hearsay rule in Connecticut

2017I conclude it's a business record." 6 "Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-7, titled, 'Hearsay within Hearsay,' provides: Hearsay within hearsay is admissible only if each part of the combined statements is independently admissible under a hearsay exception." Dinan v. Marchand , 91 Conn.App. 492 , 498 n.6, 881 A.2d 503 (2005), aff'd, 279 Conn. 558 , 903 A.2d 201 (2006) ; see also State v. Lewis , 245 Conn. 779 , 802, 717 A.2d 1140 (1998). 7 Even if this claim was reviewable, we would conclude that it is meritless.

2017I conclude it's a business record." 6 "Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-7, titled, 'Hearsay within Hearsay,' provides: Hearsay within hearsay is admissible only if each part of the combined statements is independently admissible under a hearsay exception." Dinan v. Marchand , 91 Conn.App. 492 , 498 n.6, 881 A.2d 503 (2005), aff'd, 279 Conn. 558 , 903 A.2d 201 (2006) ; see also State v. Lewis , 245 Conn. 779 , 802, 717 A.2d 1140 (1998). 7 Even if this claim was reviewable, we would conclude that it is meritless.

2021Section 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence excludes from the hearsay rule ‘‘[a] statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symp- toms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, inso- far as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ The rationale for admitting such statements ‘‘is that the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to [those who] advise or treat him.’’ (Inter

2021Section 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence excludes from the hearsay rule ‘‘[a] statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symp- toms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, inso- far as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ The rationale for admitting such statements ‘‘is that the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to [those who] advise or treat him.’’ (Inter

2003In Kelly, our Supreme Court held that a treating physician may testify as to the identity of the perpetrator and the details of a sexual assault as it is relevant “to facilitate the treatment of psychological and physical injuries.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 45 , quoting State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 565 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994). 11 Although Kelly and DePastino address the physician-patient exception to the hearsay rule, I see no reason not to permit any other qualified, mental health professional from testifying about allegations of

2003In Kelly, our Supreme Court held that a treating physician may testify as to the identity of the perpetrator and the details of a sexual assault as it is relevant “to facilitate the treatment of psychological and physical injuries.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 45 , quoting State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 565 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994). 11 Although Kelly and DePastino address the physician-patient exception to the hearsay rule, I see no reason not to permit any other qualified, mental health professional from testifying about allegations of

2021Having reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit the photographs for an abuse of discretion; see State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007); we conclude that, even if we assume that the writing on the mirror constitutes a hearsay statement, it ‘‘fall[s] within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canady, 297 Conn. 322, 341 , 998 A.2d 1135 (2010).

2021Having reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit the photographs for an abuse of discretion; see State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007); we conclude that, even if we assume that the writing on the mirror constitutes a hearsay statement, it ‘‘fall[s] within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canady, 297 Conn. 322, 341 , 998 A.2d 1135 (2010).

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1989Hearsay statements which are not admissible under any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule may nevertheless be admissible if “(1) . . . there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statements], and (2) . . . the statements] [were] supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.” State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985); see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249 , 464 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1989Hearsay statements which are not admissible under any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule may nevertheless be admissible if “(1) . . . there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statements], and (2) . . . the statements] [were] supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.” State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985); see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249 , 464 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1989Hearsay statements which are not admissible under any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule may nevertheless be admissible if “(1) . . . there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statements], and (2) . . . the statements] [were] supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.” State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985); see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249 , 464 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

1996The ‘residual,’ or ‘catch-all,’ exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is ‘a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,’ and (2) the statement is ‘supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’” State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 664 ; see also State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 S. Ct. 1455 , 79 L.

2015One such exception is the spontaneous utterance exception set forth in § 8-3 (2), which applies to: ‘‘A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’’ Under § 8-3 (2), an out-of-court declaration will not be excluded under the hearsay rule when the following factors are established: ‘‘(1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declar- ant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the

2015One such exception is the spontaneous utterance exception set forth in § 8-3 (2), which applies to: ‘‘A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’’ Under § 8-3 (2), an out-of-court declaration will not be excluded under the hearsay rule when the following factors are established: ‘‘(1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declar- ant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the

2009A hearsay statement that does not fall within one of the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule nevertheless may be admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule provided that the proponent’s use of the *384 statement is reasonably necessary and the statement itself is supported by equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability that are essential to other evidence admitted under traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aaron L., 272 Conn. 798, 812 , 865 A.2d 1135 (2005); see also Conn. Code Evid. §

2009A hearsay statement that does not fall within one of the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule nevertheless may be admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule provided that the proponent’s use of the *384 statement is reasonably necessary and the statement itself is supported by equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability that are essential to other evidence admitted under traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aaron L., 272 Conn. 798, 812 , 865 A.2d 1135 (2005); see also Conn. Code Evid. §

2024Syllabus Pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (c)), when a person has been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, the arresting officer ‘‘shall prepare a report of the incident and shall mail or otherwise transmit . . . the report and a copy of the results of any chemical test [of such person’s blood, breath or urine] to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days.’’ Pursuant further to Volck v. Muzio ( 204 Conn. 507 ), an incident report prepared in accordance with § 14-227b (c) is admissible at a motor vehicle operator’s

2019We previously have stated that the admissibility requirements set forth in § 14-227b(c)"provide sufficient indicia of reliability so that the [police] report can be introduced in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, especially in license suspension proceedings, without the necessity of producing the arresting officer." Volck v. Muzio , 204 Conn. 507 , 518, 529 A.2d 177 (1987).

2022In 1985, our Supreme Court stated that, in considering whether a hearsay statement not admissible under a traditional hearsay exception nonetheless may be admissible under the residual hearsay exception, the proper ‘‘analysis must focus on (1) whether there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the state- ment, and (2) whether the statement was supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthi- ness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985).

2022In 1985, our Supreme Court stated that, in considering whether a hearsay statement not admissible under a traditional hearsay exception nonetheless may be admissible under the residual hearsay exception, the proper ‘‘analysis must focus on (1) whether there was a reasonable necessity for the admission of the state- ment, and (2) whether the statement was supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthi- ness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 664 , 491 A.2d 345 (1985).

2022Defense counsel did not object to the reenactment but did object to the admission of certain portions of W’s grand jury testimony that were consistent with W’s in-court testimony, pursuant to State v. Whelan ( 200 Conn. 743 ), in which this court adopted a hearsay exception allowing the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.

2019The defendant also established inconsistencies in B's testimony, namely: (1) that she had testified that the first incident of intercourse was in the home's bathroom, but had told the police that the first incident took place in the defendant's bed, and (2) that she had told the police that intercourse occurred on a weekly basis when she had testified that it was less than weekly. 6 In State v. Whelan , 200 Conn. 743 , 753, 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S.Ct. 597 , 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), this court "adopted a hearsay exception allowing the substantive use of prior written inco

2019We disagree. ‘‘A dual inculpatory statement is admissible as a state- ment against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Con- necticut Code of Evidence, which carves out an excep- tion to the hearsay rule for an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable declarant if the statement at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a rea- sonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 67 , 890 A.2d 474 ,

2019We disagree. ‘‘A dual inculpatory statement is admissible as a state- ment against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Con- necticut Code of Evidence, which carves out an excep- tion to the hearsay rule for an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable declarant if the statement at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a rea- sonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 67 , 890 A.2d 474 ,

2000“In Perry v.Haritos, [ 100 Conn. 476 , 124 A. 44 (1924)], our Supreme Court recognized the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

2000“In Perry v.Haritos, [ 100 Conn. 476 , 124 A. 44 (1924)], our Supreme Court recognized the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2020The first addresses the declarant’s pur- pose or motivation in the making of the statement, and the second addresses the pertinence of the statement to that end.11 See State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 535 , 568 A.2d 1058 (‘‘[t]he medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule requires that the statements be both pertinent to treatment and motivated by a desire for treatment’’ (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2020The first addresses the declarant’s pur- pose or motivation in the making of the statement, and the second addresses the pertinence of the statement to that end.11 See State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 535 , 568 A.2d 1058 (‘‘[t]he medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule requires that the statements be both pertinent to treatment and motivated by a desire for treatment’’ (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2021The residual exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘admits into evidence statements that are technically hearsay and which do not fit within any traditional exception.’’ State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2018The due process grounds that Bansley relied on in objecting-namely, that McCotter was available, and that he had not had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine her at the prior proceeding-are not only relevant to the question of whether the admission of the transcript implicated the petitioner's due process rights pursuant to Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004), but also are directly relevant to whether the transcript fell under the exception to the hearsay rule set forth in § 8-6 (1).

2018The due process grounds that Bansley relied on in objecting-namely, that McCotter was available, and that he had not had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine her at the prior proceeding-are not only relevant to the question of whether the admission of the transcript implicated the petitioner's due process rights pursuant to Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004), but also are directly relevant to whether the transcript fell under the exception to the hearsay rule set forth in § 8-6 (1).

2004If the information does not have such a basis, it adds another level of hearsay to the report which necessitates a separate exception to the hearsay rule in order to justify its admission.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) River Dock & Pile, Inc. v. O & G Industries, Inc., 219 Conn. 787, 794 , 595 A.2d 839 (1991).

2004If the information does not have such a basis, it adds another level of hearsay to the report which necessitates a separate exception to the hearsay rule in order to justify its admission.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) River Dock & Pile, Inc. v. O & G Industries, Inc., 219 Conn. 787, 794 , 595 A.2d 839 (1991).

2019The defendant also established inconsistencies in B's testimony, namely: (1) that she had testified that the first incident of intercourse was in the home's bathroom, but had told the police that the first incident took place in the defendant's bed, and (2) that she had told the police that intercourse occurred on a weekly basis when she had testified that it was less than weekly. 6 In State v. Whelan , 200 Conn. 743 , 753, 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S.Ct. 597 , 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), this court "adopted a hearsay exception allowing the substantive use of prior written inco

2016A prior inconsistent statement of a witness, provided (A) the statement is in writing or otherwise recorded by audiotape, videotape, or some other equally reliable medium, (B) the writing or recording is duly authenticated as that of the witness, and (C) the witness has personal knowledge of the contents of the statement...." Section 8-7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: "Hearsay within hearsay is admissible only if each part of the combined statements is independently admissible under a hearsay exception." State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 753, 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S.

2017The residual, or catchall, exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) the statement is supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo , 223 Conn. 635 , 664, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) ; accord Conn. Code Evid. § 8-9.

2017The residual, or catchall, exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) the statement is supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo , 223 Conn. 635 , 664, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) ; accord Conn. Code Evid. § 8-9.

2009“Under the admissions of a party opponent exception to the hearsay rule, evidence must be offered against the party that made the admission.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Markeveys, 56 Conn. App. 716, 719 , 745 A.2d 212 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see also Bell Food Services, Inc. v. Sherbacow, 217 Conn. 476, 489 , 586 A.2d 1157 (1991) (plaintiffs could not offer statement of persons other than defendant as statement of party opponent); DeMarkey v. Fratturo, 80 Conn. App. 650, 655 , 836 A.2d 1257 (2003) (“[t]o fall within [party opponent] exception, on

2009“Under the admissions of a party opponent exception to the hearsay rule, evidence must be offered against the party that made the admission.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Markeveys, 56 Conn. App. 716, 719 , 745 A.2d 212 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952 , 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see also Bell Food Services, Inc. v. Sherbacow, 217 Conn. 476, 489 , 586 A.2d 1157 (1991) (plaintiffs could not offer statement of persons other than defendant as statement of party opponent); DeMarkey v. Fratturo, 80 Conn. App. 650, 655 , 836 A.2d 1257 (2003) (“[t]o fall within [party opponent] exception, on

2018"Although [t]he medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule requires that the statements be both pertinent to treatment and motivated by a desire for treatment ... in cases involving juveniles, [we] have permitted this requirement to be satisfied inferentially." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 556, 127 A.3d 189 ; see also State v. Telford , supra, 108 Conn. App. at 441 -42 , 948 A.2d 350 . 6 In Telford , this court concluded that the victim's testimony that she had felt "upset," "mad," and "scared" as a result of sexual abuse, and that she had discussed the abuse with someone a

2018"Although [t]he medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule requires that the statements be both pertinent to treatment and motivated by a desire for treatment ... in cases involving juveniles, [we] have permitted this requirement to be satisfied inferentially." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 556, 127 A.3d 189 ; see also State v. Telford , supra, 108 Conn. App. at 441 -42 , 948 A.2d 350 . 6 In Telford , this court concluded that the victim's testimony that she had felt "upset," "mad," and "scared" as a result of sexual abuse, and that she had discussed the abuse with someone a