hearsay rule in Michigan

2025“Under MRE 805, hearsay within hearsay is excluded where no foundation has been established to bring each independent hearsay statement within a hearsay exception.” Solomon v Shuell, 435 Mich 104, 129 ; 457 NW2d 669 (1990) (footnote omitted). -6- allegedly contained inadmissible hearsay within hearsay.

2025“Under MRE 805, hearsay within hearsay is excluded where no foundation has been established to bring each independent hearsay statement within a hearsay exception.” Solomon v Shuell, 435 Mich 104, 129 ; 457 NW2d 669 (1990) (footnote omitted). -6- allegedly contained inadmissible hearsay within hearsay.

2020Under MRE 803(4), a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if it is “made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment.” “Statements made for the purpose of medical treatment are admissible pursuant to MRE 803(4) if they were reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and if the declarant had a self-interested motivation t

2020Under MRE 803(4), a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if it is “made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment.” “Statements made for the purpose of medical treatment are admissible pursuant to MRE 803(4) if they were reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and if the declarant had a self-interested motivation t

2025See, e.g., Maiden, 461 Mich at 124 (holding that the “police report itself is plausibly admissible under the business record exception, MRE 803(6)”); Latits v Phillips, 298 Mich App 109, 113-114 ; 826 NW2d 190 (2012) (explaining that police reports may be plausibly admissible under an applicable hearsay exception but that any witness statements would constitute inadmissible secondary hearsay, absent their own applicable hearsay exception).

2022“When the document to be admitted contains a second level of hearsay, it must also qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 125 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

2019However, “[i]t is well accepted that evidence that demonstrates an individual’s state of mind will not be precluded by the hearsay rule.” People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 309 ; 642 NW2d 417 (2001).

2019However, “[i]t is well accepted that evidence that demonstrates an individual’s state of mind will not be precluded by the hearsay rule.” People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 309 ; 642 NW2d 417 (2001).

1976Over objection on the grounds of hearsay, a witness was permitted to testify that the defendant’s sister ran into his neighborhood store to use the telephone and said: "Montgomery is upstairs, hurting and raping some girl.” While this statement was clearly hearsay it comes within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. 1 People v Frank Johnson, 58 Mich App 1, 6 ; 226 NW2d 730 (1975), Rice v Jackson, 1 Mich App 105, 110-111 ; 134 NW2d 366 ; 13 ALR3d 1104 (1965).

1976Over objection on the grounds of hearsay, a witness was permitted to testify that the defendant’s sister ran into his neighborhood store to use the telephone and said: "Montgomery is upstairs, hurting and raping some girl.” While this statement was clearly hearsay it comes within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. 1 People v Frank Johnson, 58 Mich App 1, 6 ; 226 NW2d 730 (1975), Rice v Jackson, 1 Mich App 105, 110-111 ; 134 NW2d 366 ; 13 ALR3d 1104 (1965).

2011See Moncrief v Detroit, 398 Mich 181, 189 ; 247 NW2d 783 (1976) (explaining the “first principle” that “the proponent of the [hearsay] evidence must lay a foundation which establishes an exception to the hearsay rule”).

2011See Moncrief v Detroit, 398 Mich 181, 189 ; 247 NW2d 783 (1976) (explaining the “first principle” that “the proponent of the [hearsay] evidence must lay a foundation which establishes an exception to the hearsay rule”).

2024For that reason, “[h]earsay is generally prohibited and may only be admitted at trial if provided for in an exception to the hearsay rule.” People v Gursky, 486 Mich 596, 606 ; 786 NW2d 579 (2010).

2024For that reason, “[h]earsay is generally prohibited and may only be admitted at trial if provided for in an exception to the hearsay rule.” People v Gursky, 486 Mich 596, 606 ; 786 NW2d 579 (2010).

2020Given the victim’s cognitive impairment, and the trial court’s opportunity to see the victim on the stand, the trial court’s finding of unavailability under MRE 804(a)(4) was not clearly erroneous. -4- When a witness is unavailable, “testimony given by the person at an earlier hearing is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the party against whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony through cross-examination.” People v Meredith, 459 Mich 62, 66-67 ; 586 NW2d 538 (1998); MRE 804(b)(1).

2020Given the victim’s cognitive impairment, and the trial court’s opportunity to see the victim on the stand, the trial court’s finding of unavailability under MRE 804(a)(4) was not clearly erroneous. -4- When a witness is unavailable, “testimony given by the person at an earlier hearing is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the party against whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony through cross-examination.” People v Meredith, 459 Mich 62, 66-67 ; 586 NW2d 538 (1998); MRE 804(b)(1).

2025“A previous inconsistent statement of a witness, admissible to impeach credibility, is not regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule because it is not offered as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the statement, but only to prove that the witness in fact made the statement.” Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 631 ; 581 NW2d 696 (1998).

2025“A previous inconsistent statement of a witness, admissible to impeach credibility, is not regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule because it is not offered as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the statement, but only to prove that the witness in fact made the statement.” Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 631 ; 581 NW2d 696 (1998).

2025We rely on the version of the rules in effect at the time of Moffit’s trial. -12- In Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302 ; 93 S Ct 1038 ; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973), the United States Supreme Court cautioned against blanket hearsay exclusions, holding “[i]n these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” This matter is not one of those circumstances.

2025We rely on the version of the rules in effect at the time of Moffit’s trial. -12- In Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302 ; 93 S Ct 1038 ; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973), the United States Supreme Court cautioned against blanket hearsay exclusions, holding “[i]n these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” This matter is not one of those circumstances.

2023The exceptions to the hearsay rule, which developed out of the unreliability of hearsay evidence, “allow the admission of hearsay statements where the circumstances indicate that, unlike general hearsay statements, [the] statements may be presumed to be reliable.” Dhue, 444 Mich at 160 .

2008The Court of Appeals concluded that both statements fell within the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, stating that “because the statements at issue were provided in a narrative, both those portions that inculpated Scarber alone and those that inculpated his 6 Poole, supra at 161-162 , explicitly relied on the commentary to FRE 804(b)(3), on which MRE 804(b)(3) is modeled.

2026“It is well accepted that evidence that demonstrates an individual’s state of mind will not be precluded by the hearsay rule.” People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 449-451 ; 537 NW2d 577 (1995) (Statements that show marital discord are admissible).

2026“It is well accepted that evidence that demonstrates an individual’s state of mind will not be precluded by the hearsay rule.” People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 449-451 ; 537 NW2d 577 (1995) (Statements that show marital discord are admissible).

2015Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Evans’s statement to the police was not admissible under the catchall exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable, MRE 804(b)(7). 10 MRE 804(b)(7) provides for admission of a statement that is not specifically covered by any of the other hearsay exceptions in MRE 804(b), but [has] equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered

2015Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Evans’s statement to the police was not admissible under the catchall exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable, MRE 804(b)(7). 10 MRE 804(b)(7) provides for admission of a statement that is not specifically covered by any of the other hearsay exceptions in MRE 804(b), but [has] equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered

2018See People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 659 ; 672 NW2d 860 (2003) (recognizing the theory underlying the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule: that an individual having just experienced a “startling event will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication[.]”) (citation omitted).

2018See People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 659 ; 672 NW2d 860 (2003) (recognizing the theory underlying the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule: that an individual having just experienced a “startling event will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication[.]”) (citation omitted).

2025“The exclusion of ‘statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed’ is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of mind.” People v Moorer, 262 Mich App 64, 73-74 ; 683 NW2d 736 (2004) (some quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“The exclusion of ‘statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed’ is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of mind.” People v Moorer, 262 Mich App 64, 73-74 ; 683 NW2d 736 (2004) (some quotation marks and citation omitted).

2008The independent-proof requirement is consistent with the language of MRE 803(2) and was not a departure from previous Michigan law. 2 These conditions are virtually identical to the criteria for admissibility of statements under MRE 803(2), which are derived from the text of the exception: To come within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, a statement must meet three criteria: (1) it must arise out of a startling occasion; (2) it must be made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent; and (3) it must relate to the circumstances of the startling occasion. [People

2008The independent-proof requirement is consistent with the language of MRE 803(2) and was not a departure from previous Michigan law. 2 These conditions are virtually identical to the criteria for admissibility of statements under MRE 803(2), which are derived from the text of the exception: To come within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, a statement must meet three criteria: (1) it must arise out of a startling occasion; (2) it must be made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent; and (3) it must relate to the circumstances of the startling occasion. [People

2018In that case, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t has long been the rule that the declarant’s naming of the person responsible for their condition may not be admitted pursuant to the hearsay exception described in MRE 803(4),” and it excluded such statements made to a psychologist on the grounds that the identification of a perpetrator went beyond the rules allowed under the hearsay exception to describe the “general character of the cause or external source thereof.” Id. at 110 .

2018In that case, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t has long been the rule that the declarant’s naming of the person responsible for their condition may not be admitted pursuant to the hearsay exception described in MRE 803(4),” and it excluded such statements made to a psychologist on the grounds that the identification of a perpetrator went beyond the rules allowed under the hearsay exception to describe the “general character of the cause or external source thereof.” Id. at 110 .

2026See People v Hallaway, 389 Mich 265, 276 ; 205 NW2d 451 (1973) (“Where the prior extra judicial statement of a witness agrees with his testimony, the out-of-court remark is self-serving, and is not generally permitted under any established exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2026See People v Hallaway, 389 Mich 265, 276 ; 205 NW2d 451 (1973) (“Where the prior extra judicial statement of a witness agrees with his testimony, the out-of-court remark is self-serving, and is not generally permitted under any established exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2024However, “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach but it cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, unless, of course, it falls within a hearsay exception.” People v Jenkins, 450 Mich 249, 273 ; 537 NW2d 828 (1995).

2024However, “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach but it cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, unless, of course, it falls within a hearsay exception.” People v Jenkins, 450 Mich 249, 273 ; 537 NW2d 828 (1995).

2008In particular, Burton consulted Rogers v Saginaw-Bay City R Co, 187 Mich 490 ; 153 NW 784 (1915), a case that predated the Michigan Rules of Evidence but addressed the common-law spontaneous exclamation exception to the hearsay rule, which was analogous to MRE 803(2).

2008In particular, Burton consulted Rogers v Saginaw-Bay City R Co, 187 Mich 490 ; 153 NW 784 (1915), a case that predated the Michigan Rules of Evidence but addressed the common-law spontaneous exclamation exception to the hearsay rule, which was analogous to MRE 803(2).