147 California opinions name it 3 courts 1905–2026 23 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Greenbergergreen2 sentences2017“Even a hearsay statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory effect.” ( Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612.) The determination whether a statement is specifically disserving “necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 ].) In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ] (Frierson), the Supreme Court stated that the “focus” of the declarat 2017“Even a hearsay statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory effect.” (Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612 .) The determination whether a statement is specifically disserving “necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 .) In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 (Frierson), the Supreme Court stated that the “focus” of the declaration against interest exception is “the basic 3 In Grimes, s | 3 | 8 |
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.green2 sentences2021(In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 109 (Automobile Antitrust).) Indeed, the test for personal jurisdiction “ ‘is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite “affiliating circumstances” are present.’ ” (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1061 (Snowney); see Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 478–479.) Courts furthermore must exercise “ ‘[g]reat care and reserve . . . when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.” (As 2005In this setting, “the question whether ‘jurisdiction may be constitutionally exercised depends upon the circumstances of each individual case. . . . [T]he analysis is concerned with weighing the various relevant “contacts” by the foreign corporation within the state attempting to exercise jurisdiction.’ (Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 823, 831 , 17 Cal.Rptr. 150 , 366 P.2d 502 .)” (Sonora, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 536 .) But in every case of an international defendant, the procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a state court’s assertion of jurisdicti | 3 | 5 |
Hinojosa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences2017After noting the conflict between the employer's interest to be immune from liability "for the employee's injury or death that occurs in the everyday transit from home to office or plant [and] the contrary interest of the employee [ ] in his desire to be protected from loss by injury or death that occurs in the non-routine transit" ( Hinojosa , supra , at pp. 156-157, 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 ), the court concluded: We think a careful analysis of the decisions will develop the formula that reconciles the divergent positions. 2017After noting the conflict between the employer's interest to be immune from liability "for the employee's injury or death that occurs in the everyday transit from home to office or plant [and] the contrary interest of the employee [ ] in his desire to be protected from loss by injury or death that occurs in the non-routine transit" ( Hinojosa , supra , at pp. 156-157, 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 ), the court concluded: We think a careful analysis of the decisions will develop the formula that reconciles the divergent positions. | 3 | 5 |
People v. Duartegreen2 sentences2017“Even a hearsay statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory effect.” ( Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612.) The determination whether a statement is specifically disserving “necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 ].) In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ] (Frierson), the Supreme Court stated that the “focus” of the declarat 2017“Even a hearsay statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory effect.” (Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612 .) The determination whether a statement is specifically disserving “necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 .) In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 (Frierson), the Supreme Court stated that the “focus” of the declaration against interest exception is “the basic 3 In Grimes, s | 2 | 4 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2023(Ibid.; see also People v. Wilson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 271, 276 [fact that the statement is also disserving to nondeclarant does not render the statement unreliable and inadmissible].) A remedy for the mixed nature of some statements—those that are part inculpatory and part self-serving, is redaction. 1997(People v. Wilson, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 276 [“The fact that the statement is also disserving to [nondeclarant] does not render the statement unreliable and inadmissible. . . .”]; U.S. v. Sasso, supra, 59 F.3d at 349 ; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 1252-1253.) Determination of whether a statement is trustworthy is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. | 2 | 2 |
Sayles Hydro Associates v. Maughangreen2 sentences2022There would be no point in Congress requiring the federal agency to consider the state agency recommendations on environmental matters and make its own decisions about which to accept, if the state agencies had the power to impose the requirements themselves.” (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 456.) The majority argues that “First Iowa and California v. FERC could be read to apply either conflict or field preemption.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) Sayles Hydro acknowledged as much (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at pp. 455, 456), and the point does not answer the Ninth Circuit’s careful analy 2022There would be no point in Congress requiring the federal agency to consider the state agency recommendations on environmental matters and make its own decisions about which to accept, if the state agencies had the power to impose the requirements themselves.” (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at p. 456.) The majority argues that “First Iowa and California v. FERC could be read to apply either conflict or field preemption.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) Sayles Hydro acknowledged as much (Sayles Hydro, supra, 985 F.2d at pp. 455, 456), and the point does not answer the Ninth Circuit’s careful analy | 2 | 2 |
James 3 Corp. v. Truck Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2021Exchange (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101 (James 3); see Golden Eagle Ins. 2021Exchange (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101 (James 3); see Golden Eagle Ins. | 2 | 2 |
People v. B.M. (In re B.M.)green2 sentences2019(See maj. opn., ante , at p. 538 [ 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 ].) Those cases all involved the use of a sharp object in a threatening manner, and in all three cases an argument could be made that great bodily injury was not probable , but the deadly weapon finding was nonetheless upheld." ( B.M. , at pp. 539-540, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) Finally, Justice Chin suggested that, when the Supreme Court does squarely address the meaning of " 'likely' " for purposes of assault with a deadly weapon, "our resolution of the question [will] call[ ] for a car 2019(See maj. opn., ante , at p. 538 [ 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 ].) Those cases all involved the use of a sharp object in a threatening manner, and in all three cases an argument could be made that great bodily injury was not probable , but the deadly weapon finding was nonetheless upheld." ( B.M. , at pp. 539-540, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) Finally, Justice Chin suggested that, when the Supreme Court does squarely address the meaning of " 'likely' " for purposes of assault with a deadly weapon, "our resolution of the question [will] call[ ] for a car | 2 | 2 |
McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc.green2 sentences2025This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489 .) The trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to the first cause of action. 2024This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ ” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489 .) 8 Teng’s sole allegation in her appellate briefing—that Chase “had a contractual duty to provide notice of mortgage payments and breached that duty”— satisfies neither standard. | 1 | 7 |
Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2018Exchange , supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) A case by case analysis is required: *234 "The potential for conflict requires a careful analysis of the parties' respective interests to determine whether they can be reconciled (such as by a defense based on total nonliability) or whether an actual conflict of interest precludes insurer-appointed defense counsel from presenting a quality defense for the insured. 2018Exchange , supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) A case by case analysis is required: *234 "The potential for conflict requires a careful analysis of the parties' respective interests to determine whether they can be reconciled (such as by a defense based on total nonliability) or whether an actual conflict of interest precludes insurer-appointed defense counsel from presenting a quality defense for the insured. | 1 | 5 |
Williams v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2020Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at page 666 , footnote 7 (citing Morrissey v. 5 Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 ). 12 [a] fine” (ibid.), the court announced a multifactor balancing test in which “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.” (Id. at p. 665.)6 Instead of utilizing a traditional equal protection approach focused on invidious discrimination against a suspect class or the traditional substantive due process approach of identifying a burden on a fundamental right, the court announced a new, hybrid test in the following terms: “the issue cann 2020Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at page 666 , footnote 7 (citing Morrissey v. 5 Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 ). 12 [a] fine” (ibid.), the court announced a multifactor balancing test in which “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.” (Id. at p. 665.)6 Instead of utilizing a traditional equal protection approach focused on invidious discrimination against a suspect class or the traditional substantive due process approach of identifying a burden on a fundamental right, the court announced a new, hybrid test in the following terms: “the issue cann | 1 | 3 |
People v. Cervantesgreen2 sentences2014Such a determination necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 335.) In People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162 (Cervantes), a nontestifying codefendant, Morales, inculpated himself and his two codefendants, Cervantes and Martinez, in a murder and an attempted murder while speaking to a friend of all three defendants, Ojeda. 2013Such a determination necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 334-335 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 ] (Greenberger); accord, People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 174-175 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 ] (Cervantes).) When a trial court bases its ruling on a conclusion of law, or a mistake of law, we review de novo but when'we review a ruling admitting or excluding evidence we ask whether the ruling is an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 3 |
Heritage Pacific Financial v. Monroy CA1/2green2 sentences2026This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.” [Citation.]’” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 993 .) Jane Does did not attach the insurance policy and, in fact, opposed CCIC’s request for judicial notice of the policy. 2022This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489 ; accord, Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 993 .) The second amended complaint alleged Williams executed a “signature card that serves as a contract between a bank and its depositor,” which purported contract is attached as an exhibit to the second amended complaint. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Terongreen2 sentences2023(People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 90 ; People v. Teron (1978) 23 Cal.3d 103 , 113–114.) 27 PEOPLE v. WALDON Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 1986Again, the Teron court ruled there was nothing suggestive of mental illness before the trial court when it initially granted defendant's motion to proceed in propria persona, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make a careful inquiry into his capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at that time. ( People v. Teron, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 114 .) The court went on to suggest that later in the proceedings when some indicia of mental incapacity did begin to surface, the trial court "would have acted within its discretion in ordering a psychiatric | 1 | 2 |
F. HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE, LTD. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 109 (Automobile Antitrust).) Indeed, the test for personal jurisdiction “ ‘is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite “affiliating circumstances” are present.’ ” (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1061 (Snowney); see Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 478–479.) Courts furthermore must exercise “ ‘[g]reat care and reserve . . . when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.” (As 2005We make a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the case before us, being unwilling to find the serious burden on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests of the plaintiff or of California. ( F. Hoffman-La Roche, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 795-796, 805, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 407 ; see Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 115 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 .) To exercise personal jurisdiction in these circumstances would be unreasonable and unfair. | 1 | 2 |
Ross v. Moffittgreen2 sentences2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 17 ‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose . . . .’ ” (Ross v. Moffit, supra, 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, fns. omitted.)10 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financial circumstances of an alle 2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between *1027 legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....' " ( Ross v. Moffit t , supra , 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 2437 , fns. omitted.) 10 *527 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financi | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gordongreen2 sentences2017“Even a hearsay statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory effect.” ( Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612.) The determination whether a statement is specifically disserving “necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 ].) In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ] (Frierson), the Supreme Court stated that the “focus” of the declarat 2017“Even a hearsay statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory effect.” ( Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612.) The determination whether a statement is specifically disserving “necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 ].) In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ] (Frierson), the Supreme Court stated that the “focus” of the declarat | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1986It tells us also that under some circumstances a court’s ruling denying the request for a substitution of attorneys without a careful inquiry into the defendant’s reasons for requesting the substitution ‘is lacking in all the attributes of a judicial determination.’ [Citations.]” This duty-of-inquiry includes “an inquiry into the state of mind of the court-appointed attorney” and an attempt “to ascertain in what particulars the attorney was not providing appellant with a competent defense.” (Ibid.) Munoz has been cited with approval by this court in People v. Lewis, supra, 20 Cal.3d at page 49 1978It tells us also that under some circumstances a court’s ruling denying the request for a substitution of attorneys without a careful inquiry into the defendant’s reasons for requesting the substitution ‘is lacking in all the attributes of a judicial determination.’ [Citations.]” According to Munoz , the duty of the trial court includes “an inquiry into the state of mind of the court-appointed attorney” and an attempt “to ascertain in what particulars the attorney was not providing appellant with a competent defense.” ( 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 66 .) Munoz has been cited with apparent approval by t | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Grocegreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Greengreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Morsegreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Jenningsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Koontzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Snowney v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewiczgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and IIgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roberts v. United States Jayceesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Robbinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hipsher v. L. A. Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass'nred | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Friersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Long v. Century Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cornelison v. Chaneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rutledgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McWhortergreen | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Maigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti)
green
2 sentences2019(See maj. opn., ante , at p. 538 [ 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 ].) Those cases all involved the use of a sharp object in a threatening manner, and in all three cases an argument could be made that great bodily injury was not probable , but the deadly weapon finding was nonetheless upheld." ( B.M. , at pp. 539-540, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) Finally, Justice Chin suggested that, when the Supreme Court does squarely address the meaning of " 'likely' " for purposes of assault with a deadly weapon, "our resolution of the question [will] call[ ] for a car 2019(See maj. opn., ante , at p. 538 [ 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 ].) Those cases all involved the use of a sharp object in a threatening manner, and in all three cases an argument could be made that great bodily injury was not probable , but the deadly weapon finding was nonetheless upheld." ( B.M. , at pp. 539-540, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) Finally, Justice Chin suggested that, when the Supreme Court does squarely address the meaning of " 'likely' " for purposes of assault with a deadly weapon, "our resolution of the question [will] call[ ] for a car | 4 | 2018–2019 |
In Re Aaron S.
green
2 sentences2024“Section 300, subdivision (g), authorizes the juvenile court to adjudge a minor a dependent child of the court where ‘the minor’s parent has been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care of the minor . . . .’ [Citation.] The careful analysis found in In re Aaron S. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 202 . . . provides an authoritative interpretation of the statutory language. 1995Section 300, subdivision (g), authorizes the juvenile court to adjudge a minor a dependent child of the court where “the minor’s parent has been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care of the minor . . . .” (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1456(d)(8).) The careful analysis found in In re Aaron S. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 202 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 861 ] provides an authoritative interpretation of the statutory language. | 3 | 1995–2024 |
Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025A. Predominance of common questions Appellants contend that the trial court improperly considered whether they could pass on the costs of the franchise fees to tenants or other downstream payees, contrary to the holding in Clayworth, supra, 49 Cal.4th 758 .3 We agree with the trial court’s careful analysis and conclusion that 3 We disagree with appellants’ assertion that the trial court’s consideration of this issue was sua sponte. 2025A. Predominance of common questions Appellants contend that the trial court improperly considered whether they could pass on the costs of the franchise fees to tenants or other downstream payees, contrary to the holding in Clayworth, supra, 49 Cal.4th 758 .3 We agree with the trial court’s careful analysis and conclusion that 3 We disagree with appellants’ assertion that the trial court’s consideration of this issue was sua sponte. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
The People v. Tran
green
2 sentences2024Such a determination necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Tran (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1217 .) Considering Perez’s statements and the circumstances under which they were made, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining the statements were admissible as declarations against penal interest. 18 Nor does Rivera dispute that Perez was “unavailable” as required under Evidence Code section 1230. 17 C. 2014Such a determination necessarily depends upon a careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 ; People v. Tran (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1217 .) The court’s evidentiary ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but we independently review the court’s preliminary determination of trustworthiness. | 2 | 2014–2024 |
Bearden v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2020Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at page 666 , footnote 7 (citing Morrissey v. 5 Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 ). 12 [a] fine” (ibid.), the court announced a multifactor balancing test in which “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.” (Id. at p. 665.)6 Instead of utilizing a traditional equal protection approach focused on invidious discrimination against a suspect class or the traditional substantive due process approach of identifying a burden on a fundamental right, the court announced a new, hybrid test in the following terms: “the issue cann 2020Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at page 666 , footnote 7 (citing Morrissey v. 5 Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 ). 12 [a] fine” (ibid.), the court announced a multifactor balancing test in which “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.” (Id. at p. 665.)6 Instead of utilizing a traditional equal protection approach focused on invidious discrimination against a suspect class or the traditional substantive due process approach of identifying a burden on a fundamental right, the court announced a new, hybrid test in the following terms: “the issue cann | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Jose R.
green
2 sentences2018(See also *540 In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 898 [upholding a conclusion that a pin inserted in an apple was a deadly weapon, despite the fact that great bodily injury was arguably not probable].) In this case, we do not decide the question of what "likely" means in the context of the Aguilar standard, and I do not wish to prejudge that question, but our resolution of the question calls for a careful analysis like the one that appears in People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888 , 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 44 P.3d 949 , a decision involving the meaning of th 2018(See also *540 In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 898 [upholding a conclusion that a pin inserted in an apple was a deadly weapon, despite the fact that great bodily injury was arguably not probable].) In this case, we do not decide the question of what "likely" means in the context of the Aguilar standard, and I do not wish to prejudge that question, but our resolution of the question calls for a careful analysis like the one that appears in People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888 , 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 44 P.3d 949 , a decision involving the meaning of th | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Griffin v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between *1027 legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....' " ( Ross v. Moffit t , supra , 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 2437 , fns. omitted.) 10 *527 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financi 2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between *1027 legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....' " ( Ross v. Moffit t , supra , 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 2437 , fns. omitted.) 10 *527 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financi | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Douglas v. California
green
2 sentences2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between *1027 legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....' " ( Ross v. Moffit t , supra , 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 2437 , fns. omitted.) 10 *527 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financi 2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between *1027 legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....' " ( Ross v. Moffit t , supra , 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 2437 , fns. omitted.) 10 *527 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financi | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Tate v. Short
green
2 sentences2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between *1027 legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....' " ( Ross v. Moffit t , supra , 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 2437 , fns. omitted.) 10 *527 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financi 2018Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between *1027 legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....' " ( Ross v. Moffit t , supra , 417 U.S. at pp. 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 2437 , fns. omitted.) 10 *527 In imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financi | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2015While it is unfortunate that the circumstances here may have caused some confusion for Isabel, in the face of a validly served notice of entry of judgment on March 11, 2013, the prudent course of action would have been to appeal from both the March 11 and March 18 judgments within the 60-day period running from the original judgment. 8 Isabel also asks that we “resolve any uncertainties or ambiguities in favor of preserving the right to appeal,” citing Insyst and Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 534 , 152 P.3d 1109 ] (Alan). 2015While it is unfortunate that the circumstances here may have caused some confusion for Isabel, in the face of a validly served notice of entry of judgment on March 11, 2013, the prudent course of action would have been to appeal from both the March 11 and March 18 judgments within the 60-day period running from the original judgment. 8 Isabel also asks that we “resolve any uncertainties or ambiguities in favor of preserving the right to appeal,” citing Insyst and Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 534 , 152 P.3d 1109 ] (Alan). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Mars Steel Corporation v. Continental Illinois National Bank And Trust Company Of Chicago
green
2 sentences2014The 8 problem in the class-action setting, and the reason that judicial approval of the settlement of such an action is required, [citation], is that the negotiator on the plaintiffs’ side, that is, the lawyer for the class, is potentially an unreliable agent of his principals.” (Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (7th Cir. 1987) 834 F.2d 677 , 681-682.) This “makes it imperative that the district judge conduct a careful inquiry into the fairness of a settlement to the class members before allowing it to go into effect and extinguish, by the operation of res judica 2014The 8 problem in the class-action setting, and the reason that judicial approval of the settlement of such an action is required, [citation], is that the negotiator on the plaintiffs’ side, that is, the lawyer for the class, is potentially an unreliable agent of his principals.” (Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (7th Cir. 1987) 834 F.2d 677 , 681-682.) This “makes it imperative that the district judge conduct a careful inquiry into the fairness of a settlement to the class members before allowing it to go into effect and extinguish, by the operation of res judica | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences1985Until these discordant Court of Appeal decisions are resolved by our Supreme Court, we adopt the analysis of People v. Fisher, supra: “Unquestionably, neither Barrick, Spearman, Fries nor Rist mandates a reversal ‘per se’ in every case where a defendant refuses to testify after the trial court has ruled that if he testified, the prosecutor could inquire into prior similar or identical felony convictions for purposes of impeachment, [f] In Barrick, Spearman and Fries, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction only after a careful analysis of the total evidence in those particular c 1985Until these discordant Court of Appeal decisions are resolved by our Supreme Court, we adopt the analysis of People v. Fisher, supra: “Unquestionably, neither Barrick, Spearman, Fries nor Rist mandates a reversal ‘per se’ in every case where a defendant refuses to testify after the trial court has ruled that if he testified, the prosecutor could inquire into prior similar or identical felony convictions for purposes of impeachment, [f] In Barrick, Spearman and Fries, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction only after a careful analysis of the total evidence in those particular c | 2 | 1984–1985 |
| Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court green | 2 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Munoz green | 2 | 1977–1978 |
| The People v. Weber green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Chhoun green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Holford green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| In Re Monica C. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Rodas green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Godinez v. Moran green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Wycoff green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Bouvia v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Marin Ass'n of Public Employees v. Marin County Employees' Retirement Ass'n green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Cookson green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Heath v. Heath green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Sotelo v. Medianews Group, Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Arizona v. United States green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Grimes green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Leach green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Edwards green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| International Shoe Co. v. Washington green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Snyder v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.