careful analysis in Arizona

2013Id. at 1365-66 .

2003Id. at 678 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 . [12] Among the positions identified by the City as safety-sensitive in the Policy are meter reader, paint striper, tire service worker, and customer service representative. [13] Other cases cited by the majority are distinguishable because they: (1) do not address random drug testing, e.g., Wilcher, 139 F.3d at 374 (firefighters consented to random drug testing in bargaining agreement with city); Saavedra, 73 F.3d at 1532 (testing of firefighters based on reasonable suspicion); Doe, 816 P.2d at 310 (urine routinely collected from firefighters and tested as part of

2003Id. at 678 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 . [12] Among the positions identified by the City as safety-sensitive in the Policy are meter reader, paint striper, tire service worker, and customer service representative. [13] Other cases cited by the majority are distinguishable because they: (1) do not address random drug testing, e.g., Wilcher, 139 F.3d at 374 (firefighters consented to random drug testing in bargaining agreement with city); Saavedra, 73 F.3d at 1532 (testing of firefighters based on reasonable suspicion); Doe, 816 P.2d at 310 (urine routinely collected from firefighters and tested as part of

1999As the Court noted in Rummel , recidivist statutes such as the one applying to Wiggles-worth reflect the states’ interest “in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.” 445 U.S. at 276 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 . ¶ 18 Given this current interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, it is irrelevant to Wigglesworth’s claim that our legislature revised the sentencing scheme after the commission of his crimes and that the Board’s careful analysis found his sentence “exce

1999As the Court noted in Rummel , recidivist statutes such as the one applying to Wiggles-worth reflect the states’ interest “in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.” 445 U.S. at 276 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 . ¶ 18 Given this current interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, it is irrelevant to Wigglesworth’s claim that our legislature revised the sentencing scheme after the commission of his crimes and that the Board’s careful analysis found his sentence “exce

1987Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, — U.S.-, -, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1035 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).

1987Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, — U.S.-, -, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1035 , 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).

1986In re Ibarra, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 544 , 666 P.2d at 986 .

1986In re Ibarra, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 544 , 666 P.2d at 986 .

1981Having determined that the cross-examination together with the comments to the jury was fundamental error ...” 110 Ariz. at 241 , 517 P.2d at 511 State v. Landrum, supra, which also cites Anderson as authority did not hold that the testimony concerning defendant’s silence was fundamental error and like Jones did hold that the error was harmless.

1981Having determined that the cross-examination together with the comments to the jury was fundamental error ...” 110 Ariz. at 241 , 517 P.2d at 511 State v. Landrum, supra, which also cites Anderson as authority did not hold that the testimony concerning defendant’s silence was fundamental error and like Jones did hold that the error was harmless.

1976Contra, Florida Industrial Commission v. Schoenberg, 117 So.2d 538 (Fla.App.1960), a ease holding that real estate salesmen are independent contractors rather than employees provides a careful analysis of the position of various jurisdictions on the issue presented in the instant case.

1975This rule is not based on an application of the exact rules of logic, but upon the pragmatic principle that a certain quantum of proof is arbitrarily required when the courts are asked to take away life, liberty or property.” ( 52 Ariz. at 195-96 , 79 P.2d at 954-55 ) The statement that prior inferences must be established to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory in civil cases has been the subject of much criticism and confusion.

1975This rule is not based on an application of the exact rules of logic, but upon the pragmatic principle that a certain quantum of proof is arbitrarily required when the courts are asked to take away life, liberty or property.” ( 52 Ariz. at 195-96 , 79 P.2d at 954-55 ) The statement that prior inferences must be established to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory in civil cases has been the subject of much criticism and confusion.

1969We tend to agree with the Honorable Brogden, J., in his dissenting opinion in Harris v. Watson, 201 N.C. 661 , 161 S.E. 215 , 79 A.L.R. 441 (1931) when he caustically observed that if notaries public are judicial officers, then “[t]he records in the office of the Governor disclose that there are now five thousand five hundred and sixteen qualified notaries in North Carolina, and, if all of *124 these he judicial officers of the state, it is obvious that the judiciary is blessed with an overwhelming variety of personnel.” 161 S.E., at 220 .

1969We tend to agree with the Honorable Brogden, J., in his dissenting opinion in Harris v. Watson, 201 N.C. 661 , 161 S.E. 215 , 79 A.L.R. 441 (1931) when he caustically observed that if notaries public are judicial officers, then “[t]he records in the office of the Governor disclose that there are now five thousand five hundred and sixteen qualified notaries in North Carolina, and, if all of *124 these he judicial officers of the state, it is obvious that the judiciary is blessed with an overwhelming variety of personnel.” 161 S.E., at 220 .

1969In Murchison v. White, 54 Tex. 78 (1880), it was said: “ ‘It is believed that a careful analysis of the cases on this subject will show that, in a collateral proceeding, the only contingency in which the judgment of a domestic court of general jurisdiction, which has assumed to act in a case over which it might by law take jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person, can be questioned, is when the record shows affirmatively that its jurisdiction did not attach in the particular case. * * * ’ ” Texas Department of Public Safety v. Casselman, 417 S.W.2d 146, 147-148 (Tex.1967).

1950Hurley v. State, 22 Ariz. 211 , 196 P. 159 ; Impson v. State, 47 Ariz. 573 , 58 P.2d 523 , whereas the specific intent required for the misdemeanor of using a vehicle without the consent of the owner is the intent at the time of taking “of temporarily using or operating the same”.

1950Hurley v. State, 22 Ariz. 211 , 196 P. 159 ; Impson v. State, 47 Ariz. 573 , 58 P.2d 523 , whereas the specific intent required for the misdemeanor of using a vehicle without the consent of the owner is the intent at the time of taking “of temporarily using or operating the same”.

1950Hurley v. State, 22 Ariz. 211 , 196 P. 159 ; Impson v. State, 47 Ariz. 573 , 58 P.2d 523 , whereas the specific intent required for the misdemeanor of using a vehicle without the consent of the owner is the intent at the time of taking “of temporarily using or operating the same”.

1950Hurley v. State, 22 Ariz. 211 , 196 P. 159 ; Impson v. State, 47 Ariz. 573 , 58 P.2d 523 , whereas the specific intent required for the misdemeanor of using a vehicle without the consent of the owner is the intent at the time of taking “of temporarily using or operating the same”.

1937It is well set forth in Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430 , 78 S. W. 93 , 94, as follows: “The parties in all these cases are joint tort feasors.