careful analysis in Kansas

2024If a right is fundamental, then government infringement on that right must pass strict scrutiny analysis, where the government prevails if it "can show '"a subordinating interest which is compelling'" and that the infringement . . . is 'narrowly tailored to serve' that interest." State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 957 , 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 , 83 S. Ct. 328 , 9 L.

2024If a right is fundamental, then government infringement on that right must pass strict scrutiny analysis, where the government prevails if it "can show '"a subordinating interest which is compelling'" and that the infringement . . . is 'narrowly tailored to serve' that interest." State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 957 , 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 , 83 S. Ct. 328 , 9 L.

2024If a right is fundamental, then government infringement on that right must pass strict scrutiny analysis, where the government prevails if it "can show '"a subordinating interest which is compelling'" and that the infringement . . . is 'narrowly tailored to serve' that interest." State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 957 , 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 , 83 S. Ct. 328 , 9 L.

2024If a right is fundamental, then government infringement on that right must pass strict scrutiny analysis, where the government prevails if it "can show '"a subordinating interest which is compelling'" and that the infringement . . . is 'narrowly tailored to serve' that interest." State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 957 , 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 , 83 S. Ct. 328 , 9 L.

2024Ed. 2d 545 (2022), the Court explained that an unenumerated right in the United States Constitution is fundamental if it is "'deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition'" and "it is essential to our Nation's 'scheme of ordered liberty.'" To make this determination, the Court conducts "a careful analysis of the history of the right at issue." 597 U.S. at 238 .

2022Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355 , 22 P.3d 124 (2001), demonstrated that a stay of discovery was not appropriate.

2022Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355 , 22 P.3d 124 (2001), demonstrated that a stay of discovery was not appropriate.

1992In Ackers v. First National Bank of Topeka, 192 Kan. 319 , the deceased husband, Frank, died intestate.

1974In City of Hutchinson v. Ryan, 154 Kan. 751 , 121 P. 2d 179 , this court held: “In determining whether statutory provisions are mandatory or directory, it is a general rule that where strict compliance with the provision is essential to the preservation of the rights of parties affected and to the validity of the proceeding, the provision is mandatory, but where the provision fixes a mode of proceeding and a time within which an official aot is to be done, and is intended to secure order, system and dispatch of the public business, the provision is directory.” (Syl. f 1.) The subject was furth

1974In City of Hutchinson v. Ryan, 154 Kan. 751 , 121 P. 2d 179 , this court held: “In determining whether statutory provisions are mandatory or directory, it is a general rule that where strict compliance with the provision is essential to the preservation of the rights of parties affected and to the validity of the proceeding, the provision is mandatory, but where the provision fixes a mode of proceeding and a time within which an official aot is to be done, and is intended to secure order, system and dispatch of the public business, the provision is directory.” (Syl. f 1.) The subject was furth

1974In Carson v. McDowell, 203 Kan. 40 , 452 P. 2d 828 , the provision in K.

1974In Carson v. McDowell, 203 Kan. 40 , 452 P. 2d 828 , the provision in K.

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1965(In re Estate of Brown, 189 Kan. 193 , 368 P. 2d 27 ; In re Estate of Hill, 162 Kan. 385 , 176 P. 2d 515 .) This court, after a careful analysis of our previous decisions, set forth the general rules relating to antenuptial contracts in In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546 , 119 P. 2d 483 , stating: “The general rule in this state is that contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and und

1960Proof of such service shall be made by affidavit, . . .; and thereupon the appeal shall be deemed to be perfected.” (Emphasis supplied. ) We believe a careful analysis of what is said and held in Polzin v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass’n, 179 Kan. 670 , 298 P. 2d 333 , on rehearing 180 Kan. 178 , 302 P. 2d 1003 ; Thompson v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 182 Kan. 616 , 322 P. 2d 341 , and the numerous cases there cited, warrants a negative answer to the all-decisive question to which we have heretofore referred.

1960Proof of such service shall be made by affidavit, . . .; and thereupon the appeal shall be deemed to be perfected.” (Emphasis supplied. ) We believe a careful analysis of what is said and held in Polzin v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass’n, 179 Kan. 670 , 298 P. 2d 333 , on rehearing 180 Kan. 178 , 302 P. 2d 1003 ; Thompson v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 182 Kan. 616 , 322 P. 2d 341 , and the numerous cases there cited, warrants a negative answer to the all-decisive question to which we have heretofore referred.

1960(See, also, Hodge v. Bishop, 96 Kan. 419 , 151 Pac. 1105 .) A careful analysis of the answer in the instant case leads to the inescapable conclusion that the allegations concerning the “Separate Maintenance Agreement” are connected with the subject of the plaintiff’s action, but the allegations, construed in view of the relief sought, indicate the “Separate Maintenance Agreement” is asserted, not for affirmative relief, but merely as a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action for an absolute divorce.

1960(See, also, Hodge v. Bishop, 96 Kan. 419 , 151 Pac. 1105 .) A careful analysis of the answer in the instant case leads to the inescapable conclusion that the allegations concerning the “Separate Maintenance Agreement” are connected with the subject of the plaintiff’s action, but the allegations, construed in view of the relief sought, indicate the “Separate Maintenance Agreement” is asserted, not for affirmative relief, but merely as a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action for an absolute divorce.

1960Proof of such service shall be made by affidavit, . . .; and thereupon the appeal shall be deemed to be perfected.” (Emphasis supplied. ) We believe a careful analysis of what is said and held in Polzin v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass’n, 179 Kan. 670 , 298 P. 2d 333 , on rehearing 180 Kan. 178 , 302 P. 2d 1003 ; Thompson v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 182 Kan. 616 , 322 P. 2d 341 , and the numerous cases there cited, warrants a negative answer to the all-decisive question to which we have heretofore referred.

1960Proof of such service shall be made by affidavit, . . .; and thereupon the appeal shall be deemed to be perfected.” (Emphasis supplied. ) We believe a careful analysis of what is said and held in Polzin v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass’n, 179 Kan. 670 , 298 P. 2d 333 , on rehearing 180 Kan. 178 , 302 P. 2d 1003 ; Thompson v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 182 Kan. 616 , 322 P. 2d 341 , and the numerous cases there cited, warrants a negative answer to the all-decisive question to which we have heretofore referred.

1960Proof of such service shall be made by affidavit, . . .; and thereupon the appeal shall be deemed to be perfected.” (Emphasis supplied. ) We believe a careful analysis of what is said and held in Polzin v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass’n, 179 Kan. 670 , 298 P. 2d 333 , on rehearing 180 Kan. 178 , 302 P. 2d 1003 ; Thompson v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 182 Kan. 616 , 322 P. 2d 341 , and the numerous cases there cited, warrants a negative answer to the all-decisive question to which we have heretofore referred.

1960If not it is certainly required by our later decision of Nicolay v. Parker, 185 Kan. 481 , 345 P. 2d 1013 , where it is held: “Where in attempting to perfect an appeal to this court under the provisions of G.

1960If not it is certainly required by our later decision of Nicolay v. Parker, 185 Kan. 481 , 345 P. 2d 1013 , where it is held: “Where in attempting to perfect an appeal to this court under the provisions of G.

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959So construed, recognizing as we must that under our own decisions ( Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, supra; La Harpe v. Gas Co., supra) as well as those of the highest court of the land (see, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 , 81 L.ed. 510, 57 S.Ct. 364 ; Interstate Gas Co. v. Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 , 91 L.ed. 1742, 67 S.Ct. 1482 ; Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 , 95 L.ed. 190, 71 S.Ct. 215 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 , 95 L.ed. 204, 71 S.Ct. 221 ) the Commission has power to regulate the physical p

1959It suffices to say a careful analysis of that instrument discloses that, notwithstanding it is titled “Option Agreement,” it is an agreement similar in form and substance to the agreements involved in our former decisions of Marquez v. Cave, 134 Kan. 374 , 5 P. 2d 1081 ; Ditzen v. Given, 139 Kan. 506 , 32 P. 2d 448 .

1959It suffices to say a careful analysis of that instrument discloses that, notwithstanding it is titled “Option Agreement,” it is an agreement similar in form and substance to the agreements involved in our former decisions of Marquez v. Cave, 134 Kan. 374 , 5 P. 2d 1081 ; Ditzen v. Given, 139 Kan. 506 , 32 P. 2d 448 .

1959It suffices to say a careful analysis of that instrument discloses that, notwithstanding it is titled “Option Agreement,” it is an agreement similar in form and substance to the agreements involved in our former decisions of Marquez v. Cave, 134 Kan. 374 , 5 P. 2d 1081 ; Ditzen v. Given, 139 Kan. 506 , 32 P. 2d 448 .

1959It suffices to say a careful analysis of that instrument discloses that, notwithstanding it is titled “Option Agreement,” it is an agreement similar in form and substance to the agreements involved in our former decisions of Marquez v. Cave, 134 Kan. 374 , 5 P. 2d 1081 ; Ditzen v. Given, 139 Kan. 506 , 32 P. 2d 448 .

1958(McCoy v. Fleming, 153 Kan. 780, 783 , 113 P. 2d 1074 ; Simeon v. Schroeder, 170 Kan. 471, 475 , 227 P. 2d 153 ; Ehrhart v. Spencer, 175 Kan. 227, 233 , 263 P. 2d 246 ; Shobe v. Tobin Construction Co., 179 Kan. 43, 48 , 292 P. 2d 729 .) Even so, we have examined the will and, it may be stated, that after a careful analysis of its terms and provisions we are unwilling to say, that where — as here — a testatrix gives, bequeaths and devises all her right, title and interest in and to a drug store, including fixtures, merchandise and stock and accounts receivable owed to said store subject to the

1958(McCoy v. Fleming, 153 Kan. 780, 783 , 113 P. 2d 1074 ; Simeon v. Schroeder, 170 Kan. 471, 475 , 227 P. 2d 153 ; Ehrhart v. Spencer, 175 Kan. 227, 233 , 263 P. 2d 246 ; Shobe v. Tobin Construction Co., 179 Kan. 43, 48 , 292 P. 2d 729 .) Even so, we have examined the will and, it may be stated, that after a careful analysis of its terms and provisions we are unwilling to say, that where — as here — a testatrix gives, bequeaths and devises all her right, title and interest in and to a drug store, including fixtures, merchandise and stock and accounts receivable owed to said store subject to the

1958(Sweet v. Bank, 69 Kan. 641, 643 , 77 Pac. 538 ; Ireland v. Waymire, 107 Kan. 384, 386 , 191 Pac. 304 ; Taylor v. Robertson Petroleum Co., supra, Syl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, and page 827.) Here, assuming the trial court’s action in requiring appellees to separately state and number what now appears in the amended petition as cause of action number three was proper, which we doubt, it is clear from a careful analysis of the amended petition, appellees are relying upon a single claim for relief under the allegations of causes of action Nos. two and three.

1958(Sweet v. Bank, 69 Kan. 641, 643 , 77 Pac. 538 ; Ireland v. Waymire, 107 Kan. 384, 386 , 191 Pac. 304 ; Taylor v. Robertson Petroleum Co., supra, Syl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, and page 827.) Here, assuming the trial court’s action in requiring appellees to separately state and number what now appears in the amended petition as cause of action number three was proper, which we doubt, it is clear from a careful analysis of the amended petition, appellees are relying upon a single claim for relief under the allegations of causes of action Nos. two and three.

1958(McCoy v. Fleming, 153 Kan. 780, 783 , 113 P. 2d 1074 ; Simeon v. Schroeder, 170 Kan. 471, 475 , 227 P. 2d 153 ; Ehrhart v. Spencer, 175 Kan. 227, 233 , 263 P. 2d 246 ; Shobe v. Tobin Construction Co., 179 Kan. 43, 48 , 292 P. 2d 729 .) Even so, we have examined the will and, it may be stated, that after a careful analysis of its terms and provisions we are unwilling to say, that where — as here — a testatrix gives, bequeaths and devises all her right, title and interest in and to a drug store, including fixtures, merchandise and stock and accounts receivable owed to said store subject to the

1958(McCoy v. Fleming, 153 Kan. 780, 783 , 113 P. 2d 1074 ; Simeon v. Schroeder, 170 Kan. 471, 475 , 227 P. 2d 153 ; Ehrhart v. Spencer, 175 Kan. 227, 233 , 263 P. 2d 246 ; Shobe v. Tobin Construction Co., 179 Kan. 43, 48 , 292 P. 2d 729 .) Even so, we have examined the will and, it may be stated, that after a careful analysis of its terms and provisions we are unwilling to say, that where — as here — a testatrix gives, bequeaths and devises all her right, title and interest in and to a drug store, including fixtures, merchandise and stock and accounts receivable owed to said store subject to the