careful analysis in Wyoming

2012Osborn, 672 P.2d at 778-79 .

2008Osborn, 672 P.2d at 778-79 .

2013Dobbins, ¶ 11, 298 P.3d at 811 , citing McCard v. State, 2003 WY 142, ¶ 6 , 78 P.3d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.2008).

2012McCard, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Stout v. State, 2001 WY 114, ¶8 , 35 P.3d 1198 (Wyo.2001)) (internal citations omitted). [¶ 51] In this case, we are charged with determining whether or not the district court abused its discretion in denying Dobbins’ pre-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

2012McCard, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Stout v. State, 2001 WY 114, ¶8 , 35 P.3d 1198 (Wyo.2001)) (internal citations omitted). [¶ 51] In this case, we are charged with determining whether or not the district court abused its discretion in denying Dobbins’ pre-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

1992Som-mer, Comment, Criminal Procedure — A Trial Court May Refuse to Instruct the Jury on a Lesser Included Offense When Defendant Offers Exculpatory Testimony — United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir.1980), 56 Notre Dame Law. 553 , 560 (1981) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted), the author accurately concludes: The Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Chapman is an aberration in the law.

1992Sommer, Comment, Criminal Procedure—A Trial Court May Refuse to Instruct the Jury on a Lesser Included Offense When Defendant Offers Exculpatory Testimony— United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir.1980), 56 Notre Dame Law. 553 , 560 (1981) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted), the author accurately concludes: The Tenth Circuit's holding in United States v. Chapman is an aberration in the law.

1988In light of the standard for testamentary capacity adopted in In re Estate of Morton, supra, the facts which are material for our pur poses are Roosa’s comprehension of the extent and nature of his estate, the identity of the beneficiary and its relationship to Roosa and the disposition of his property which was to take effect at his death.

1988In light of the standard for testamentary capacity adopted in In re Estate of Morton, supra, the facts which are material for our purposes *1034 are Roosa's comprehension of the extent and nature of his estate, the identity of the beneficiary and its relationship to Roosa and the disposition of his property which was to take effect at his death.

1973“Probable cause” and “reasonable cause” have been held to be synonymous and interchangeable, Riley v. State, 179 Md. 304 , 18 A.2d 583, 586 , and cases cited in 36 Words and Phrases, Reasonable Cause, pp. 457-458 (Perm.Ed.).

1973“Probable cause” and “reasonable cause” have been held to be synonymous and interchangeable, Riley v. State, 179 Md. 304 , 18 A.2d 583, 586 , and cases cited in 36 Words and Phrases, Reasonable Cause, pp. 457-458 (Perm.Ed.).

1973As Mr. Chief Justice McIntyre *105 said in Rice v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 675, 676 , “A jury can always disregard the testimony of an expert if the jurors find it to be unreasonable.” Careful analysis of the record in this case under the above outlined rules discloses ample evidence to support the finding of the jury that defendant was sane at the time of the crime.

1972In that case the court while observing that local taxes measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce have not always fared as well as other tax forms, stated, 377 U.S. at 440-441 , 84 S.Ct. at 1568 : “A careful analysis of the cases in this field teaches that the validity of the [gross receipts] tax rests upon whether the State is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation.

1972In that case the court while observing that local taxes measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce have not always fared as well as other tax forms, stated, 377 U.S. at 440-441 , 84 S.Ct. at 1568 : “A careful analysis of the cases in this field teaches that the validity of the [gross receipts] tax rests upon whether the State is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1967In Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, supra, and in most of the cases from other jurisdictions coming to our attention where a claim has been allowed under statutory provisions similar to ours — for example, see Morris v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz. App. 393 , 414 P.2d 996 ; Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Lazaroff, 109 Colo. 248 , 124 P.2d 755 ; Larson v. State, 79 Idaho 446 , 320 P.2d 763 ; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 139 , 181 N.E. 638 ; Mulligan v. E.

1935If it is correct that the insurance in question came into existence about 1911, then the only reason why a tax of the character in question could be held to be within the act of 1897 is under the rule mentioned in Pellish Bros. v. Cooper, 47 Wyo. 480 , 38 P. (2d) 607 , namely, that legislative enactments, general and comprehensive in operation, ordinarily apply to all persons, subjects and business within their general purview and scope coming into existence subsequent to their enactment.

1935If it is correct that the insurance in question came into existence about 1911, then the only reason why a tax of the character in question could be held to be within the act of 1897 is under the rule mentioned in Pellish Bros. v. Cooper, 47 Wyo. 480 , 38 P. (2d) 607 , namely, that legislative enactments, general and comprehensive in operation, ordinarily apply to all persons, subjects and business within their general purview and scope coming into existence subsequent to their enactment.