hearsay rule in Illinois

2026Such determinations will be reversed on -9- appeal “only where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). ¶ 27 Admission of a statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule requires the trial court to find “(1) there was an ‘occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement,’ (2) the declarant lacked time to fabricate the statement, and (3) the declarant’s statement relates to the circumstances o

2025“Due to its lack of reliability, hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at 88-89 ). ¶ 18 Indubitably, Ms. Taylor’s testimony was hearsay.

2026I, § 8; Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)). ¶ 98 “Hearsay *** is an out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due to its lack of reliability unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.” People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1997).

2025An abuse of discretion occurs where the “decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable such that no reasonable person would agree with it.” People v. Caraga, 2018 IL App (1st) 170123, ¶ 36 . 6 ¶ 22 “Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due to its lack of reliability unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.” People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1997).

2026If the inquiry reveals that the forensic report was “made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial, it is testimonial.” Id. ¶ 157 Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), resolution of a confrontation clause claim requires addressing the following: (1) was the out-of-court statement hearsay because it was offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein? (2) if hearsay, was the statement admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule? (3) if admissible hearsay, was the statement testimonial in nature? and (4) if testimonial, was the admi

2026If the inquiry reveals that the forensic report was “made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial, it is testimonial.” Id. ¶ 157 Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), resolution of a confrontation clause claim requires addressing the following: (1) was the out-of-court statement hearsay because it was offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein? (2) if hearsay, was the statement admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule? (3) if admissible hearsay, was the statement testimonial in nature? and (4) if testimonial, was the admi

2020See People v. Floyd, 103 Ill. 2d 541, 546 (1984) (statements that indicate the declarant’s state of mind are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable to testify, there is a reasonable probability that the proffered hearsay statements are truthful, and the statements are relevant to a material issue in the case).

2011Plaintiff relies on People v. Floyd, 103 Ill. 2d 541, 546 (1984), to support her argument that evidence of the declarant’s state of mind is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the proffered hearsay statements are reliable.

2025Section 115-10.2a(a) provides a statement “not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is identified as unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that: (1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and (2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of

2025Section 115-10.2a(a) provides a statement “not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is identified as unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that: (1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and (2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of

2016The Bridgewater court, citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1990), noted that the hearsay exception established by section 115-10 was not "firmly rooted," and therefore, evidence admitted under it needed to show "a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgewater, 259 Ill.

2012At that time, United States Supreme Court doctrine held that hearsay statements can be admitted at trial without violating the confrontation clause if those statements either (1) fall under a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or (2) possess “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). ¶ 101 However, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004), the Supreme Court abrogated its prior case law regarding the confrontation clause and adopted the view that (at most) the confrontation clause bars only “te

2021However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). ¶ 129 “The question to be considered in judging the admissibility of a declaration of this character is whether the declaration was made under circumstances that provide ‘considerable assurance’ of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness.” Id. at 67 (quoting Chambers, 410 U

2000People v. Bowel, 111 Ill.2d 58, 66 , 94 Ill.Dec. 748 , 488 N.E.2d 995 (1986), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 313 (1973) ("the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice").

2026Such determinations will be reversed on -9- appeal “only where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). ¶ 27 Admission of a statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule requires the trial court to find “(1) there was an ‘occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement,’ (2) the declarant lacked time to fabricate the statement, and (3) the declarant’s statement relates to the circumstances o

2026For a hearsay statement to qualify as an excited utterance, and thus a hearsay exception, “there must be an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement, there must be an absence of time for the declarant to fabricate the statement, and the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.” People v. Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d 89, 107 (2009).

2014App. 3d at 512 , 946 N.E.2d at 482 (a police officer’s testimony that a confidential informant told him the defendant would be purchasing heroin was inadmissible to show the steps of the police investigation; the court found the error harmless). ¶ 118 The State’s repeated abuse of this limited exception to the hearsay rule–in the face of repeated condemnation from the appellate court–shows a disrespect for the fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule, which “is to test the real value of testimony by exposing the source of the assertion to cross-examination by the party against whom it is offere

2014App. 3d at 512 , 946 N.E.2d at 482 (a police officer’s testimony that a confidential informant told him the defendant would be purchasing heroin was inadmissible to show the steps of the police investigation; the court found the error harmless). ¶ 118 The State’s repeated abuse of this limited exception to the hearsay rule–in the face of repeated condemnation from the appellate court–shows a disrespect for the fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule, which “is to test the real value of testimony by exposing the source of the assertion to cross-examination by the party against whom it is offere

2021However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). ¶ 129 “The question to be considered in judging the admissibility of a declaration of this character is whether the declaration was made under circumstances that provide ‘considerable assurance’ of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness.” Id. at 67 (quoting Chambers, 410 U

2021However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). ¶ 129 “The question to be considered in judging the admissibility of a declaration of this character is whether the declaration was made under circumstances that provide ‘considerable assurance’ of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness.” Id. at 67 (quoting Chambers, 410 U

2010See, e.g., Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d at 559 , 568 N.E.2d 895 (holding that a telephone conversation between the alleged victim of an aggravated criminal sexual assault and her father, which took place while the defendant was nearby could not be admitted under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements indicating declarant’s state of mind to show that the defendant had a gun and that the victim could not get away); Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 154-56 , 687 N.E.2d at 936-37 (holding that a detective’s 42 testimony about conversations in which several victims described how they were attacked by the d

2010See, e.g., Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d at 559 (holding that a telephone conversation between the alleged victim of an aggravated criminal sexual assault and her father, which took place while the defendant was nearby, could not be admitted under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements indicating declarant’s state of mind to show that the defendant had a gun and that the victim could not get away); Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 154-56 , 687 N.E.2d at 936-37 (holding that a detective’s testimony about conversations in which several victims described how they were attacked by the defendant was not ad

2026In the prosecution of certain sex offenses, “statements made by the victim to medical personnel for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment[,] including descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or - 22 - sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof[,] insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.” Id.

2019App. 3d 710, 721 (1987) (“We are unaware of any criminal case where a physician has been permitted, under the physician-patient exception to the hearsay rule, to repeat a statement made by the patient identifying the assailant.”); cf. Spicer, 379 Ill.

2021Apr. 26, 2012), excludes from the hearsay rule “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” For the excited utterance exception to apply, “(1) there must be an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) there must be an absence of time for the declarant to fabricate the statement; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.” People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 352 (2000)).

2021See People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347-48 (2000). -7- No. 1-18-2595 qualify as a business record under the hearsay rule.”).

2004App. 3d 1001, 1008 , 708 N.E.2d 1196 (1999) (dying declaration admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule “ ‘in the assumption that belief of impending death excludes the possibility of fabrication by the declarant,’ ” quoting M.

2004People v. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill.App.3d 1001, 1012 , 237 Ill.Dec. 156 , 708 N.E.2d 1196 (1999); People v. Gibson, 99 Ill.App.3d 1068, 1076 , 55 Ill.Dec. 35 , 425 N.E.2d 1208 (1981) ("Trial courts are vested with considerable discretion in admitting testimony which comes within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, for each case must rest on its own facts").

2016People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , ¶ 5 n.1; see People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 381 (1990). ¶ 51 However, “there is a caveat to the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule that the declarant must have had an opportunity to observe personally the matter of which he speaks.” People v. Hill, 60 Ill.

2016People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , ¶ 5 n.1; see People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 381 (1990). ¶ 50 However, “there is a caveat to the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule that the declarant must have had an opportunity to observe personally the matter of which he speaks.” People v. Hill, 60 Ill.

2004Our supreme court expressed the same conclusion in People v. Poland, 22 Ill. 2d 175, 180 , 174 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1961): “We see no useful purpose to be served in dealing with the problem by using the term ‘res gestae.’ That amorphous concept has been applied indiscriminately to a multitude of situations, some of which contain no element of hearsay at all, while others involve true exceptions to the hearsay rule.

2004Our supreme court expressed the same conclusion in People v. Poland, 22 Ill. 2d 175, 180 , 174 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1961): “We see no useful purpose to be served in dealing with the problem by using the term ‘res gestae.’ That amorphous concept has been applied indiscriminately to a multitude of situations, some of which contain no element of hearsay at all, while others involve true exceptions to the hearsay rule.

2018See Crawford , 541 U.S. at 60 -62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (holding the rule of satisfying a hearsay exception for admission set forth in Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. 56 , 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), is overturned in regards to testimonial hearsay).

2018See Crawford , 541 U.S. at 60 -62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (holding the rule of satisfying a hearsay exception for admission set forth in Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. 56 , 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), is overturned in regards to testimonial hearsay).

2009“Relevant admissions of a party, whether consisting of a statement or conduct, are admissible when offered by the opponent as an exception to the hearsay rule.” People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 374-75 (1994).

2002In Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 374-75 , 643 N.E.2d at 665 , our supreme court held that “[rjelevant admissions of a party *** are admissible when offered by the opponent as an exception to the hearsay rule.” Arnold and Keehn were potential adverse parties since the effect of Arnold’s testimony implicated Keehn’s dog as the aggressor and suggested that she and possibly her daughter were not to blame for Zaragoza’s injuries.

2020App. 3d 400, 408 (2005). ¶ 14 The theory upon which entries made in the regular course of business are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule is that “ ‘since their purpose is to aid in the proper transaction of the business and they are useless for that purpose unless accurate, the motive for following a routine of accuracy is great and the motive to falsify nonexistent.’ ” Kimble, 358 Ill.

2018Jan. 1, 2011) provides for the admission of "records of regularly conducted activity" where the records consist of: "A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts [or] *875 events * * * made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness * * *." ¶ 48 "The theory upon which e

2023Rule 804(b)(5) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for “[a] statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Id. ¶ 40 The State’s burden of proof at a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.

2021Sidebar 228, 230-31 (2012) (discussing Giles). 2 ¶ 88 Because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is both an exception to the hearsay rule and extinguishes confrontation clause claims on equitable grounds (Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ; Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 ), we hold the trial court properly admitted all three of Teresa’s statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and there was no violation of defendant’s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses. ¶ 89 CONCLUSION ¶ 90 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. ¶ 91 Affirmed. 2 “This

1998See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 528 (holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, where the defendant was able to confront and cross-examine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d at 284 (same).

1998See Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 528 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 (holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, where the defendant was able to confront and cross-examine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made); Goodman, 81 Ill.2d at 284 , 41 Ill.Dec. 793 , 408 N.E.2d 215 (same).

2016The State further argues the judge cured any potential negative inference that the jury might have drawn by immediately issuing a limiting instruction. 39 ¶ 91 Police officers may testify to their investigatory procedures without violating the hearsay rule, “even if a logical inference may be drawn that the officer took subsequent steps as a result of the substance of that conversation.” People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155, 159-60 (1992) (citing People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988)); People v. Shorty, 408 Ill.

2016The State further argues the judge cured any potential negative inference that the jury might have drawn by immediately issuing a limiting instruction. 39 ¶ 91 Police officers may testify to their investigatory procedures without violating the hearsay rule, “even if a logical inference may be drawn that the officer took subsequent steps as a result of the substance of that conversation.” People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155, 159-60 (1992) (citing People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988)); People v. Shorty, 408 Ill.

2016The State further argues the judge cured any potential negative inference that the jury might have drawn by immediately issuing a limiting instruction. 39 ¶ 91 Police officers may testify to their investigatory procedures without violating the hearsay rule, “even if a logical inference may be drawn that the officer took subsequent steps as a result of the substance of that conversation.” People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155, 159-60 (1992) (citing People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988)); People v. Shorty, 408 Ill.

2016The State further argues the judge cured any potential negative inference that the jury might have drawn by immediately issuing a limiting instruction. 39 ¶ 91 Police officers may testify to their investigatory procedures without violating the hearsay rule, “even if a logical inference may be drawn that the officer took subsequent steps as a result of the substance of that conversation.” People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155, 159-60 (1992) (citing People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988)); People v. Shorty, 408 Ill.