hearsay rule in Louisiana

2018State v. Wille , 559 So.2d 1321 (La. 1990), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 880 , 113 S.Ct. 231 , 121 L.Ed.2d 167 (1992) ; State v. Lloyd , supra. Exceptions to the hearsay rule include dying declarations.

2012However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has warned that the State should not be allowed to use an officer as a “passkey” to present inadmissible hearsay evidence to the jury in the guise of “explaining police actions.” State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 737 (La.1992); see also State v. Broadway, 96-2659 p. 8 (La.10/19/99), 753 So.2d 801, 809 (“[T]he fact that an officer acted on information obtained during the investigation may not be used as an indirect method of bringing before the jury the substance of the out-of-court assertions of the defendant’s guilt that would otherwise be barred by the hea

2014Hearold, 603 So.2d at 737 , Moreover, as to any exception to the hearsay rule based on an officer’s testimony regarding information that immediately prompted an investigation, the issue of relevancy is significantly interrelated with the hearsay issue.

2012However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has warned that the State should not be allowed to use an officer as a “passkey” to present inadmissible hearsay evidence to the jury in the guise of “explaining police actions.” State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 737 (La.1992); see also State v. Broadway, 96-2659 p. 8 (La.10/19/99), 753 So.2d 801, 809 (“[T]he fact that an officer acted on information obtained during the investigation may not be used as an indirect method of bringing before the jury the substance of the out-of-court assertions of the defendant’s guilt that would otherwise be barred by the hea

2016C.E. art. 803(2) For the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule to apply, “the event must be sufficiently startling to render the declarant’s . normal reflective thought process inoperative, and the state ment must be a spontaneous reaction to the event and not the result of reflective thought.” State v. Bernard, 2014-0580, p. 20 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/3/15), 171 So.3d 1063, 1077 , citing State v. Henderson, 362 So.2d 1358, 1362 (La.1978).

1998State v. Henderson, supra. See also State v. Crawford, 95-1352 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/96) ; 672 So.2d 197 , writ denied, 96-1126 (La.10/4/96); 679 So.2d 1379 . |9The Defendant’s proffer of the evidence is insufficient to support his claims that the statements fell within one or both of these exceptions to the hearsay rule.

2007See, e.g., State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564, 572 (La.1981)("[I]n the prosecution of sex offenses the better rule is that the original complaint of a young child is admissible when the particular facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the complaint was the product of a shocking episode and not a fabrication."); State v. Adams, 394 So.2d 1204, 1212 (La.1981) (same); State v. Noble, 342 So.2d 170, 173 (La.1977) (same).

1990See State v. Adams, 394 So.2d 1204 (La.1981); State v. Brown, 302 So.2d 290 (La.1974).

2018State v. Trahan , 576 So.2d 1 (La. 1990).

1994One year later, in State v. Trahan, 576 So.2d 1 (La.1990), the Supreme Court, repeating Justice Lemmon's words, said that the exception to the hearsay rule allowed in Gremillion was an unusual exception and should be sparingly applied.

1989This exception is delineated in the seminal case of State v. Monroe, 345 So.2d 1185, 1188-1190 (La. 1977): "The so-called business records exception to the hearsay rule had its genesis in this state in civil rather than criminal law. * * * * * * Having no statutory formulation of the business records exception, this Court has in previous opinions quoted with approval the following statement of the *655 common law `regular entries in the course of business' exception: 'A permanent record made in the ordinary course of business, by a person unavailable for testimony, from personal knowledge of t

1987Monroe, 345 So.2d 1185 (La.1977), this court reaffirmed its original formulation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule: ‘Before the exception may be invoked by the State against the defendant, allowing introduction of a permanent record made in the ordinary course of business from personal knowledge of the facts recorded, or from information furnished to one having business duty to observe and report the facts, it must be shown that the person who made the record is genuinely unavailable for testimony, that he had no strong motive to misrepresent, and that in all probability th

1990In each instance, the issue before this Court is whether the testimony is hearsay under the definition of hearsay adopted by this Court, and therefore inadmissible; whether the testimony is, by definition, nonhearsay and therefore admissible; or whether the testimony, even though hearsay, is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. *80 In proceeding to answer these inquiries, we look first to the definition of hearsay embraced by this Court in State v. Martin, 356 So.2d 1370, 1373-74 (La.1978) (quoting McCormick, Evidence § 246 (Cleary ed. 1972)): Hearsay evidence is testimony in cou

1986In State v. Martin, 356 So.2d 1370 (La.1978), however, the Supreme Court, recognizing a divergence of authority, concluded that statements of identification might come under a broad exception to the hearsay rule.

2006For support, he cites State v. Wilkinson, 00-339 pp. 18-19 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/18/00) , 772 So.2d 758, 768 , writ denied, 00-3161 (La.10/12/01), 799 So.2d 494 , which discussed a similar statute, La.R.S. 13:3714: In State v. Trahan, 332 So.2d 218, 220 (La.1976), the court explained that, because the medical records rule is an exception to the hearsay rule created by statute, it is essential that all of the formalities prescribed in the statute be followed before such records are admissible in evidence.

2000In State v. Trahan, 332 So.2d 218, 220 (La.1976), the court explained that, because the medical records rule is an exception to the hearsay rule created by statute, it is essential that all of the formalities prescribed in the statute be followed before such records are admissible in evidence.

2014Hearsay is not admissible because it is unreliable evidence, but exceptions to the hearsay rule allow such evidence to be introduced “when there are indicia that the evidence is reliable.” See Buckbee v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 561 So.2d 76, 87 (La.1990) (Watson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2011“In its broadest sweep, the hearsay rule excludes all testimony regarding statements made out-of-court by declar-ants who at the time of making the statements were not under oath, not in the presence of the trier of fact, and thus not subject to cross-examination.” Buckbee v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. Inc., 561 So.2d 76, 80 (La.1990).

1989In State v. Middlebrook, 409 So.2d 588, 590 (La.1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated the following: This court has long recognized an exception to the hearsay rule allowing admission of the early complaints of rape victims.

1987In State v. Middlebrook, 409 So.2d 588, 590 (La.1982) the court noted that the first complaint of a rape victim is a recognized exception to the hearsay rule: This court has long recognized an exception to the hearsay rule allowing admission of the early complaints of rape victims.

2018The Arita court, cited State v. Lee, 577 So.2d 1193 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1991), which relied on State v. Nicholas, 359 So.2d 965 (La. 1978) and State v. Woodard, 387 So.2d 1066 (La. 1980), 2 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "fingerprints on file with a police agency fall under the public documents exception to the hearsay rule. 04-39, p. 12, 900 So.2d at 44 .

2018The Arita court, cited State v. Lee, 577 So.2d 1193 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1991), which relied on State v. Nicholas, 359 So.2d 965 (La. 1978) and State v. Woodard, 387 So.2d 1066 (La. 1980), 2 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "fingerprints on file with a police agency fall under the public documents exception to the hearsay rule. 04-39, p. 12, 900 So.2d at 44 .

2016See State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947, pp. 4-6 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 201-02 (holding that the exclusion of hearsay evidence suggesting that the defendant’s roommate killed the victim was reversible error); State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1078 (La. 1989) (“While the statement does not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, it should have, nevertheless, been admitted into evidence due to its reliability and trustworthy nature.”).

2016See State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947, pp. 4-6 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 201-02 (holding that the exclusion of hearsay evidence suggesting that the defendant’s roommate killed the victim was reversible error); State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1078 (La. 1989) (“While the statement does not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, it should have, nevertheless, been admitted into evidence due to its reliability and trustworthy nature.”).

2016See State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947, pp. 4-6 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 201-02 (holding that the exclusion of hearsay evidence suggesting that the defendant’s roommate killed the victim was reversible error); State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1078 (La. 1989) (“While the statement does not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, it should have, nevertheless, been admitted into evidence due to its reliability and trustworthy nature.”).

2016See State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947, pp. 4-6 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 201-02 (holding that the exclusion of hearsay evidence suggesting that the defendant’s roommate killed the victim was reversible error); State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1078 (La. 1989) (“While the statement does not fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, it should have, nevertheless, been admitted into evidence due to its reliability and trustworthy nature.”).

2009FN24. 757 S.W.2d at 359. * * * In White [v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) ], the Supreme Court held that the admission of a hearsay statement of a four-year-old child declarant at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause, even though the prosecutor did not put the child-complainant on the stand or seek a finding of unavailability.FN31 But the out-of-court statement in White was held to be admissible because it fell within two clearly established exceptions to the hearsay rule-spontaneous declaration and medical examination.

2009FN24. 757 S.W.2d at 359. * * * In White [v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) ], the Supreme Court held that the admission of a hearsay statement of a four-year-old child declarant at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause, even though the prosecutor did not put the child-complainant on the stand or seek a finding of unavailability.FN31 But the out-of-court statement in White was held to be admissible because it fell within two clearly established exceptions to the hearsay rule-spontaneous declaration and medical examination.

1990See State v. Pace, 301 So.2d 323, 326 (La.1974); State v. Anderson, 526 So.2d 499, 502 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988), writ denied, 537 So.2d 1160 (1989).

1976ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 3 AND 4 In these two assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the victim's mother to testify that on the day of the offense, her daughter called her from her grandmother's house and said that she wanted to come home because she had something to tell her mother, and that when she came home she immediately started crying and screaming, dropped her clothes and game to the floor, and told her mother, "Derwin got me, mama." In State v. Pace, La., 301 So.2d 323 (1974), we held similar evidence admissible under the

2017“In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 .

2017“In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 .

1987State v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 921 (La.1982); State v. Walker, 344 So.2d 990 (La.1977).

1985In State v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 921, 924 (La.1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court found that hearsay testimony relating to an admission by the defendant is admissible under a widely recognized exception to the hearsay rule.

1990State v. Smith, 285 So.2d 240, 243 (La.1973). [9] Plaintiffs urge the Court to rule that Vincent's testimony to Buckbee's second statement is admissible under a broad residual exception to the hearsay rule equivalent to that permitted by L.C.E. art. 804(B)(6) and Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5). [10] Both the federal rule and the Louisiana code article reflect concerns articulated by this Court in State v. Smith, supra , that the hearsay possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and that a necessity exist for its introduction in a particular case. [11] Although the instant case is not governe

1990State v. Smith, 285 So.2d 240, 243 (La.1973). [9] Plaintiffs urge the Court to rule that Vincent's testimony to Buckbee's second statement is admissible under a broad residual exception to the hearsay rule equivalent to that permitted by L.C.E. art. 804(B)(6) and Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5). [10] Both the federal rule and the Louisiana code article reflect concerns articulated by this Court in State v. Smith, supra , that the hearsay possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and that a necessity exist for its introduction in a particular case. [11] Although the instant case is not governe

2015See, e.g., State v. Juniors, 03-2425, p. 44 (La.6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 325 (upholding exclusion of medical records offered by the defendant containing the statement that the victim had been shot “by a disgruntled employee” because the statement by an unidentified person “was not reasonably related to diagnosis and treatment” of the victim suffering from a gunshot wound to the head, “and, thus, was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to LSA-C.E. art. 803(4).”); see also State v. Baldwin, 96-1660 (La.12/12/97), 705 So.2d 1076 , unpub’d appx. at xxii (trial court erred i

2015See, e.g., State v. Juniors, 03-2425, p. 44 (La.6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 325 (upholding exclusion of medical records offered by the defendant containing the statement that the victim had been shot “by a disgruntled employee” because the statement by an unidentified person “was not reasonably related to diagnosis and treatment” of the victim suffering from a gunshot wound to the head, “and, thus, was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to LSA-C.E. art. 803(4).”); see also State v. Baldwin, 96-1660 (La.12/12/97), 705 So.2d 1076 , unpub’d appx. at xxii (trial court erred i

2012Statements against penal interest were first recognized by this court as exceptions to the hearsay rule in State v. Gilmore, 332 So.2d 789 (La.1976).

2011Statements against penal interest were first recognized by this court as exceptions to the hearsay rule in State v. Gilmore, 332 So.2d 789 (La.1976).

1990In State v. Hodgeson, 305 So.2d 421, 428 (La.1975) the court held that print-out sheets of business records stored in a computer were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, if relevant and material, without the necessity of producing the individual who made the entries in the regular course of business if it was shown that: 1) the computing equipment is recognized as standard equipment; 2) the entries are made in the regular course of business at or reasonably near the time when the recorded event occurred; and, 3) the foundation testimony satisfies the trial cour

1986Co., 433 So.2d 745 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982), writ denied, 435 So.2d 450 (La.1983), we set forth the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule: “(1) persons concerned with recording the information must be unavailable for testimony, or production of such persons would be a needless burden; (2) the first collected record available or useable by the court is introduced; (3) the records are identified at the trial by one familiar with the bookkeeping procedure; and (4) the evidence seems reliable in light of the following factors (a) contemporaneousness of the entry with the o