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5 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
White v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2009In Crawford, the Court noted the existence of “[v]arious formulations of th[e] core class of ‘testimonial’ statements”: “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent— that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” Brief for Petitioner 23; “extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S 2009In Crawford, the Court noted the existence of “[v]arious formulations of th[e] core class of ‘testimonial’ statements”: “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent— that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” Brief for Petitioner 23; “extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S | 1 | 1 |
Savage v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1982In Savage v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 1012, 1018 , 45 S.E.2d 313, 317 (1947), we said the words “gross receipts” mean “whole, entire, total receipts.” The State Corporation Commission there sought to impose a motor vehicle gross receipts tax on the operator of a truck line. 1982In Savage v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 1012, 1018 , 45 S.E.2d 313, 317 (1947), we said the words “gross receipts” mean “whole, entire, total receipts.” The State Corporation Commission there sought to impose a motor vehicle gross receipts tax on the operator of a truck line. | 1 | 1 |
Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Sutherlandgreen2 sentences1929See Stonega Coke and Coal Company v. Sutherland, 136 Va. 489 , 118 S. E. 133 . 1929See Stonega Coke and Coal Company v. Sutherland, 136 Va. 489 , 118 S. E. 133 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009The majority’s reliance on the “primary purpose” language in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), is flawed, as a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), reveals. 2009The majority’s reliance on the “primary purpose” language in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), is flawed, as a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), reveals. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2009The majority’s reliance on the “primary purpose” language in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), is flawed, as a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), reveals. 2009The majority’s reliance on the “primary purpose” language in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), is flawed, as a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), reveals. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Terry v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1956This case differs materially from Terry v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 507 , 6 S. E. (2d) 673 , where identification was by a discredited witness who gave conflicting descriptions of her assailant, was unable to identify him in the first line-up and whose identification at his second line-up was of doubtful validity. 1956This case differs materially from Terry v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 507 , 6 S. E. (2d) 673 , where identification was by a discredited witness who gave conflicting descriptions of her assailant, was unable to identify him in the first line-up and whose identification at his second line-up was of doubtful validity. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Phillips v. City of Portsmouth
neutral
2 sentences1919At any rate such questions were not in issue in the court below so far as appears in the record and they were not passed upon by such court so far as appears from the decree under review and the memorandum opinion made a part of the decree, nor have they been argued before us, except the narrow question of whether the principle of the case of Phillips v. City of Portsmouth, 115 Va. 180 , 78 S. E. 651 , and kindred cases referred to below, is applicable to the said claim of an equitable set-off; so that we wishe to be understood as expressing no opinion on such questions, except upon the narrow 1919At any rate such questions were not in issue in the court below so far as appears in the record and they were not passed upon by such court so far as appears from the decree under review and the memorandum opinion made a part of the decree, nor have they been argued before us, except the narrow question of whether the principle of the case of Phillips v. City of Portsmouth, 115 Va. 180 , 78 S. E. 651 , and kindred cases referred to below, is applicable to the said claim of an equitable set-off; so that we wishe to be understood as expressing no opinion on such questions, except upon the narrow | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.