hearsay rule in Texas

2018Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(“[A]ppellate courts review a trial court’s determination of whether evidence is admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule only for an abuse of discretion”); Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595 (“The admissibility of an out-of-court statement under the exceptions to the general hearsay exclusion rule is within the trial court’s discretion.”).

2018As a reviewing court, we must determine whether the statement was made “‘under such circumstances as would reasonably show that it resulted from impulse rather than reason and reflection.’” Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596 , quoting Fowler v. State, 379 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.Crim.App. 1964). 6 We review a trial court’s determination whether evidence is admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule for an abuse of discretion.

2026In determining whether a trial court erred in admitting or excluding hearsay evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule, “a reviewing court looks to see whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion; before the reviewing court may reverse the trial court’s decision, it must find the trial court’s ruling was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 579 .

2025Art[icle] 38.072 or . . . some other exception to the hearsay rule.” 800 S.W.2d at 548 ; 5 4 see also Galindo v. State, No. 02-22-00151-CR, 2023 WL 2607752 , at *3 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Mar. 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Once the opponent of hearsay evidence makes the proper objection, it becomes the burden of the proponent of the evidence to establish that an exception applies that would make the evidence admissible in spite of its hearsay character.” (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571 , 578–79 (Tex. Crim.

2025“Identifying challenged evidence as hearsay or as calling for hearsay should be regarded by courts at all levels as a sufficiently specific objection, except under the most unusual circumstances.” Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)); see, e.g., Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“Based upon the [hearsay] objection and the State’s response thereto, it is obvious that the trial court and the parties were well aware that the evidence was being proffered as an exception to the hearsay rule . . . .

2022After a party raises an objection to hearsay testimony, “the burden shifts to the offeror to show that the testimony is admissible pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule.” Ortega, 126 S.W.3d at 620 (citing Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. Crim.

2025See id.; Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (discussing the tacit presumption that patients understand that medical professionals’ “questions are designed to elicit accurate information and that veracity will serve their best interest”); Gutierrez v. State, 630 S.W.3d 270 , 280 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet. ref’d) (“[S]tatements describing acts of sexual abuse are pertinent to the victim’s medical diagnosis and treatment.” (quoting Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d))); see also Landaverde v. State, No. 10- 10 23-00228-CR, 2025

2015App. 2008). 20 Munoz v. State, 288 S.W.3d 55, 58 (Tex. App.—Houston[1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)(citing Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). 21 Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188-89 . 14 On appeal, the Appellant claims the statement does not meet the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule.

2019App. 2008) (“The hearsay doctrine, codified in Rules 801 and 802 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, is designed to exclude out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted that pose any of the four ‘hearsay dangers’ of faulty perception, faulty memory, accidental miscommunication, or insincerity.”); Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 151 (Tex. Crim.

2012When interpreting Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 801(e)(2)(E), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that, before the alleged exception to the hearsay rule becomes admissible, the State must first show that the conspiracy existed. 10 Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 148 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2026PROC. art. 38.072; see also Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that Article 38.07 deals with the sufficiency of evidence required to sustain a conviction for certain sexual offenses, while Article 38.072 concerns the admissibility of outcry evidence that would otherwise be barred by the hearsay rule); Chapman v. State, 349 S.W.3d 241, 245 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d).

2009“When offered for the truth of the matters asserted, so called ‘outcry testimony’ is hearsay; as such, it is objectionable unless the testimony is permitted by a prescribed exception to the hearsay rule.” Dorado v. State, 843 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2025Art[icle] 38.072 or . . . some other exception to the hearsay rule.” 800 S.W.2d at 548 ; 5 4 see also Galindo v. State, No. 02-22-00151-CR, 2023 WL 2607752 , at *3 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Mar. 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Once the opponent of hearsay evidence makes the proper objection, it becomes the burden of the proponent of the evidence to establish that an exception applies that would make the evidence admissible in spite of its hearsay character.” (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571 , 578–79 (Tex. Crim.

2024See id. art. 38.072, § 2(b) (“A statement that meets the requirements of Subsection (a) is not inadmissible because of the hearsay rule.”); Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545 , 547–48 (Tex. Crim.

2011Yanez v. State , 187 S.W.3d 724, 738 (Tex. App.­­­­–Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing Torres v. State , 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Salazar v. State , 38 S.W.3d 141, 153-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc); see also Coffin v. State , 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that a ruling on admissibility of an out-of-court statement under a hearsay exception is within the trial court's discretion, subject to review only for abuse of discretion)).

2006Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153-54 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 379 ; see also Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (holding that a ruling on admissibility of an out-of-court statement under a hearsay exception is within the trial court’s discretion, subject to review only for abuse of discretion).

2009“When offered for the truth of the matters asserted, so called ‘outcry testimony’ is hearsay; as such, it is objectionable unless the testimony is permitted by a prescribed exception to the hearsay rule.” Dorado v. State, 843 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2009"When offered for the truth of the matters asserted, so called `outcry testimony' is hearsay; as such, it is objectionable unless the testimony is permitted by a prescribed exception to the hearsay rule." Dorado v. State, 843 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2014The Austin Court of Appeals has explained that: “The medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule is based on the assumption that the patient appreciates that the effectiveness of the treatment may depend on the accuracy of the information provided to the physician.” Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d 237, 247 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 292 (Edward Cleary, ed., 3d ed. 1984)).

2006Evid . 803(4); see Gregory v. State , 56 S.W.3d 164, 183 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism = d) (noting that courts have held statements made by a suspected victim of child abuse as to causation and source of injuries admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule); Fleming v. State , 819 S.W.2d 237, 247 (Tex. App. C Austin 1991, pet. ref = d) (holding statements of a suspected child abuse victim describing the abusive acts and identifying the abuser reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment and therefore admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule).

2023Even if the out-of-court statement itself is not introduced, the hearsay rule may apply if the testimony allows the jury to ascertain the purport of the statement; this type of evidence is known as “backdoor hearsay.” Id.

2021See, e.g., Schaffer, 777 S.W.2d at 113 (officer’s testimony, which was “designed to circumvent the hearsay rule and present the jury with information from unsworn, out-of-court sources,” was inadmissible “backdoor hearsay”); Head, 4 S.W.3d at 265 (referring to officer’s testimony, in which he effectively testified to the 14 inadmissible statements of a non-testifying informant as being “indirect hearsay,” which was inadmissible at trial); Soroa v. State, No. 08-98-00119-CR, 2000 WL 1514096 , at *10-11 (Tex.App.--El Paso Oct. 12, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (referring to

2005The decision in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), treating the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations as a "firmly rooted” one for the purpose of applying the reliability test of Roberts [ 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980)] gave leeway to prosecutors and courts to try cases by introducing statements made in 911 calls and to responding officers (as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted), even if the declarant did not testify. 6 .

2005The decision in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), treating the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations as a "firmly rooted” one for the purpose of applying the reliability test of Roberts [ 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980)] gave leeway to prosecutors and courts to try cases by introducing statements made in 911 calls and to responding officers (as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted), even if the declarant did not testify. 6 .

2021Rule 107 is an exception to the hearsay rule, Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 217 , and “is designed to reduce the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression from hearing only a part of some act, conversation, or writing.” Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011).

2013“Hearsay statements are generally not admissible unless the statement falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.” Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 217 ; see TEX.

2015If a statement is made by a declarant who does not testify and the statement is testimonial, then it is not admissible even if a hearsay exception applies or if the testimony bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id., 541 U.S. at 60 , 124 S. Ct. at 1369 .

2015If a statement is made by a declarant who does not testify and the statement is testimonial, then it is not admissible even if a hearsay exception applies or if the testimony bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id., 541 U.S. at 60 , 124 S. Ct. at 1369 .

2024The State does not address Devasia’s argument that admission of the “entire” video was in error. optional completeness is an exception to the hearsay rule.”) (citing Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814 (Tex. Crim.

2024An adverse party may also introduce any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement that is necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by the opponent.”); Castillo v. State, 573 S.W.3d 869, 877 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (“The rule of optional completeness is an exception to the hearsay rule.” (citing Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011))).

2021“By contrast, [we] review a trial court’s determination of whether evidence is admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule only for an abuse of discretion,” id. at 743 , and “will uphold an evidentiary ruling if it was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case,” James v. State, 8 Approximately three months after the incident, Hutzelman filed an affidavit of non-prosecution, in which she stated that Brown did not hit her and was just holding her back from breaking the table. 7 555 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (citing

2020THE COURT: And you’re seeking to keep it out why? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, because I don’t believe it shows motive, and I don’t believe it has anything to do with the relationship between John Finch and Lindsey, at least this video doesn’t. -4- objections to the admission of excited utterances arise because the hearsay exception depends largely upon the subjective state of mind of the declarant at the time of the statement, whereas the issue of whether an out-of-court statement (excited or otherwise) is ‘testimonial’ under Crawford depends upon the perceptions of an objectively reasonabl

2025Id. (citing Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex. Crim.

1998The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule apples when the declarant is “ ‘dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event.’ ” Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (quoting Tex.R.Crim.

2002See Dewberry , 4 S.W.3d at 753 ; but see Lilly v. Virginia , 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S. Ct. 1887 , 144 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (holding that statements against penal interests made to police officers were often not trustworthy enough to satisfy the right to confrontation of witnesses, and are not "firmly rooted" exception to hearsay).

2002See Dewberry , 4 S.W.3d at 753 ; but see Lilly v. Virginia , 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S. Ct. 1887 , 144 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (holding that statements against penal interests made to police officers were often not trustworthy enough to satisfy the right to confrontation of witnesses, and are not "firmly rooted" exception to hearsay).

2015A trial court's decision to admit evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.1 A trial court has only abused its discretion if its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.2 Article 38.072 of the code of criminal procedure provides a mechanism that requires the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis if outcry testimony reaches the level of reliability required to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.3 Indicia of reliability that the trial court may consider [under article 38.072] include (1) whether the child victim tes

2013To qualify for the hearsay exception, the statement must describe the alleged offense and must have been made to the first 4 person, eighteen years of age or older, other than the defendant, to whom the child made a “statement about the offense.” Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91 .

2024Id. § 2(b)(3). “[O]utcry testimony admitted in compliance with [Article] 38.072 is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, meaning it is considered substantive evidence, admissible for the truth of the matter asserted in the testimony.” Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim.

2007Ann. art. 38.072 (Vernon 2005) (provides exception to the hearsay rule); Rodriguez v. State , 819 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) ("the crux of the question presented is therefore whether the State, as the proponent of evidence presumptively barred by the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, has carried its burden of proving that the ... statements ... bore sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand scrutiny under the Clause”).

2008See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) ("the crux of the question presented is therefore whether the State, as the proponent of evidence presumptively barred by the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, has carried its burden of proving that the ... statements ... bore sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand scrutiny under the Clause”).

2026“An extra-judicial statement or writing may be admitted as circumstantial evidence from which an inference may be drawn, and not the truth of the matter stated, therein, without violating the hearsay rule.” Gholson v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. Crim.

2024“An extra-judicial statement or writing may be admitted as circumstantial evidence from which an inference may be drawn, and not for the truth of the matter stated, therein, without violating the hearsay rule.” Gholson v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. Crim.

2019When asked how she knew this, Campbell testified that Jelena stated that Appellant had threatened to kill her multiple times and that if Jelena ever died in an accident, to ensure that her death was investigated. 224 (...continued) defendant properly objected to hearsay, the State then had the burden to show that the proffered evidence was admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception). 225 See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that “if extraneous offense evidence is not ‘relevant’ apart from supporting an inference of ‘character conformity,’ it is absolutel

2019When asked how she knew this, Campbell testified that Jelena stated that Appellant had threatened to kill her multiple times and that if Jelena ever died in an accident, to ensure that her death was investigated. 224 (...continued) defendant properly objected to hearsay, the State then had the burden to show that the proffered evidence was admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception). 225 See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that “if extraneous offense evidence is not ‘relevant’ apart from supporting an inference of ‘character conformity,’ it is absolutel

2025Id. at 381 (present-sense- impression exception is “predicated on the notion that the utterance is a reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental processes” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 28 Nor does Galvan’s statement fall within the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay bar.

2023“The hearsay doctrine, codified in Rules 801 and 802 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, is designed to exclude out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted that pose any of the four ‘hearsay dangers’ of faulty perception, faulty memory, accidental miscommunication, or insincerity.” Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. Crim.

2025However, “[i]n order to have evidence admitted under a hearsay exception, the proponent of the evidence must specify which exception he is relying upon.” Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim.

2023Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841 , 846 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Lund v. State, 366 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d) (“A witness’[s] prior inconsistent statement is admissible for impeachment, but as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted, it is inadmissible unless a hearsay exception applies.”).

2015Robert, 448 U.S. 56 , 64 S.Ct. 2538 . 65 L.Ed.2d 587 (1980). ' The Court of Criminal Appeals has provided that the constitutional right to confront can prevent admissibility even where a hearsay exception is applicable.

2009Before Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), was decided, the scope of a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights was delineated by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), which conditioned the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it fell under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Under this test, a hearsay statement was per se reliable under the Confrontation Clause if it fell within a “firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule.

2005For example, appellant argues that the hearsay exception for business records should be liberally construed, citing Coulter v. State , 494 S.W.2d 876, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

1990Even though the formal requirements may be shown, they are not to be admitted automatically; the indispensable fundamental trustworthiness of the proffered record must be evident.” Id. at 884 . “[E]vidence within the ambit of a recognized exception to the hearsay rule is not admissible if it does not have the ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” McCrary v. State, 604 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

2019He relies primarily on Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990), clarified on reh’g (1992), for the proposition that because matters “observed by law-enforcement personnel” are excepted from the hearsay exception for public records as applied in criminal cases, see TEX.R.EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii), those same matters are also excluded from the scope of the business-records hearsay objection, see TEX.R.EVID. 803(6).

2012See also Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 811-12 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (noting that Rule 803(8)'s "broad language, read in light of the legislative history as a whole, leads to the conclusion that Congress’ broader concern was with the potentially prejudicial influence of an adversarial setting and with a defendant's confrontation rights”); McLeod v. State, 56 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) ("The exclusionary clause [in Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B) ], which prohibits from this hearsay exception matters observed by police officers, only applies where possible impa