hearsay rule in Tennessee

2026However, “[o]nce the trial court has made its factual findings, the next questions—whether the facts prove that the statement (1) was hearsay and (2) fits under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule— are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Id. (citing State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 128 (Tenn. Crim.

2026However, “[o]nce the trial court has made its factual findings, the next questions—whether the facts prove that the statement (1) was hearsay and (2) fits under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule—are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Id. (citing State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 128 (Tenn. Crim.

2014“The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 400 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn. 2001)).

2014Evid. 802. “‘The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 400 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn. 2001)).

2025“Once the trial court has made its factual findings, the next questions— whether the facts prove that the statement (1) was hearsay and (2) fits under one [of] the exceptions to the hearsay rule—are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 479 (citing State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 128 (Tenn. Crim.

2025“If a hearsay statement does fit under one of the exceptions, the trial court may not use the hearsay rule to suppress the statement.” Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 479 .

2015Although the application of the various exceptions to the hearsay rule “may initially depend upon factual determinations” to which a reviewing court must defer, the trial court “has no discretion to exclude hearsay exception evidence that is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.” Id. at 760-61 .

2014Although the application of the various exceptions to the hearsay rule “may initially depend upon factual determinations” to which a reviewing court must defer, the trial court “has no discretion to exclude hearsay exception evidence that is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.” Id.

2026However, “[o]nce the trial court has made its factual findings, the next questions—whether the facts prove that the statement (1) was hearsay and (2) fits under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule— are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Id. (citing State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 128 (Tenn. Crim.

2026However, “[o]nce the trial court has made its factual findings, the next questions—whether the facts prove that the statement (1) was hearsay and (2) fits under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule—are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Id. (citing State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 128 (Tenn. Crim.

2020The fact that the declarant is a child does not undermine the hearsay exception, although the court should consider “all the circumstances of a child’s statement because the child’s ability to articulate the reason for the statement may be affected by age or developmental maturity.” Stinnett, 958 S.W.2d at 332 .

2013“Rule 613(b) does not 5 As the State conceded at trial, the preliminary hearing testimony, if admissible as extrinsic evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613, appears to also satisfy the hearsay exception outlined in Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26). -11- expressly limit the impeaching party to one form of extrinsic evidence, nor does it require an impeaching party to choose between two available forms of extrinsic evidence.” Id. at 314 . “[I]t is well-established that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and their rulings will not be reverse

2010Notwithstanding the constraints imposed by the Henderson tripartite test, our supreme court has also recognized that “firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate the Confrontation Clause.” See State v. Causby, 706 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986); see also State v. Darrell R.

1999Moreover, our supreme court has also recognized that “firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate the Confrontation Clause.” 6 See State v. Causby, 706 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tenn.1986); see also State v. Hester, No. 03C01-9704-CR-00144, 1998 WL 288711 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Knoxville, June 4, 1998) (citing State v. Alley, 968 S.W.2d 314 , (Tenn.Crim.App. at *66 Jackson 1997), perm, to appeal denied, (Tenn. Mar. 2, 1998); State v. Lillard, No. 01C01-9602-CC-00051, 1997 WL 67906 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Nashville, Feb. 12, 1997)).

2014“The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 400 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn. 2001)).

2014Evid. 802. “‘The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 400 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn. 2001)).

2019The State responds that Defendant misconstrues the roles of Mr. Woods and the club because a victim is not a party to a criminal case, so neither Mr. Woods nor the club required “standing” to “bring the charge” of theft of services. “[A] victim in a criminal case does not meet the definition of a ‘party.’” State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307, 314 (Tenn. 2007) (stating that a victim’s statement does not meet the hearsay exception for admission of a party opponent because a victim is not a party to a criminal proceeding).

2016However, this Court continued to clarify that "[b]y so stating, we are not suggesting that the proof in this case should have been admitted as an admission by a party opponent, nor are we holding that the complaining witness in a criminal case is a party for purposes of Rule 803(1.2)(A).” The Court of Criminal Appeals properly concluded that "a rape victim is not a 'party' for purposes of the hearsay exception for party admissions.” Howard, 2015 WL 4626860 , at *8 (citing State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307, 314 (Tenn. 2007)). 7 .

2020Co., 303 S.W.3d 256, 262-63 (Tenn. 2010) (recognizing that “[t]he purpose of this hearsay exception is to permit the use of inherently trustworthy business records at trial by eliminating the expense and inconvenience that would result from requiring the testimony of everyone involved in the preparation and maintenance of such records”) (providing five criteria that must be satisfied in order for a document to be admissible under the business records exception). 7 Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(8) states that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule: Public Records and Reports.

2020Co., 303 S.W.3d 256, 262-63 (Tenn. 2010) (recognizing that “[t]he purpose of this hearsay exception is to permit the use of inherently trustworthy business records at trial by eliminating the expense and inconvenience that would result from requiring the testimony of everyone involved in the preparation and maintenance of such records”) (providing five criteria that must be satisfied in order for a document to be admissible under the business records exception). 7 Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(8) states that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule: Public Records and Reports.

2020App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. McLeod, 937 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tenn. 1996), this court addressed whether statements given by third parties to treating medical personnel, as opposed to statements given by a minor patient to medical personnel, fell within the exception to the hearsay rule for medical treatment and diagnosis.

2019Rule 803(4), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, provides the exception to the hearsay rule for “[statements] made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment describing medical history; past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations; or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” The Advisory Commission Comments for Rule 803(4) clarify that such statements “must be for both diagnosis and treatment.” Our supreme court has explained that “if physicians or other medical personnel rely upon the statement in dia

2012State v. Livingston, 907 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tenn. 1995); see also Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tenn. 1998) (noting that “because a prior complaint constitutes hearsay, it is not admissible as substantive evidence unless it satisfies some hearsay exception”; thus, Livingston did not create a new hearsay exception).

2003State v. Livingston, 907 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tenn. 1995); see also Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tenn. 1998) (noting that “[b]ecause a prior complaint constitutes hearsay, it is not admissible as substantive evidence unless it satisfies some hearsay exception”; thus, Livingston did not create a new hearsay exception).

2022Notably, “only the declarant’s conduct, not some third party’s conduct, is provable by this hearsay exception.” Id., Advisory Comm’n Cmts.; see State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 282-83 (Tenn. 2016); State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 171 (Tenn. 1994). - 23 - Initially, we note that the Appellant argues that because none of the State’s witnesses testified regarding the victim’s state of mind as it related to the making of his will, their hearsay testimony should have been excluded.

2014App. 2010) (victim’s statements about her fear of the defendant, which were made close to the time of her death, -22- were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and were relevant to show her state of mind at the time she made the statement and her behavior at the time of her death); State v. Hutchinson, 898 S.W.2d 161, 172 (Tenn. 1994) (victim’s statement that he was going fishing “with the boys” was admissible to show his state of mind, i.e., that he intended to go fishing, and connected one of the defendants to the fishing trip where the victim was drowned).

2013Both federal and state courts have held that the hearsay exception concerning statements of co-conspirators is firmly enough rooted in existing jurisprudence that “a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)).

2007In Roberts , the Court held that “when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable,” id. at 66 , and even when there is a showing of unavailability, the hearsay statement “is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability,’ ” id. “[Ujnder Roberts , an out-of-court statement by an unavailable witness is admissible if it (1) falls within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or (2) contains such particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that adversarial testing of the state

2018Franklin, 308 S.W.3d at 823 (citing State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tenn. 2001), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 581-82 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997)).

2001The requirement that the declarant still be under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condition is the one which “relates most directly to the underlying rationale for the [excited utterance] exception [to the hearsay rule].” State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997).

2024See State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 277 (Tenn. 2016) (holding defendant’s argument for admissibility under a hearsay exception waived because defendant only argued that it was not hearsay in the trial court).

2022Notably, “only the declarant’s conduct, not some third party’s conduct, is provable by this hearsay exception.” Id., Advisory Comm’n Cmts.; see State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 282-83 (Tenn. 2016); State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 171 (Tenn. 1994). - 23 - Initially, we note that the Appellant argues that because none of the State’s witnesses testified regarding the victim’s state of mind as it related to the making of his will, their hearsay testimony should have been excluded.

2018Franklin, 308 S.W.3d at 823 (citing State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tenn. 2001), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 581-82 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997)).

2008“The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn. 2001), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 580-81 (Tenn. 2004).

2002Within the context of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, our supreme court has defined a conspiracy as “a combination between two or more persons to do a criminal or unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means.” State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516 , -43- 555 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 , 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001); see also Alley, 968 S.W.2d at 316 ; State v. Lequire, 634 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Tenn. Crim.

1999Moreover, our supreme court has also recognized that “firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate the Confrontation Clause.” 6 See State v. Causby, 706 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tenn.1986); see also State v. Hester, No. 03C01-9704-CR-00144, 1998 WL 288711 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Knoxville, June 4, 1998) (citing State v. Alley, 968 S.W.2d 314 , (Tenn.Crim.App. at *66 Jackson 1997), perm, to appeal denied, (Tenn. Mar. 2, 1998); State v. Lillard, No. 01C01-9602-CC-00051, 1997 WL 67906 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Nashville, Feb. 12, 1997)).

2026“Underlying the excited utterance exception is the theory that ‘circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tenn. Crim.

2015The Advisory Commission Comment following this exception explains that “[c]ombining the hearsay exception with relevancy principles, declarations of mental state will be admissible to prove mental state at issue or subsequent conduct consistent with that mental state,” but that “only the declarant‟s conduct, not some third party‟s conduct, is provable by this hearsay exception.” Id., Advisory Comm‟n Comment.

2026“Underlying the excited utterance exception is the theory that ‘circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.’” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tenn. Crim.

2022State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010).

2020However, with regard to the victim’s affirmance that the defendant had “messed” with her, the court concluded that it would only be “admissible if the statement falls within the purview of another exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 517 .

2012However, with regard to the victim’s affirmance that the defendant had “messed” with her, the court concluded that it would only be “admissible if the statement falls within the purview of another exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 517 .

2017See Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 148-49 .

2014“Combining the hearsay exception with relevancy principles, declarations of mental state will be admissible to prove mental state at issue or subsequent conduct consistent with that mental state.” Id., Advisory Comm’n Cmts.

2015Specifically, Defendant complains that Mr. Steen‟s testimony did not meet the hearsay exception relied upon by the trial court, a statement of a co-conspirator, and that the trial court did not require the foundation for the admissibility of the evidence to be placed on the record as required by State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tenn. 1995).

2003State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tenn. 1995).

2008See State v. Andre Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tenn., Jackson, 2008) (citing, inter alia, State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn.1997), and State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 73 (Tenn.1992)); State v. Judge Brooks, 249 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tenn., Jackson, 2008); see also State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 400 (Tenn.2005); State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn.2001) (“The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”) (citing State v. Stinnett, 958 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn.19

2008See State v. Andre Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tenn., Jackson, 2008) (citing, inter alia, State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn.1997), and State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 73 (Tenn.1992)); State v. Judge Brooks, 249 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tenn., Jackson, 2008); see also State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 400 (Tenn.2005); State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn.2001) (“The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”) (citing State v. Stinnett, 958 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn.19

2020As Justice Scalia emphasized, “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Id. at 68-69 . - 18 - Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804 governs the hearsay exception regarding unavailable witnesses.

2017It also claimed that even if a hearsay exception applied, the statement should be excluded pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

2009And while “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice,” id., it also may not be given short shrift.

2009And while “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice,” id., it also may not be given short shrift.

2010Later, however, the Supreme Court ruled that "where the proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992). 22 In Henderson, 554 S.W.2d at 119-20 , our supreme court ruled that toxicology reports indicating the presence of illegal drugs could not be admitted through a witness other than the one that performed the test.

2004The court stated that at least three criteria must be met in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause: (1) the evidence to be presented must not be “crucial” or “devastating,” (2) the State must make a good faith effort to secure the presence of the person whose statement is to be offered against the defendant, and (3) the evidence offered under a hearsay exception must bear its own “indicia of reliability.” Henderson, 554 S.W.2d at 119-20 .

2016He also argues that this Court should apply our holding in State v. Brown and find that this testimony was “critical to the defense.” 29 S.W.3d 427 (Tenn. 2000).

2010In applying the applicable considerations, the court concluded that the hearsay testimony was critical to the defense; that the evidence was reliable, both of the witnesses being friends of the victim around the time of the incident; and that the State’s interest in enforcing the hearsay rule was “substantially less than Brown’s compelling interest in presenting the evidence.” Brown, 29 S.W.3d at 435 .