careful analysis in Michigan

2018Diligence during voir dire extends to making “a careful inquiry of a prospective juror under oath.” Id. at 663, citing Clemmons v Super Food Services, Inc, 3 Mich App 377 ; 142 NW2d 491 (1966).

2018Diligence during voir dire extends to making “a careful inquiry of a prospective juror under oath.” Id. at 663, citing Clemmons v Super Food Services, Inc, 3 Mich App 377 ; 142 NW2d 491 (1966).

2002In McNair v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187 ; 9 NW2d 52 (1943), for instance, we held that the state’s failure to plead sovereign immunity will not constitute a waiver because “failure to' plead the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a cause of action where none existed before.” In Penix v City of St Johns, 354 Mich 259 ; 92 NW2d 332 (1958), we held that a complaint which contained no averment that the defendant was engaging in a proprietary function, and which in fact alleged activity to which governmental immunity applied, stated no cause of action against the municipality.

2002In McNair v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187 ; 9 NW2d 52 (1943), for instance, we held that the state’s failure to plead sovereign immunity will not constitute a waiver because “failure to' plead the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a cause of action where none existed before.” In Penix v City of St Johns, 354 Mich 259 ; 92 NW2d 332 (1958), we held that a complaint which contained no averment that the defendant was engaging in a proprietary function, and which in fact alleged activity to which governmental immunity applied, stated no cause of action against the municipality.

2002In McNair v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187 ; 9 NW2d 52 (1943), for instance, we held that the state’s failure to plead sovereign immunity will not constitute a waiver because “failure to' plead the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a cause of action where none existed before.” In Penix v City of St Johns, 354 Mich 259 ; 92 NW2d 332 (1958), we held that a complaint which contained no averment that the defendant was engaging in a proprietary function, and which in fact alleged activity to which governmental immunity applied, stated no cause of action against the municipality.

2002In McNair v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187 ; 9 NW2d 52 (1943), for instance, we held that the state’s failure to plead sovereign immunity will not constitute a waiver because “failure to' plead the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a cause of action where none existed before.” In Penix v City of St Johns, 354 Mich 259 ; 92 NW2d 332 (1958), we held that a complaint which contained no averment that the defendant was engaging in a proprietary function, and which in fact alleged activity to which governmental immunity applied, stated no cause of action against the municipality.

2024But in Solano, the Arizona Supreme Court held that “whenever a plea is taken pursuant to a ‘package deal’ the trial court is required to conduct a careful inquiry into the totality of the circumstances 11 Id. at 288-290 (citations omitted). 12 State v Solano, 150 Ariz 398; 724 P2d 17 (1986) (en banc). 13 State v Tietjens, 151 Ariz 560; 729 P2d 914 (1986) (en banc). 11 surrounding the plea.” 14 Likewise, in Tietjens, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded: “In the period since defendant filed this appeal, we upheld the legality of package-deal plea agreements in State v Solano, . . . as long as th

2024But in Solano, the Arizona Supreme Court held that “whenever a plea is taken pursuant to a ‘package deal’ the trial court is required to conduct a careful inquiry into the totality of the circumstances 11 Id. at 288-290 (citations omitted). 12 State v Solano, 150 Ariz 398; 724 P2d 17 (1986) (en banc). 13 State v Tietjens, 151 Ariz 560; 729 P2d 914 (1986) (en banc). 11 surrounding the plea.” 14 Likewise, in Tietjens, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded: “In the period since defendant filed this appeal, we upheld the legality of package-deal plea agreements in State v Solano, . . . as long as th

2019Diligence during voir dire extends to making “a careful inquiry of a prospective juror under oath.” Gustafson v Morrison, 57 Mich App 655, 663 ; 226 NW2d 681 (1975).

2019Diligence during voir dire extends to making “a careful inquiry of a prospective juror under oath.” Gustafson v Morrison, 57 Mich App 655, 663 ; 226 NW2d 681 (1975).

2002But the rule to be drawn from a careful analysis of the adjudged cases and the reasons upon which they are founded, does not seem to us to involve any such presumption in the accurate or legal sense of the term, and may be more correctly stated to be, that all contracts in restraint of trade are void, if considered only in the abstract, and without reference to the situation or objects of the parties or other circumstances under or with reference to which they were made .... [Emphasis in original.] But if, considered with reference to the situation, business and objects of the parties, and in

2002But the rule to be drawn from a careful analysis of the adjudged cases and the reasons upon which they are founded, does not seem to us to involve any such presumption in the accurate or legal sense of the term, and may be more correctly stated to be, that all contracts in restraint of trade are void, if considered only in the abstract, and without reference to the situation or objects of the parties or other circumstances under or with reference to which they were made .... [Emphasis in original.] But if, considered with reference to the situation, business and objects of the parties, and in

1988In Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660 ; 103 S CT 2064; 76 L Ed 2d 221 (1983) (wherein the Court holds that it is error to automatically revoke probation because the defendant could not pay his fine absent a determination that the defendant failed to make bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist), the Court cites the Douglas-Griffin line of cases and opts for a due process analysis of the issue, stating: Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather

1988In Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660 ; 103 S CT 2064; 76 L Ed 2d 221 (1983) (wherein the Court holds that it is error to automatically revoke probation because the defendant could not pay his fine absent a determination that the defendant failed to make bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist), the Court cites the Douglas-Griffin line of cases and opts for a due process analysis of the issue, stating: Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather

1988In Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660 ; 103 S CT 2064; 76 L Ed 2d 221 (1983) (wherein the Court holds that it is error to automatically revoke probation because the defendant could not pay his fine absent a determination that the defendant failed to make bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist), the Court cites the Douglas-Griffin line of cases and opts for a due process analysis of the issue, stating: Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather

1988In Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660 ; 103 S CT 2064; 76 L Ed 2d 221 (1983) (wherein the Court holds that it is error to automatically revoke probation because the defendant could not pay his fine absent a determination that the defendant failed to make bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist), the Court cites the Douglas-Griffin line of cases and opts for a due process analysis of the issue, stating: Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather

1981Likewise, in People v Medley, 339 Mich 486 ; 64 NW2d 708 (1954), the defendant was bound over after preliminary examination on a charge of assault with intent to kill.

1981Likewise, in People v Medley, 339 Mich 486 ; 64 NW2d 708 (1954), the defendant was bound over after preliminary examination on a charge of assault with intent to kill.

1980Accordingly, the trial court’s careful analysis of this issue in its order dated June 8, 1979, in light of the procedural guidelines outlined in Bond , and Metro Homes, Inc v City of Warren, 19 Mich App 664 ; 173 NW2d 230 (1969), is adopted: "Defendant’s allegation that the procedures proposed by plaintiffs for determination and distribution of the refund are impermissible and perhaps unconstitutional based upon Northview Construction Co v St Clair Shores, 399 Mich 184 (1976, on rehearing) is likewise without merit.

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980Accordingly, the trial court’s careful analysis of this issue in its order dated June 8, 1979, in light of the procedural guidelines outlined in Bond , and Metro Homes, Inc v City of Warren, 19 Mich App 664 ; 173 NW2d 230 (1969), is adopted: "Defendant’s allegation that the procedures proposed by plaintiffs for determination and distribution of the refund are impermissible and perhaps unconstitutional based upon Northview Construction Co v St Clair Shores, 399 Mich 184 (1976, on rehearing) is likewise without merit.

1980Accordingly, the trial court’s careful analysis of this issue in its order dated June 8, 1979, in light of the procedural guidelines outlined in Bond , and Metro Homes, Inc v City of Warren, 19 Mich App 664 ; 173 NW2d 230 (1969), is adopted: "Defendant’s allegation that the procedures proposed by plaintiffs for determination and distribution of the refund are impermissible and perhaps unconstitutional based upon Northview Construction Co v St Clair Shores, 399 Mich 184 (1976, on rehearing) is likewise without merit.

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 .

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The unique situation presented by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression." Id., p 76 (emphasis supplied). [26] Mosley, supra, pp 95-96 . [27] National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415 ; 83 S Ct 328 ; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). [28] Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1 ; 84 S Ct 1113 ; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). [29] United Mine Workers of America v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US 217 ; 88 S Ct 353 ; 19

1980The proposed procedures were specifically adopted in Metro Homes, Inc v City of Warren, 19 Mich App 664 (1969) and Bond v Ann Arbor School District, 383 Mich 693 (1970), and actually Northview tacitly endorsed the procedures therein * * *.

1979After extensive review of Federal cases deciding the issue, the Court in Dorrikas stated: "It is apparent from a reading of these cases that the appellate courts mentioned believe the United States supreme court would not permit the type of cross-exam *711 ination carried on in the instant case without (1) the trial judge determining, in the absence of the jury, whether or not the criminal acts actually took place, the time of their commission, and a determination as to whether they were relevant to the issue being tried, and (2) the trial judge making a careful instruction to the jury as to t

1975As recently as in Alexander v Detroit, 392 Mich 30 ; 219 NW2d 41 (1974), we examined the record and found a classification to be purely arbitrary.

1975As recently as in Alexander v Detroit, 392 Mich 30 ; 219 NW2d 41 (1974), we examined the record and found a classification to be purely arbitrary.

1971Contrast People v. Blewett (1969), 18 Mich App 327 , reversed (1969), 382 Mich 793 , without opinion, apparently for noncompliance with MCLA § 768.35 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1058) (see text accompanying fn 14, supra ), where the defendant equivocated and the record did not show a careful inquiry by the judge either as to whether the defendant did in fact wish to plead guilty or that his plea was a well-considered and well-advised choice.

1971Contrast People v. Blewett (1969), 18 Mich App 327 , reversed (1969), 382 Mich 793 , without opinion, apparently for noncompliance with MCLA § 768.35 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1058) (see text accompanying fn 14, supra), where the defendant equivocated and the record did not show a careful inquiry by the judge either as to whether the defendant did in fact wish to plead guilty or that his plea was a well-considered and well-advised choice.

1970In plaintiff’s brief it is stated: “A careful analysis of the more recent cases compels one to conclude that there is no rigid rule of one-third or one-half which our Supreme Court follows (Smith v. Smith [1952], 334 Mich 56 ; Johnson v. Johnson [1956], 346 Mich 418 ).

1970In plaintiff’s brief it is stated: “A careful analysis of the more recent cases compels one to conclude that there is no rigid rule of one-third or one-half which our Supreme Court follows (Smith v. Smith [1952], 334 Mich 56 ; Johnson v. Johnson [1956], 346 Mich 418 ).

1969Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (1952), 343 US 495 ( 72 S Ct 777 , 96 L Ed 1098 ); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents (1959), 360 US 684 ( 79 S Ct 1362 , 3 L Ed 2d 1512 ); Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), 378 US 184 ( 84 S Ct 1676 , 12 L Ed 2d 793 ).

1969Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (1952), 343 US 495 ( 72 S Ct 777 , 96 L Ed 1098 ); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents (1959), 360 US 684 ( 79 S Ct 1362 , 3 L Ed 2d 1512 ); Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), 378 US 184 ( 84 S Ct 1676 , 12 L Ed 2d 793 ).

1969Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (1952), 343 US 495 ( 72 S Ct 777 , 96 L Ed 1098 ); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents (1959), 360 US 684 ( 79 S Ct 1362 , 3 L Ed 2d 1512 ); Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), 378 US 184 ( 84 S Ct 1676 , 12 L Ed 2d 793 ).

1969Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (1952), 343 US 495 ( 72 S Ct 777 , 96 L Ed 1098 ); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents (1959), 360 US 684 ( 79 S Ct 1362 , 3 L Ed 2d 1512 ); Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), 378 US 184 ( 84 S Ct 1676 , 12 L Ed 2d 793 ).

1969Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, framed the specific issue (p 739): “We are here concerned with the extent of the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction, after that attorney has conscientiously determined that there is no merit to the indigent’s appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Further, the facts involved in Anders indicate that the United States Supreme Court considered this issue solely in the light of California’s constitutional grant of “a right of appeal.” A careful analysis of the majority opinion in Anders reveals that it w

1969Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, framed the specific issue (p 739): “We are here concerned with the extent of the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction, after that attorney has conscientiously determined that there is no merit to the indigent’s appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Further, the facts involved in Anders indicate that the United States Supreme Court considered this issue solely in the light of California’s constitutional grant of “a right of appeal.” A careful analysis of the majority opinion in Anders reveals that it w