hearsay rule in Washington

1999Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 174 (quoting Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d at 292 (“The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness on which the various specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are based are those that existed at the time the statement was made and do not include those that may be added by using hindsight.”)); Wright, 497 U.S. at 820 (same); see, e.g., ER 803-04.

1999“The circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness on which the various specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are based are those that existed at the time the statement was made and do not include those that may. be added by using hindsight.” Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 174 (quoting Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1979)).

2022In Crawford, the court prohibited tape-recorded statements offered as evidence under a hearsay analysis, and held that the inability to cross-examine the witness violated the Sixth Amendment. 541 U.S. at 40, 68-69 .

2022In Crawford, the court prohibited tape-recorded statements offered as evidence under a hearsay analysis, and held that the inability to cross-examine the witness violated the Sixth Amendment. 541 U.S. at 40, 68-69 .

2004However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the confrontation clause is not violated "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736 .

2004However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the confrontation clause is not violated "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736 .

2011Because we hold that any error in admitting these statements was harmless, we do not address the State's assertion of a "res gestae hearsay exception" to the hearsay rule. [4] See Chapin, 118 Wash.2d at 688 , 826 P.2d 194 ("[A]s the time between the event and the statement lengthens, the opportunity for reflective thought arises and the danger of fabrication increases.

2011Because we hold that any error in admitting these statements was harmless, we do not address the State's assertion of a "res gestae hearsay exception" to the hearsay rule. [4] See Chapin, 118 Wash.2d at 688 , 826 P.2d 194 ("[A]s the time between the event and the statement lengthens, the opportunity for reflective thought arises and the danger of fabrication increases.

2003The emphasis in a reliability determination is on the truthfulness of the declarant: “[I]f the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 820 (citing 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1420, at 251 (James H.

2003Ed. 2d 638 (1990). “|T]f the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial.” Id. at 820 .

2021See State v. Pavlik, 165 Wn. App. 645, 650 , 268 P.3d 986 (2011) (“‘self-serving’ seems to be a shorthand way of saying that it was hearsay and did not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule” (quoting State v. King, 71 Wn.2d 573, 577 , 429 P.2d 914 (1967))).

2021See State v. Pavlik, 165 Wn. App. 645, 650 , 268 P.3d 986 (2011) (“‘self-serving’ seems to be a shorthand way of saying that it was hearsay and did not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule” (quoting State v. King, 71 Wn.2d 573, 577 , 429 P.2d 914 (1967))).

2018State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 854 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

2018State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 854 , 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

2015There, the court held inadmissible a child abuse victim's statements to a social worker where the record showed that the social worker questioned her simply to determine whether to report the suspected abuse to Child Protective Services, not for the purpose of treating or diagnosing the child's physical or psychological needs.38 Statements the child made to the medical provider who initially examined her, however, were properly admitted.39 Here, the testimony established that Jean's statements were not made solely to report the allegations but were made for the purpose of medical treatment and

1991Statements made for this purpose are admissible under the hearsay exception provided in ER 803(a)(4), which reads: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.[ 8 ] See also In re Penelope B., 104 Wn.2d 643, 655-56 , 709 P.2d 1185 (1985) (child's statements made to child psychiatrist as to alleged acts of sexual contact between the child and her father admissib

2016Under Roberts , if a declarant’s hearsay statements were admissible against a defendant under an exception to the hearsay rule and that declarant was not available for cross-examination, the statements were inadmissible unless the State proved (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the statement bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” Id.

2005Relying on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly classified the 911 call as an excited utterance, which is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and thus satisfies the requirements of reliability.

2005We see no valid comparison between motel registration slips that have not been sufficiently authenticated and jail booking records that have been sufficiently authenticated. ¶ 28 Finally, Iverson cites Monson, 113 Wash.2d 833 , 784 P.2d 485 , which addressed whether a certified driving record was properly admitted under the hearsay exception provided in RCW 5.44.040 for certified records.

2005We see no valid comparison between motel registration slips that have not been sufficiently authenticated and jail booking records that have been sufficiently authenticated. ¶28 Finally, Iverson cites Monson, 113 Wn.2d 833 , which addressed whether a certified driving record was properly admitted under the hearsay exception provided in RCW 5.44.040 for certified records.

2021See State v. Pavlik, 165 Wn. App. 645, 650 , 268 P.3d 986 (2011) (“‘self-serving’ seems to be a shorthand way of saying that it was hearsay and did not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule” (quoting State v. King, 71 Wn.2d 573, 577 , 429 P.2d 914 (1967))).

2021See State v. Pavlik, 165 Wn. App. 645, 650 , 268 P.3d 986 (2011) (“‘self-serving’ seems to be a shorthand way of saying that it was hearsay and did not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule” (quoting State v. King, 71 Wn.2d 573, 577 , 429 P.2d 914 (1967))).

2011State v. King, 71 Wn.2d 573, 577 , 429 P.2d 914 (1967); State v. Johnson, 60 Wn.2d 21, 31 , 371 P.2d 611 (1962); 5 R.

2011State v. King, 71 Wn.2d 573, 577 , 429 P.2d 914 (1967); State v. Johnson, 60 Wn.2d 21, 31 , 371 P.2d 611 (1962); 5 R.

2012Examining the constitutional text, the court noted that the phrase “face to face” has not “ ‘been read literally, for to do so would result in eliminating all exceptions to the hearsay rule.’ ” Pugh, 167 Wn.2d at 836 (quoting Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 169 ).

2009Pugh relies on State v. Stentz, 30 Wash. 134, 142 , 70 P. 241 (1902), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Fire, 145 Wn.2d 152 , 34 P.3d 1218 (2001), for the proposition that article I, section 22’s confrontation right guarantees the right to cross-examine the witness in open court in the presence of the accused. ¶22 But the state confrontation clause has not “been read literally, for to do so would result in eliminating all exceptions to the hearsay rule.” State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 169 , 691 P.2d 197 (1984).

2025In Woods, the Supreme Court expressly stated that the conscious omission of facts alone is not sufficient to preclude admission under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 143 Wn.2d at 600 .

2021“Often, the key determination is whether the statement was made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that the statement could not be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.” State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 597 , 23 P.3d 1046 (2001). “[C]ourts look to the amount of time that passed between the startling event and the utterance, as well as any other factors that indicate whether the witness had an opportunity to reflect on the event and fabricate a story about it.” State v. Briscoeray, 95 Wn. App. 167, 174 , 97

1984These discrete exceptions are based on the common law res gestae exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1 , 92 P.2d 1113 , 127 A.L.R. 1022 (1939). (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a natural declaration or statement growing out of the event, and not a mere narrative of a past, completed affair; (3) it must be a statement of fact, and not the mere expression of an opinion; (4) it must be a spontaneous or instinctive utterance of thought, dominated or e

1984These discrete exceptions are based on the common law res gestae exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1 , 92 P.2d 1113 , 127 A.L.R. 1022 (1939). (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a natural declaration or statement growing out of the event, and not a mere narrative of a past, completed affair; (3) it must be a statement of fact, and not the mere expression of an opinion; (4) it must be a spontaneous or instinctive utterance of thought, dominated or e

1976Misapplication of an exception to the hearsay rule which leads to the erroneous admission of evidence in a criminal trial “does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 , 26 L.

1976Misapplication of an exception to the hearsay rule which leads to the erroneous admission of evidence in a criminal trial “does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 , 26 L.

1999Wright, 497 U.S. at 821 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 . [116] State v. John Doe, 105 Wash.2d 889, 896 , 719 P.2d 554 (1986); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178-79 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). [117] Wright, 497 U.S. at 823 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ; Ryan, 103 Wash.2d at 174 , 691 P.2d 197 ; State v. Frey, 43 Wash.App. 605 , 611 n. 9, 718 P.2d 846 (1986). [118] Ryan, 103 Wash.2d at 174 , 691 P.2d 197 (quoting Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d at 292 ("The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness on which the various specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are based are those th

1999Wright, 497 U.S. at 821 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 . [116] State v. John Doe, 105 Wash.2d 889, 896 , 719 P.2d 554 (1986); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178-79 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). [117] Wright, 497 U.S. at 823 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ; Ryan, 103 Wash.2d at 174 , 691 P.2d 197 ; State v. Frey, 43 Wash.App. 605 , 611 n. 9, 718 P.2d 846 (1986). [118] Ryan, 103 Wash.2d at 174 , 691 P.2d 197 (quoting Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d at 292 ("The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness on which the various specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are based are those th

2007State v. Whelchel, 115 Wn.2d 708, 715 , 801 P.2d 948 (1990).

2000Id. at 722-25; see State v. Anderson, 107 Wn.2d 745 , 733 P.2d 517 (1987) (Hearsay statements made by a nontestifying codefendant and introduced by the State against the defendant as a declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule under ER 804(b)(3) do not violate the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause because there is a sufficient indicia of reliability guaranteeing the trustworthiness of the statements.).

1996The reason excited utterances are sufficiently reliable to warrant a hearsay exception is that such utterances are "made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that [the] statement could not be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.’ ” State v. Strauss, 119 Wn.2d 401, 416 , 832 P.2d 78 (1992) (quoting Johnson v. Ohls, 76 Wn.2d 398, 406, 457 P.2d 194 (1969)).

1996The reason excited utterances are sufficiently reliable to warrant a hearsay exception is that such utterances are "made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that [the] statement could not be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.’ ” State v. Strauss, 119 Wn.2d 401, 416 , 832 P.2d 78 (1992) (quoting Johnson v. Ohls, 76 Wn.2d 398, 406, 457 P.2d 194 (1969)).