10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1953–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
White v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen2 sentences2005Id.; see Croskey, 596 A.2d at 990 ; see also White v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 793 A.2d 1255, 1258 (D.C.2002). 2002See White, supra, 793 A.2d at 1258 ; see also Stoner v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen’s Retirement & Relief Bd., 368 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1977). | 2 | 2 |
Hill v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023Hill v. United States, 622 A.2d 680, 683-84 (D.C. 1993) (“[A]ppellant’s burden is not light . . . , ‘following a proper hearing, the determination of juror bias or prejudice lies particularly within the discretion of the trial court, reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion . . . .’” (brackets omitted) (quoting Leeper v. United 26 States, 579 A.2d 695, 698 (D.C. 1990))). | 1 | 1 |
Leeper v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023Hill v. United States, 622 A.2d 680, 683-84 (D.C. 1993) (“[A]ppellant’s burden is not light . . . , ‘following a proper hearing, the determination of juror bias or prejudice lies particularly within the discretion of the trial court, reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion . . . .’” (brackets omitted) (quoting Leeper v. United 26 States, 579 A.2d 695, 698 (D.C. 1990))). | 1 | 1 |
Michael D. Tann v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023The government further argues that the court’s investigation supported the finding that the juror could remain fair and impartial and that “potential . . . prejudice was vitiated by the court’s limiting instruction and the court’s finding that the juror had overcome her fear.” Finally, the government argues that under Tann v. United States, 127 A.3d 400, 471 (D.C. 2015), an obstruction charge does not “render the court’s careful inquiry and findings insufficient.” We review a trial court’s determination of juror bias for abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Castillo-Campos v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Castillo-Campos, 987 A.2d at 493 (noting that the jury acquitted defendants of several charges when finding that it was able to understand and process the evidence against each codefendant). 2015See Castillo-Campos, 987 A.2d at 493 (noting that the jury acquitted defendants of several charges when finding that it was able to understand and process the evidence against each codefendant). | 1 | 1 |
Croskey v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters' Retirement & Relief Boardgreen1 sentence2005Id.; see Croskey, 596 A.2d at 990 ; see also White v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 793 A.2d 1255, 1258 (D.C.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Stoner v. DISTRICT OF COL. POL. & FIRE., ETC.green1 sentence2002See White, supra, 793 A.2d at 1258 ; see also Stoner v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen’s Retirement & Relief Bd., 368 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Wieck v. Sterenbuchgreen1 sentence1977Wieck v. Sterenbuch, D.C.App., 350 A.2d 384, 387 (1976); Industrial Bank of Washington v. Tobriner, 132 U.S.App. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seling v. Young
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 144-45 (concluding that “appellant has not put before us the ‘clearest proof’ of punitive effects that would be required to afford him relief on his ex post facto claim” (quoting Seling, 531 U.S. at 261 )). 16 The majority quotes from this passage, ante at 20 n.11, but omits the language making it clear that that the court concluded that Seling only barred as- applied-to-an-individual ex post facto claims. 34 For these reasons, I depart from the majority opinion’s ex post facto analysis but concur in the judgment. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Sandground
green
1 sentence2007The Committee noted, for example, that unlike the attorney in In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (D.C.2002) (one-year suspension where lawyer accepted monetary compensation from adverse party and agreed not to pursue litigation and not to disclose arrangement to clients), “Wiggins had no malicious or venal motive and did not benefit financially from the advice he rendered.” Similarly, the Committee found that Wiggins’ ratification of a course of action Pennington had “already selected” entailed far less “involvement in the client’s dishonest conduct” than did the conduct of the attorney in In re Sandgr | 1 | 2007–2007 |
In Re Hager
green
1 sentence2007The Committee noted, for example, that unlike the attorney in In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (D.C.2002) (one-year suspension where lawyer accepted monetary compensation from adverse party and agreed not to pursue litigation and not to disclose arrangement to clients), “Wiggins had no malicious or venal motive and did not benefit financially from the advice he rendered.” Similarly, the Committee found that Wiggins’ ratification of a course of action Pennington had “already selected” entailed far less “involvement in the client’s dishonest conduct” than did the conduct of the attorney in In re Sandgr | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Crowder v. United States
green
2 sentences1991Had defense counsel requested a careful inquiry or a cautionary instruction of the sort suggested in Crowder, 383 A.2d at 342 n. 11, in order to minimize any possible feeling of juror coercion which counsel believed likely under the atmosphere in court at the time, the judge's failure to give an instruction would present a different issue. 1991Had defense counsel requested a careful inquiry or a cautionary instruction of the sort suggested in Crowder, 383 A.2d at 342 n. 11, in order to minimize any possible feeling of juror coercion which counsel believed likely under the atmosphere in court at the time, the judge’s failure to give an instruction would present a different issue. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Henderson v. Snider Bros., Inc.
green
1 sentence1983In our first opinion in Henderson v. Snider Brothers, Inc., supra, 409 A.2d at 1086 , we remarked that many courts, including our own, have inadvertently used two different standards: “actually litigated and necessarily decided” and “actually litigated or necessarily decided.” Careful analysis of the case law makes clear that “and” is the correct conjunction. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Conover v. Halley
neutral
1 sentence1953A careful analysis of these cases was made by this court in Conover v. Halley, D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2d 110 , where it was held that the transmission by a patient of a check to his physician in an amount less than a bill rendered, together with a letter expressing a “trust” that the check would be accepted as full payment for services, and the cashing of the check by the physician did not constitute accord and satisfaction. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.