hearsay rule in Iowa

2025The three individuals are in that same vehicle, that red vehicle, that red Sedan. [Pirie] denies his presence there at Hy-Vee, why?” The problem is that neither of these friends testified as witnesses, so Officer Johnson’s testimony “circumvent[ed] the hearsay rule and present[ed] the 10 jury with information from unsworn, out-of-court sources.” State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 497 (Iowa 2017).

2024Backdoor hearsay is when “the question and answer d[o] not produce hearsay ‘in the classic or textbook sense,’ [but] the questioning was nevertheless designed to circumvent the hearsay rule and present the jury with information from unsworn, out-of-court sources.” State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 497 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).

2025“If a court’s factual findings with respect to application of the hearsay rule are not ‘clearly erroneous’ or without substantial evidence to support them, they are binding on appeal.” State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).

2024See State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2001) (explaining that when a fact finding is made to determine that a hearsay exception applies, the finding is upheld if supported by substantial evidence).

2022We concluded these statements were admissible under rule 5.803(3)—the same hearsay exception the district court applied in Thompson’s case—because the victim’s emotional state was relevant “to rebut the defendant’s position that he and the victim had a loving relationship.” Id. at 19 ; see also Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tex. Crim.

2022“Hearsay . . . must be excluded as evidence at trial unless admitted as an exception or exclusion under the hearsay rule or some other provision.” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 18 (Iowa 2006) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); accord Iowa R.

2022State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2009).

2022State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2009).

2023The State argues the body camera statements were admissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(2)—the excited utterance exception—allowing admission of “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” To determine if the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule applies, we follow the five-factor test in State v. Atwood: 7 (1) the time lapse between the event and the statement, (2) the extent to which questioning elicited the statements that otherwise would not have been volunteered, (3) the age and con

2015The court of appeals concluded trial counsel had not breached an essential duty in failing to object on Confrontation 2The district court weighed the factors outlined by this court in State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 1999), and concluded A.H.’s statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, Iowa R.

2016See Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Iowa 2002) (noting a doctor “who is called to treat and actually treats the patient” may testify under the hearsay exception because there is an increased “probability that the patient will not falsify in statements made to his physician at a time when he is expecting and hoping to receive from him medical aid and benefit.” (quoting Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 1021 , 65 N.W.2d 553, 555 (1954))).

2016See Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Iowa 2002) (noting a doctor “who is called to treat and actually treats the patient” may testify under the hearsay exception because there is an increased “probability that the patient will not falsify in statements made to his physician at a time when he is expecting and hoping to receive from him medical aid and benefit.” (quoting Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 1021 , 65 N.W.2d 553, 555 (1954))).

1985State v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 1976); Porter v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 231 (Iowa 1974).

1981State v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 1976).

2009However, hearsay must be excluded “unless admitted as an exception or exclusion under the hearsay rule or some other provision.” State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2003).

2009However, hearsay must be excluded “unless admitted as an exception or exclusion under the hearsay rule or some other provision.” State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2003).

2025“Although we generally review a court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, we review a hearsay claim for correction of errors at law.” State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

2025Standard of Review “Although we generally review a court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, we review a hearsay claim for correction of errors at law.” State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

2018If evidence is hearsay, it must be excluded “unless admitted as an exception or exclusion under the hearsay rule or some other provision.” State v. Harper, 770 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2009) (citation omitted).

2016If evidence is hearsay, it must be excluded “unless admitted as an exception or exclusion under the hearsay rule or some other provision.” State v. Harper, 770 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2009) (citation omitted).

2015In 1980, the Supreme Court held that a determination of whether a witness’s hearsay statement admitted pursuant to various common law exceptions to the hearsay rule violated the Confrontation Clause turned on whether such evidence contained sufficient “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 , 65 L.

2015In 1980, the Supreme Court held that a determination of whether a witness’s hearsay statement admitted pursuant to various common law exceptions to the hearsay rule violated the Confrontation Clause turned on whether such evidence contained sufficient “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 , 65 L.

2020The residual exception to the hearsay rule is to “be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.” State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1983) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A.

2015State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1983). “[T]he residual exception to the hearsay rule may be used to admit statements made by a child sex abuse victim when the requirements of the exception are met.” Rojas, 524 N.W.2d at 663 .

2020Id.; see also In re Est. of Poulos, 229 N.W.2d 721, 727 (Iowa 1975) (“We have long held that medical and hospital records are admissible, upon proper foundation, as an exception to the hearsay rule.”).

1983In some cases the special assurance of reliability — the patient’s belief that accuracy is essential to effective treatment — also applies to statements concerning the cause, and a • physician who views this as related to diagnosis and treatment might reasonably be expected to communicate this to the patient and perhaps take other steps to assure a reliable response, [emphasis added] The hearsay exception regarding statements made to a physician for diagnosis and treatment was applied in In re Estate of Poulos, 229 N.W.2d 721, 727 (Iowa 1975).

2003Using a theoretical analysis based on the approach followed in determining whether admission of hearsay statements at trial conflicts with the Confrontation Clause, Jordan argues that once hearsay has been admitted into a trial pursuant to an exception to the rule against hearsay, it may not be subject to further challenge because, by its admission, the court has determined it to be reliable. 1 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736, 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848, 859 (1992) (“[Wlhere proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly *880 rooted excep

2003Using a theoretical analysis based on the approach followed in determining whether admission of hearsay statements at trial conflicts with the Confrontation Clause, Jordan argues that once hearsay has been admitted into a trial pursuant to an exception to the rule against hearsay, it may not be subject to further challenge because, by its admission, the court has determined it to be reliable. 1 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736, 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848, 859 (1992) (“[Wlhere proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly *880 rooted excep

1976See State v. Watson, supra, at 704 ; State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 744 , 748 *891 (Iowa 1975); State v. Lyons, 210 N.W.2d 543, 546-547 (Iowa 1973); VI Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 1788 at 234 ("If, then, an utterance can be used as circumstantial evidence, i. e. without inferring from it as an assertion to the fact asserted * * * the Hearsay rule does not oppose any barrier, because it is not applicable.").

1976See State v. Watson, supra, at 704 ; State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 744 , 748 *891 (Iowa 1975); State v. Lyons, 210 N.W.2d 543, 546-547 (Iowa 1973); VI Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 1788 at 234 ("If, then, an utterance can be used as circumstantial evidence, i. e. without inferring from it as an assertion to the fact asserted * * * the Hearsay rule does not oppose any barrier, because it is not applicable.").

1986Iowa Rule of Evidence 803(2) excepts from the hearsay rule “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” The 1983 Iowa committee comment to that rule noted that our court had already adopted that definition, the same *535 as Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), in State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1981).

1983In resisting defendant’s hearsay objection, the prosecution argued this evidence was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, see State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1981).

2016Instead, we hold that in each case, the trial court must, as with other statements made during medical diagnosis and treatment, apply the test we adopted in Tracy to determine whether the statements made in that case should fall within this exception to the hearsay rule. 1 482 N.W.2d at 681 .

2016Instead, we hold that in each case; the trial court must, as with other statements made during medical diagnosis and treatment, apply the test we adopted in Tracy to determine whether the statements made in that case should fall within this exception to the hearsay rule. 1 482 N.W.2d at 681 .

2010Although Hanes’s defense attorney asked the nurse practitioner about “a dialogue initiated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment,” Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d at 170 , and it appears the nurse practitioner’s answer would likely fall within the exception to the hearsay rule, because there was no offer of proof, we do not know exactly what the nurse practitioner would have answered.

2010Although Hanes’s defense attorney asked the nurse practitioner about “a dialogue initiated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment,” Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d at 170 , and it appears the nurse practitioner’s answer would likely fall within the exception to the hearsay rule, because there was no offer of proof, we do not know exactly what the nurse practitioner would have answered.

2024See State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874 , 879 (Iowa 2019) (“ ‘The State, as the proponent of the evidence, has the burden’ to establish the testimony comes within the exception to the rule.” (quoting Smith, 876 N.W.2d at 189 )); State v. Cagley, 638 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2001) (“The State, as proponent of the hearsay evidence, has the burden of proving it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2024See Walker, 935 N.W.2d at 879; Smith, 876 N.W.2d at 189 ; Cagley, 638 N.W.2d at 681 ; see also United States v. Irvin, 682 F.3d 1254, 1262 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating the opponents of the evidence had “no obligation to affirmatively disprove the applicability of the business records exception” because “[t]he burden was on the government alone”); Berroteran v. Superior Ct., 505 P.3d 601 , 620 (Cal. 2022) (concluding intermediate appellate court erred when it “shifted the burden of proof concerning this hearsay exception to the opponent of the evidence”); Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 815 (Te

2024See State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874 , 879 (Iowa 2019) (“ ‘The State, as the proponent of the evidence, has the burden’ to establish the testimony comes within the exception to the rule.” (quoting Smith, 876 N.W.2d at 189 )); State v. Cagley, 638 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2001) (“The State, as proponent of the hearsay evidence, has the burden of proving it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2024See Walker, 935 N.W.2d at 879; Smith, 876 N.W.2d at 189 ; Cagley, 638 N.W.2d at 681 ; see also United States v. Irvin, 682 F.3d 1254, 1262 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating the opponents of the evidence had “no obligation to affirmatively disprove the applicability of the business records exception” because “[t]he burden was on the government alone”); Berroteran v. Superior Ct., 505 P.3d 601 , 620 (Cal. 2022) (concluding intermediate appellate court erred when it “shifted the burden of proof concerning this hearsay exception to the opponent of the evidence”); Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 815 (Te

1979NOTES [1] Section 690.3, The Code 1977. [2] This definition is similar to that contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 801 which was adopted in State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 1973). [3] Fed.R.Evid. 803(1) provides: "The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as to witness: (1) Present Sense Impression.

1973We extensively discussed the hearsay rule in State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1973), quoting with approval the following definition of hearsay from rule 801, i roposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates: “(a) Statement.

2020The State indicated it did not believe the statements were hearsay because they were being offered for the non-hearsay 4 We observe trial counsel also may have made a strategic decision not to raise the issue considering counsel’s success in avoiding a jury finding that Goodon specifically intended to kill or seriously injure Amanda—particularly in light of Goodon’s own statements that the responding officer “had him for breaking and entering, assault with a deadly weapon, times three, and possession of a dangerous weapon.” 11 purpose of demonstrating its effect on Amanda and further relied up

1976In State v. Leonard, 243 N.W.2d 887, 890-891 (Iowa 1976), this court quoted with approval the following explanation of the theory of the hearsay rule as set forth in VI Wigmore on Evidence, (Third Ed.), section 1766 at 177-178: “The theory of the hearsay rule * * * is that, when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted in it, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of our inference, and therefore the assertion can be received only when made upon the stand, subject to the test of cross- examination.

2019The court relied on the woman’s unavailability, the case of State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Iowa 1990), and the forfeiture-by-wrongding exception to the hearsay rule.

2015See 456 N.W.2d at 225 .

2016See Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Iowa 2002) (noting a doctor “who is called to treat and actually treats the patient” may testify under the hearsay exception because there is an increased “probability that the patient will not falsify in statements made to his physician at a time when he is expecting and hoping to receive from him medical aid and benefit.” (quoting Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 1021 , 65 N.W.2d 553, 555 (1954))).

2016See Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Iowa 2002) (noting a doctor “who is called to treat and actually • treats the patient” may testify under the hearsay exception because there is an increased “probability that the patient will not falsify in statements made to his physician at a time when he is expecting and hoping to receive from him medical aid and benefit.” (quoting Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 1021 , 65 N.W.2d 553, 555 (1954))).

2014Admission of the same, he further argues, violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witness. “[W]e review the admission of hearsay for errors at law, while Confrontation Clause issues are reviewed de novo.” State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2003). “[B]oth the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause operate to prevent the wrongful admission of testimony to the prejudice of a defendant.” Id.

2014Admission of the same, he further argues, violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witness. “[W]e review the admission of hearsay for errors at law, while Confrontation Clause issues are reviewed de novo.” State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2003). “[B]oth the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause operate to prevent the wrongful admission of testimony to the prejudice of a defendant.” Id.

2019“A party must establish the applicability of an exception to the hearsay rule authorizing the admission of third-party hearsay statements contained in a business record.” Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d at 842 .

2014See generally State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Iowa 2008) (noting the business records exception to the hearsay rule states evidence may be admitted if it is a business record made at or near the time of the act, made by a person with knowledge of the activity, and it was made and kept in the regular course of business activity).

2019A “backdoor hearsay” problem occurs when a “question and answer [does] not produce hearsay ‘in the classic or textbook sense,’ [but] the questioning nevertheless [is] designed to circumvent the hearsay rule and present the jury with information from unsworn, out-of-court sources.” State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 497 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Schaffer v. State, 721 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. App. 1986)).

2015“Backdoor hearsay” has been defined as “a form of question and answer that does not produce hearsay in the classic or textbook sense” but “nevertheless is designed to circumvent the hearsay rule and present the jury with information from unsworn, out-of-court sources.” See Schaffer v. State, 721 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).