careful inquiry in Colorado

2014Arguello, 772 P.2d at 97-98 (instructing courts to follow guidelines in the Colorado Trial Judge's Benchbook); Rawson, 97 P.3d at 319 ; see King, 728 P.2d at 1270 ("[The trial court, before forcing the defendant to trial without the benefit of counsel, had the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant's financial condition, the defendant's understanding of his right to counsel, and his desires regarding legal representation.").

2009When a defendant states that he or she cannot afford counsel or would like the court to appoint counsel, the court is “required to make a careful financial inquiry to determine eligibility for court-appointed counsel.” People v. Alengi 148 P.3d 154, 161 (Colo.2006); see also Steinbeck, 186 P.3d at 57 (“Before a court may require a defendant claiming indigency to go to trial without the benefit of counsel, the court has a ‘duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant’s financial condition.’ ” (quoting King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Colo.1986))).

2026P. 44(c)); People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. 2006) (“Because there exists a strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional 9 right, the trial court has the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant's right to counsel and his or her desires regarding legal representation.”). ¶ 18 Violation of a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is structural error.

2015P. 44(c)); cf. People v. Edebohls , 944 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[T]he trial court should . . . seek from the defendant a narrative response, on the record, indicating his or her understanding of the right to conflict-free representation and a description of the conflict at issue.”); Alengi , 148 P.3d at 159 (“Because there exists a strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, the trial court has the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant’s right to counsel and his or her desires regarding legal representation.”). ¶12      Â

2014Arguello, 772 P.2d at 97-98 (instructing courts to follow guidelines in the Colorado Trial Judge's Benchbook); Rawson, 97 P.3d at 319 ; see King, 728 P.2d at 1270 ("[The trial court, before forcing the defendant to trial without the benefit of counsel, had the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant's financial condition, the defendant's understanding of his right to counsel, and his desires regarding legal representation.").

2009When faced with such a request to terminate counsel, "the trial court has the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant's right to counsel and his or her desires regarding legal representation." People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo.2006); see People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 94 (Colo.1989) ("[The judge must carefully inquire into the defendant's reasons for the request. ...").

2014And "when several members of a jury panel abandon their beliefs to settle upon a common ground with their fellow jurors," as is the case in a compromise verdict, "the defendant has not been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by all members of the jury, and he has been denied due process of the law." Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 PaSuper. 549, 543 A.2d 1106, 1130 (1988); see also People v. Lantz, 186 Ill.2d 243 , 238 Ill.Dec. 592 , 712 N.E.2d 314, 324 (1999) (Heiple, J., dissenting) (a compromise verdict "renders defendant's trial so fundamentally unfair that it violates due process"). 125 The

2014And "when several members of a jury panel abandon their beliefs to settle upon a common ground with their fellow jurors," as is the case in a compromise verdict, "the defendant has not been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by all members of the jury, and he has been denied due process of the law." Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 PaSuper. 549, 543 A.2d 1106, 1130 (1988); see also People v. Lantz, 186 Ill.2d 243 , 238 Ill.Dec. 592 , 712 N.E.2d 314, 324 (1999) (Heiple, J., dissenting) (a compromise verdict "renders defendant's trial so fundamentally unfair that it violates due process"). 125 The

2014And "when several members of a jury panel abandon their beliefs to settle upon a common ground with their fellow jurors," as is the case in a compromise verdict, "the defendant has not been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by all members of the jury, and he has been denied due process of the law." Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 PaSuper. 549, 543 A.2d 1106, 1130 (1988); see also People v. Lantz, 186 Ill.2d 243 , 238 Ill.Dec. 592 , 712 N.E.2d 314, 324 (1999) (Heiple, J., dissenting) (a compromise verdict "renders defendant's trial so fundamentally unfair that it violates due process"). 125 The

2014And “when several members of a jury panel abandon their beliefs to settle upon a common ground with their fellow jurors,” as is the case in a compromise verdict, “the defendant has not been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by all members of the jury, and he has been denied due process of the law.” Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 Pa.Super. 549 , 543 A.2d 1106, 1130 (1988) ; see also People v. Lantz, 186 Ill.2d 243 , 238 Ill.Dec. 592 , 712 N.E.2d 314, 324 (1999) (Heiple, J., dissenting) (a compromise verdict “renders defendant's trial so fundamentally unfair that it violates due process”). ¶ 25

2014Such a suggestion increases the risk that "the jury will be diverted from a careful analysis of the conduct at issue." United States v. Clarridge, 811 F.Supp. 697, 702 (D.D.C.1992). 124 As a result, the jury may "reach a compromise verdict or assume the defendant,. is guilty on at least some, of the charges." Johnson, 130 F.3d at 1426 ; see also Ball, 470 U.S. at 868 , 105 S.Ct. 1668 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Where the prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty

2014Such a suggestion increases the risk that “the jury will be diverted from a careful analysis of the conduct at issue.” United States v. Clarridge, 811 F.Supp. 697, 702 (D.D.C.1992). ¶ 24 As a result, the jury may “reach a compromise verdict or assume the defendant is guilty on at least some of the charges.” Johnson, 130 F.3d at 1426 ; see also Ball, 470 U.S. at 868 , 105 S.Ct. 1668 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[W]here the prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty o

2014Such a suggestion increases the risk that "the jury will be diverted from a careful analysis of the conduct at issue." United States v. Clarridge, 811 F.Supp. 697, 702 (D.D.C.1992). 124 As a result, the jury may "reach a compromise verdict or assume the defendant,. is guilty on at least some, of the charges." Johnson, 130 F.3d at 1426 ; see also Ball, 470 U.S. at 868 , 105 S.Ct. 1668 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Where the prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty

2014Such a suggestion increases the risk that "the jury will be diverted from a careful analysis of the conduct at issue." United States v. Clarridge, 811 F.Supp. 697, 702 (D.D.C.1992). 124 As a result, the jury may "reach a compromise verdict or assume the defendant,. is guilty on at least some, of the charges." Johnson, 130 F.3d at 1426 ; see also Ball, 470 U.S. at 868 , 105 S.Ct. 1668 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Where the prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty

2005As noted by the majority, trial courts need not "maintain a continuing vigilance over the financial affairs of one accused of crime in order to ferret out his [possible] poverty." Rather, once the trial court is satisfied that a defendant is able to secure the services of an attorney, the burden rests on that defendant "to apprise the court of any change in circumstances resulting in indigency." Allen v. People, 157 Colo. 582, 591 , 404 P.2d 266, 271 (1965).

2005As noted by the majority, trial courts need not "maintain a continuing vigilance over the financial affairs of one accused of crime in order to ferret out his [possible] poverty." Rather, once the trial court is satisfied that a defendant is able to secure the services of an attorney, the burden rests on that defendant "to apprise the court of any change in circumstances resulting in indigency." Allen v. People, 157 Colo. 582, 591 , 404 P.2d 266, 271 (1965).

2026See Anaya v. People, 764 P.2d 779, 783 (Colo. 1988) (“[T]here is no way to know whether the character of the proceedings would have changed, whether counsel would have made different decisions, or whether the defense strategy would have been different if [counsel of choice] had represented [the defendant].

2025Id. at ¶ 34 , 369 P.3d at 620 . ¶8 Similarly, here, the district court declined to adopt a bright-line rule, instead concluding that a previous denial of a summary judgment or directed verdict motion "is a factor in the probable cause analysis." The district court went on to find that Schnelle had alleged sufficient factual evidence which, if taken as true, would support her assertion that the defendants lacked probable cause to bring the professional negligence claim against her.

2025Id. at ¶ 34, 369 P.3d at 620. ¶8 Similarly, here, the district court declined to adopt a bright-line rule, instead concluding that a previous denial of a summary judgment or directed verdict motion "is a factor in the probable cause analysis." The district court went on to find that Schnelle had alleged sufficient factual evidence which, if taken as true, would support her assertion that the defendants lacked probable cause to bring 6 the professional negligence claim against her.

2015P. 44(c)); cf. People v. Edebohls , 944 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[T]he trial court should . . . seek from the defendant a narrative response, on the record, indicating his or her understanding of the right to conflict-free representation and a description of the conflict at issue.”); Alengi , 148 P.3d at 159 (“Because there exists a strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, the trial court has the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant’s right to counsel and his or her desires regarding legal representation.”). ¶12      Â

2009When a defendant states that he or she cannot afford counsel or would like the court to appoint counsel, the court is “required to make a careful financial inquiry to determine eligibility for court-appointed counsel.” People v. Alengi 148 P.3d 154, 161 (Colo.2006); see also Steinbeck, 186 P.3d at 57 (“Before a court may require a defendant claiming indigency to go to trial without the benefit of counsel, the court has a ‘duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant’s financial condition.’ ” (quoting King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Colo.1986))).

2009This rule is echoed by Chief Justice Directive 04-04(II)(D), which states that, upon receipt of the public defender’s finding, “the court shall review the person’s application for Public Defender, including any requests for exception to the determination of the Public Defender.” Interpreting Chief Justice Directive 04-04, the Steinbeck division held that “ ‘[s]hall’ is a mandatory word that creates an obligation” for a trial court to “ask sufficient questions to determine for itself the issue of indigency.” Steinbeck, 186 P.3d at 57 .

2006See People v. Madril, supra, 746 P.2d at 1337 .

2005King v. People, supra, 728 P.2d at 1270 ; see Allen v. People, supra, 157 Colo. at 590 , 404 P.2d at 271 (the trial court's inquiry into a defendant's financial ability to employ private counsel may be pertinent); see also Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 20 , 88 S.Ct. 3 , 19 L.Ed.2d 20 (1967); United States v. Moore, 671 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.1982); Douglas v. Hendricks, 236 F.Supp.2d 412 (D.N.J.2002); DiBartolomeo v. State, 450 So.2d 925 (Fla.Dist.

2005King v. People, supra, 728 P.2d at 1270 ; see Allen v. People, supra, 157 Colo. at 590 , 404 P.2d at 271 (the trial court's inquiry into a defendant's financial ability to employ private counsel may be pertinent); see also Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 20 , 88 S.Ct. 3 , 19 L.Ed.2d 20 (1967); United States v. Moore, 671 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.1982); Douglas v. Hendricks, 236 F.Supp.2d 412 (D.N.J.2002); DiBartolomeo v. State, 450 So.2d 925 (Fla.Dist.

2005L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). “ ‘[F]orcing a criminal defendant to go to trial pro se’ without conducting an appropriate inquiry into his financial ability to afford counsel ‘constitutes a denial of [a] defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel.’ ” United States v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d 894, 896-97 (10th Cir.1987)(quoting United States v. Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662 (2d Cir.1983)); see also King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Colo.1986)(“before forcing the defendant to trial without the benefit of counsel, [the trial court] had the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant’s financial condition

2005L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). "`[F]orcing a criminal defendant to go to trial pro se' without conducting an appropriate inquiry into his financial ability to afford counsel `constitutes a denial of [a] defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.'" United States v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d 894, 896-97 (10th Cir.1987)(quoting United States v. *18 Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662 (2d Cir.1983)); see also King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Colo.1986)("before forcing the defendant to trial without the benefit of counsel, [the trial court] had the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant's financial conditi

2005L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). “ ‘[F]orcing a criminal defendant to go to trial pro se’ without conducting an appropriate inquiry into his financial ability to afford counsel ‘constitutes a denial of [a] defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel.’ ” United States v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d 894, 896-97 (10th Cir.1987)(quoting United States v. Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662 (2d Cir.1983)); see also King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Colo.1986)(“before forcing the defendant to trial without the benefit of counsel, [the trial court] had the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant’s financial condition

2005L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). "`[F]orcing a criminal defendant to go to trial pro se' without conducting an appropriate inquiry into his financial ability to afford counsel `constitutes a denial of [a] defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.'" United States v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d 894, 896-97 (10th Cir.1987)(quoting United States v. *18 Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662 (2d Cir.1983)); see also King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Colo.1986)("before forcing the defendant to trial without the benefit of counsel, [the trial court] had the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant's financial conditi