hearsay rule in Connecticut

2017I conclude it's a business record." 6 "Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-7, titled, 'Hearsay within Hearsay,' provides: Hearsay within hearsay is admissible only if each part of the combined statements is independently admissible under a hearsay exception." Dinan v. Marchand , 91 Conn.App. 492 , 498 n.6, 881 A.2d 503 (2005), aff'd, 279 Conn. 558 , 903 A.2d 201 (2006) ; see also State v. Lewis , 245 Conn. 779 , 802, 717 A.2d 1140 (1998). 7 Even if this claim was reviewable, we would conclude that it is meritless.

2017I conclude it's a business record." 6 "Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-7, titled, 'Hearsay within Hearsay,' provides: Hearsay within hearsay is admissible only if each part of the combined statements is independently admissible under a hearsay exception." Dinan v. Marchand , 91 Conn.App. 492 , 498 n.6, 881 A.2d 503 (2005), aff'd, 279 Conn. 558 , 903 A.2d 201 (2006) ; see also State v. Lewis , 245 Conn. 779 , 802, 717 A.2d 1140 (1998). 7 Even if this claim was reviewable, we would conclude that it is meritless.

2021Section 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence excludes from the hearsay rule ‘‘[a] statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symp- toms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ The rationale for admitting such statements ‘‘is that the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to [those who] advise or treat him.’’ (Interna

2021Section 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence excludes from the hearsay rule ‘‘[a] statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symp- toms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ The rationale for admitting such statements ‘‘is that the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to [those who] advise or treat him.’’ (Interna

2003In Kelly, our Supreme Court held that a treating physician may testify as to the identity of the perpetrator and the details of a sexual assault as it is relevant “to facilitate the treatment of psychological and physical injuries.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 45 , quoting State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 565 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994). 11 Although Kelly and DePastino address the physician-patient exception to the hearsay rule, I see no reason not to permit any other qualified, mental health professional from testifying about allegations of

2003In Kelly, our Supreme Court held that a treating physician may testify as to the identity of the perpetrator and the details of a sexual assault as it is relevant “to facilitate the treatment of psychological and physical injuries.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 45 , quoting State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 565 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994). 11 Although Kelly and DePastino address the physician-patient exception to the hearsay rule, I see no reason not to permit any other qualified, mental health professional from testifying about allegations of

2021Having reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit the photographs for an abuse of discretion; see State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007); we conclude that, even if we assume that the writing on the mirror constitutes a hearsay statement, it ‘‘fall[s] within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canady, 297 Conn. 322, 341 , 998 A.2d 1135 (2010).

2021Having reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit the photographs for an abuse of discretion; see State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007); we conclude that, even if we assume that the writing on the mirror constitutes a hearsay statement, it ‘‘fall[s] within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canady, 297 Conn. 322, 341 , 998 A.2d 1135 (2010).

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1989Hearsay statements which are not admissible under any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule may nevertheless be admissible if “(1) . . . there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statements], and (2) . . . the statements] [were] supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.” State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985); see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249 , 464 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

2015One such exception is the spontaneous utterance exception set forth in § 8-3 (2), which applies to: ‘‘A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’’ Under § 8-3 (2), an out-of-court declaration will not be excluded under the hearsay rule when the following factors are established: ‘‘(1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declar- ant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the

2015One such exception is the spontaneous utterance exception set forth in § 8-3 (2), which applies to: ‘‘A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’’ Under § 8-3 (2), an out-of-court declaration will not be excluded under the hearsay rule when the following factors are established: ‘‘(1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declar- ant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the

2009A hearsay statement that does not fall within one of the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule nevertheless may be admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule provided that the proponent’s use of the *384 statement is reasonably necessary and the statement itself is supported by equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability that are essential to other evidence admitted under traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aaron L., 272 Conn. 798, 812 , 865 A.2d 1135 (2005); see also Conn. Code Evid. §

2009A hearsay statement that does not fall within one of the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule nevertheless may be admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule provided that the proponent’s use of the *384 statement is reasonably necessary and the statement itself is supported by equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability that are essential to other evidence admitted under traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aaron L., 272 Conn. 798, 812 , 865 A.2d 1135 (2005); see also Conn. Code Evid. §

2022Defense counsel did not object to the reenactment but did object to the admission of certain portions of W’s grand jury testimony that were consistent with W’s in-court testimony, pursuant to State v. Whelan ( 200 Conn. 743 ), in which this court adopted a hearsay exception allowing the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.

2022The court concluded that the audio recording was admissible under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule and, in the alternative, pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).

2024Syllabus Pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (c)), when a person has been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, the arresting officer ‘‘shall prepare a report of the incident and shall mail or otherwise transmit . . . the report and a copy of the results of any chemical test [of such person’s blood, breath or urine] to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days.’’ Pursuant further to Volck v. Muzio ( 204 Conn. 507 ), an incident report prepared in accordance with § 14-227b (c) is admissible at a motor vehicle operator’s

2019We previously have stated that the admissibility requirements set forth in § 14-227b(c)"provide sufficient indicia of reliability so that the [police] report can be introduced in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, especially in license suspension proceedings, without the necessity of producing the arresting officer." Volck v. Muzio , 204 Conn. 507 , 518, 529 A.2d 177 (1987).

2022In 1985, our Supreme Court stated that, in considering whether a hearsay statement not admissible under a traditional hearsay exception nonetheless may be admissible under the residual hearsay exception, the proper ‘‘analysis must focus on (1) whether there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) whether the statement was supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthi- ness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985).

2022In 1985, our Supreme Court stated that, in considering whether a hearsay statement not admissible under a traditional hearsay exception nonetheless may be admissible under the residual hearsay exception, the proper ‘‘analysis must focus on (1) whether there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) whether the statement was supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthi- ness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985).

2019We disagree. ‘‘A dual inculpatory statement is admissible as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which carves out an exception to the hearsay rule for an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable declarant if the statement at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 67 , 890 A.2d 474 , cert. de

2019We disagree. ‘‘A dual inculpatory statement is admissible as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which carves out an exception to the hearsay rule for an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable declarant if the statement at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 67 , 890 A.2d 474 , cert. de

2000“In Perry v.Haritos, [ 100 Conn. 476 , 124 A. 44 (1924)], our Supreme Court recognized the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

2000“In Perry v.Haritos, [ 100 Conn. 476 , 124 A. 44 (1924)], our Supreme Court recognized the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

1994The state argues further that even if the testimony from the third trial is excluded, the testimony from the first and second trials and the probable cause hearing, may be admitted under the former testimony exception. "[P]rior testimony of an unavailable witness is admissible in a subsequent trial as an exception to the hearsay rule." State v. Torres, 210 Conn. 631 , 646 , 556 A.2d 1013 (1989), citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 67 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 165 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970); State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500 , 503-

1994The state argues further that even if the testimony from the third trial is excluded, the testimony from the first and second trials and the probable cause hearing, may be admitted under the former testimony exception. "[P]rior testimony of an unavailable witness is admissible in a subsequent trial as an exception to the hearsay rule." State v. Torres, 210 Conn. 631 , 646 , 556 A.2d 1013 (1989), citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 67 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 165 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970); State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500 , 503-

2004If the information does not have such a basis, it adds another level of hearsay to the report which necessitates a separate exception to the hearsay rule in order to justify its admission.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) River Dock & Pile, Inc. v. O & G Industries, Inc., 219 Conn. 787, 794 , 595 A.2d 839 (1991).

2004If the information does not have such a basis, it adds another level of hearsay to the report which necessitates a separate exception to the hearsay rule in order to justify its admission.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) River Dock & Pile, Inc. v. O & G Industries, Inc., 219 Conn. 787, 794 , 595 A.2d 839 (1991).

2017The residual, or catchall, exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) the statement is supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo , 223 Conn. 635 , 664, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) ; accord Conn. Code Evid. § 8-9.

2017The residual, or catchall, exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) the statement is supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo , 223 Conn. 635 , 664, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) ; accord Conn. Code Evid. § 8-9.

2022The court concluded that the audio recording was admissible under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule and, in the alternative, pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).

2022The court concluded that the audio recording was admissible under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule and, in the alternative, pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).

2021Section 8-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part that certain statements are ‘‘not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness,’’ including ‘‘(1) . . . [a] statement that is being offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity . . . .’’ It is well established that ‘‘[s]tatements made out of court by a [party opponent] are universally deemed admissible when offered against him . . . so long as they are relevant and material to issues in the case.’’ (Citation omitted

2021Section 8-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part that certain statements are ‘‘not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness,’’ including ‘‘(1) . . . [a] statement that is being offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity . . . .’’ It is well established that ‘‘[s]tatements made out of court by a [party opponent] are universally deemed admissible when offered against him . . . so long as they are relevant and material to issues in the case.’’ (Citation omitted

2020The medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule is codified in § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence: ‘‘A statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ Admissibility of such statements turns on whether ‘‘the declarant was seeking medical diagnosis or treatment, and the statements are reasonably pertinent to ach

2020The medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule is codified in § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence: ‘‘A statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ Admissibility of such statements turns on whether ‘‘the declarant was seeking medical diagnosis or treatment, and the statements are reasonably pertinent to ach

2009“Under the admissions of a party opponent exception to the hearsay rule, evidence must be offered against the party that made the admission.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Markeveys, 56 Conn. App. 716, 719 , 745 A.2d 212 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see also Bell Food Services, Inc. v. Sherbacow, 217 Conn. 476, 489 , 586 A.2d 1157 (1991) (plaintiffs could not offer statement of persons other than defendant as statement of party opponent); DeMarkey v. Fratturo, 80 Conn. App. 650, 655 , 836 A.2d 1257 (2003) (“[t]o fall within [party opponent] exception, on

2009“Under the admissions of a party opponent exception to the hearsay rule, evidence must be offered against the party that made the admission.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Markeveys, 56 Conn. App. 716, 719 , 745 A.2d 212 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see also Bell Food Services, Inc. v. Sherbacow, 217 Conn. 476, 489 , 586 A.2d 1157 (1991) (plaintiffs could not offer statement of persons other than defendant as statement of party opponent); DeMarkey v. Fratturo, 80 Conn. App. 650, 655 , 836 A.2d 1257 (2003) (“[t]o fall within [party opponent] exception, on

2002The rationale underlying the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule is that “the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to a physician employed to advise or treat him.” Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272, 275 , 205 A.2d 773 (1964), overruled on other grounds by George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312 , 736 A.2d 889 (1999); see also C.

2002The rationale underlying the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule is that “the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to a physician employed to advise or treat him.” Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272, 275 , 205 A.2d 773 (1964), overruled on other grounds by George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312 , 736 A.2d 889 (1999); see also C.

2022We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Under Crawford v. Washington, [ 541 U.S. 36, 59 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], hearsay statements of an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may be admitted in accordance with the confrontation clause only if the defendant previously has had the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.’’ State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 618 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008). ‘‘Nontestimonial [hearsay] statements, however, are not subject to the confrontation clause and may be admitted under state rules of evidence’’ if they fall un

2022We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Under Crawford v. Washington, [ 541 U.S. 36, 59 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], hearsay statements of an unavailable witness that are testimonial in nature may be admitted in accordance with the confrontation clause only if the defendant previously has had the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.’’ State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598, 618 , 960 A.2d 993 (2008). ‘‘Nontestimonial [hearsay] statements, however, are not subject to the confrontation clause and may be admitted under state rules of evidence’’ if they fall un

2020We conclude, however, that—regardless of whether supporting documentation or testimony from the third party is offered—it is the third party’s ‘‘duty to report [the information] in a business context which provides the reliability to justify [the business records exception to the hearsay rule].’’ State v. Milner, 206 Conn. 512, 521 , 539 A.2d 80 (1988); see D’Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 59 , 97 A.2d 893 (1953); see also U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Jones, 925 F.3d 534, 538 (1st Cir. 2019) (‘‘[t]he key question is whether the records in question are reliable enough to be admissible’’ [internal

2020We conclude, however, that—regardless of whether supporting documentation or testimony from the third party is offered—it is the third party’s ‘‘duty to report [the information] in a business context which provides the reliability to justify [the business records exception to the hearsay rule].’’ State v. Milner, 206 Conn. 512, 521 , 539 A.2d 80 (1988); see D’Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 59 , 97 A.2d 893 (1953); see also U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Jones, 925 F.3d 534, 538 (1st Cir. 2019) (‘‘[t]he key question is whether the records in question are reliable enough to be admissible’’ [internal