection unless the proponent of the testimony shows, by an offer of proof, that the out-of-court statement upon which the testimony is grounded is not hearsay.” Typically this is done by describing the intended testimony and identifying an applicable hearsay exception or nonhearsay purpose for the testimony.

2013In State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 705 , 889 P.2d 729, 734 (Ct.App.1994), this Court held that “where it appears that a question directed to the witness may call for hearsay, the appropriate response is for the trial court to sustain [a hearsay] objection unless the proponent of the testimony shows, by an offer of proof, that the out-of-court statement upon which the testimony is grounded is not hearsay.” Typically this is done by describing the intended testimony and identifying an applicable hearsay exception or nonhearsay purpose for the testimony.

2016“The records or reports sought to be admitted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule need not be authenticated by the person who made the records, but it is necessary that the records be authenticated by a person who has custody of the record as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision of its creation.” Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 547 , 328 P.3d 520, 527 (2014) (quoting Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 450 , 915 P.2d 6, 12 (1996)).

2016“The records or reports sought to be admitted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule need not be authenticated by the person who made the records, but it is necessary that the records be authenticated by a person who has custody of the record as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision of its creation.” Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 547 , 328 P.3d 520, 527 (2014) (quoting Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 450 , 915 P.2d 6, 12 (1996)).

2013Id. “[A]dmission of excited utterances as an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 421 , 776 P.2d 424, 430 (1989).

2013Id. “[A]dmission of excited utterances as an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 421 , 776 P.2d 424, 430 (1989).

2024State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518 , 927 P.2d 897, 908 (Ct. App. 1996).

2024State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518 , 927 P.2d 897, 908 (Ct. App. 1996).

2014State v. McDonald, 141 Idaho 287, 288 , 108 P.3d 434, 435 (Ct.App.2005); State v. McPhie, 104 Idaho 652, 655 , 662 P.2d 233, 236 (1983); see also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence §§ 244, 273 (6th ed.2006) (the hearsay rule promotes compliance with the “three conditions under which witnesses ordinarily are required to testify: oath, personal presence at the trial, and cross-examination”).

2014State v. McDonald, 141 Idaho 287, 288 , 108 P.3d 434, 435 (Ct.App.2005); State v. McPhie, 104 Idaho 652, 655 , 662 P.2d 233, 236 (1983); see also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence §§ 244, 273 (6th ed.2006) (the hearsay rule promotes compliance with the “three conditions under which witnesses ordinarily are required to testify: oath, personal presence at the trial, and cross-examination”).

2005See State v. McPhie, 104 Idaho 652, 655 , 662 P.2d 233, 236 (1983); Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304, 309 , 581 P.2d 350, 355 (1978).

2005See State v. McPhie, 104 Idaho 652, 655 , 662 P.2d 233, 236 (1983); Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304, 309 , 581 P.2d 350, 355 (1978).

2019See Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho at 127 , 714 P.2d at 96 (citing State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472 , 546 P.2d 1180 (1976) and State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727 , 471 P.2d 582 (1970)).

2019See Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho at 127 , 714 P.2d at 96 (citing State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472 , 546 P.2d 1180 (1976) and State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727 , 471 P.2d 582 (1970)).

2018California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).

2002California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 , 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 495 (1970).

2026See Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 275 , 281 P.3d 103, 112 (2012) (holding that a police report was inadmissible under the catch-all exception to hearsay); State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 , 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003) (holding that a police report is inadmissible under both the public records exception and the business records exception to the hearsay rule).

2026See Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 275 , 281 P.3d 103, 112 (2012) (holding that a police report was inadmissible under the catch-all exception to hearsay); State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 , 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003) (holding that a police report is inadmissible under both the public records exception and the business records exception to the hearsay rule).

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2021See, e.g., State v. Hill, 104 N.E.3d 794, 806 (Ohio 2018) (holding that a prescription bottle label, even if considered hearsay, would be admissible under the business records exception); Phillips v. State, 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a crib label warning users not to use the crib if broken was not hearsay because the warning was a directive or imperative); Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 198 (Miss. 2004) (holding a medication label is “unquestionable hearsay” when used to prove the contents of that medication); Com. v. Harvey, 666 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1995) (noting

2002The relevant circumstances "include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." Id. "[I]f the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial." Id. at 820 , 110 S.Ct. at 3149 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 655 .

2002The relevant circumstances "include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." Id. "[I]f the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial." Id. at 820 , 110 S.Ct. at 3149 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 655 .

2024Id. at 376–78, 458 P.3d at 954– 56.

2024Id. at 376–78, 458 P.3d at 954– 56.

2019There are two requirements of an excited utterance: “(1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.” State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 732 , 240 P.3d 575, 578 (2010) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568 , 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007)).

2019There are two requirements of an excited utterance: “(1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.” State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 732 , 240 P.3d 575, 578 (2010) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568 , 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007)).

2018In so doing, the Court first explained that the hearsay exception was based on "the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true." Id. at 599 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 .

2018In so doing, the Court first explained that the hearsay exception was based on “the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true.” Id. at 599 .

1999“Where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.” Id. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 .

1999“Where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.” Id. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 .

1990In Hester we noted that the comments to I.R.E. 803(24) of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee explained that this "other exception" subsection of the rule recognizes that not every contingency can be treated by detailed rules and that the hearsay rule has never been a closed system and should not be. 114 Idaho at 696 , 760 P.2d at 35 .

1990In Hester we noted that the comments to I.R.E. 803(24) of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee explained that this “other exception” subsection of the rule recognizes that not every contingency can be treated by detailed rules and that the hearsay rule has never been a closed system and should not be. 114 Idaho at 696 , 760 P.2d at 35 .

1989E.g., State v. Chacon, 36 Idaho 148, 155 , 209 P. 889, 891 (1922); State v. Breyer, 40 Idaho 324, 334 , 232 P. 560, 564 (1925); Parker, 112 Idaho at 4 , 730 P.2d at 924 .

1989E.g., State v. Chacon, 36 Idaho 148, 155 , 209 P. 889, 891 (1922); State v. Breyer, 40 Idaho 324, 334 , 232 P. 560, 564 (1925); Parker, 112 Idaho at 4 , 730 P.2d at 924 .

1982R. relied heavily on certain statements in Quayle v. Mackert, 92 Idaho 563 , 447 P.2d 679 (1968), the court below correctly perceived that the opinion in that case did not contain any holding on the hearsay rule, no objection having been made to preserve the question for appeal.

1982R. relied heavily on certain statements in Quayle v. Mackert, 92 Idaho 563 , 447 P.2d 679 (1968), the court below correctly perceived that the opinion in that case did not contain any holding on the hearsay rule, no objection having been made to preserve the question for appeal.

2019There are two requirements of an excited utterance: “(1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.” State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 732 , 240 P.3d 575, 578 (2010) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568 , 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007)).

2019There are two requirements of an excited utterance: “(1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.” State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 732 , 240 P.3d 575, 578 (2010) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568 , 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007)).

2019The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 , 247 P.3d 582 (2010), addressed the admissibility of a murder victim’s declarations under I.R.E. 803(3) about her fear of the defendant and noted additional requirements for admissibility.

2019The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 , 247 P.3d 582 (2010), addressed the admissibility of a murder victim’s declarations under I.R.E. 803(3) about her fear of the defendant and noted additional requirements for admissibility.