careful analysis in Idaho

2023Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . .” A careful analysis of unfair prejudice is essential when ruling on character evidence because “[t]he prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 , 205 P.3d at 1188 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 , 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978)).

2023Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . .” A careful analysis of unfair prejudice is essential when ruling on character evidence because “[t]he prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 , 205 P.3d at 1188 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 , 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978)).

2016The Court stated that the analysis of the issue “requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means *797 and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose..." I d. at 666-67, 103 S.Ct. at 2069 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 229 .

2016The Court stated that the analysis of the issue “requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means *797 and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose..." I d. at 666-67, 103 S.Ct. at 2069 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 229 .

1984App.) 69 S.W. 145 , a Texas case, which upon a careful analysis, while it approved the instruction requested, that is, held it was sufficient, not that it would have been error to refuse to give it because the court there said: “Appellant’s identity as the criminal may rest alone upon his uncorroborated confession” (italics ours), and herein the proof of the fact that the deceased was dead and had been killed was proved absolutely and beyond peradventure of a doubt, aliunde the confessions or admissions or statements of the defendant, and this court as early as Fifth Idaho considering the suff

1984App.) 69 S.W. 145 , a Texas case, which upon a careful analysis, while it approved the instruction requested, that is, held it was sufficient, not that it would have been error to refuse to give it because the court there said: “Appellant’s identity as the criminal may rest alone upon his uncorroborated confession” (italics ours), and herein the proof of the fact that the deceased was dead and had been killed was proved absolutely and beyond peradventure of a doubt, aliunde the confessions or admissions or statements of the defendant, and this court as early as Fifth Idaho considering the suff

2007A claim very similar to Braaten’s was considered by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539 (Minn.Ct.App.1992).

1994The court observed that this testimony appeared to be the type of propensity evidence prohibited by Rule 404, but concluded, based on State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991), that evidence of other misconduct is admissible to prove that the defendant was a quick-tempered or violent person and had a propensity to commit violent acts.

1994The court observed that this testimony appeared to be the type of propensity evidence prohibited by Rule 404, but concluded, based on State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991), that evidence of other misconduct is admissible to prove that the defendant was a quick-tempered or violent person and had a propensity to commit violent acts.

1988That due weight should be given to the decision of the hearing officer, as well as to the proceedings before the officer, has also been recognized by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts in School Committee of Franklin v. Commissioner of Education, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 683 , 462 N.E.2d 338, 345 (1984), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Mass. 800 , 482 N.E.2d 796 (1985): ... the department’s and the parents’ principal remaining objection is that the judge did not give sufficient consideration to the agency record_ The objection finds little support in the judge’s careful analysis of the weight to be accorde

1988That due weight should be given to the decision of the hearing officer, as well as to the proceedings before the officer, has also been recognized by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts in School Committee of Franklin v. Commissioner of Education, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 683 , 462 N.E.2d 338, 345 (1984), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Mass. 800 , 482 N.E.2d 796 (1985): ... the department’s and the parents’ principal remaining objection is that the judge did not give sufficient consideration to the agency record_ The objection finds little support in the judge’s careful analysis of the weight to be accorde

1984The requested instruction was furthermore clearly erroneous in this: that it went beyond the law as heretofore laid down by this court as to what evidence, in addition to the confessions of the defendant, is necessary to sustain a conviction and did not state that slight corroborating facts are sufficient, which has clearly been the rule in this State since 1902 as appears from the following quotation, cited with approval on this same proposition in State v. Wilson, 51 Ida. 659, at 669 , 9 Pac. (2d) 497 . “____ It is also a well-recognized rule that the fact that a crime has been committed can

1984The requested instruction was furthermore clearly erroneous in this: that it went beyond the law as heretofore laid down by this court as to what evidence, in addition to the confessions of the defendant, is necessary to sustain a conviction and did not state that slight corroborating facts are sufficient, which has clearly been the rule in this State since 1902 as appears from the following quotation, cited with approval on this same proposition in State v. Wilson, 51 Ida. 659, at 669 , 9 Pac. (2d) 497 . “____ It is also a well-recognized rule that the fact that a crime has been committed can

1984Then there is other evidence than his confession which in our opinion, would justify the verdict of the jury, and which points with certainty to the guilt of the defendant." ( State v. Smith, 5 Ida. 291 , 48 Pac. 1060 .) Furthermore, Cox v. State, supra , has been somewhat modified in a later decision of the same court, Ingram v. State, 78 Tex.Cr.Rep. 559, 182 S.W. 290 at 303 , holding that confessions may be used to aid even the proof of the corpus delicti not alone the connection of the defendant *312 with the crime.

1984App.) 69 S.W. 145 , a Texas case, which upon a careful analysis, while it approved the instruction requested, that is, held it was sufficient, not that it would have been error to refuse to give it because the court there said: “Appellant’s identity as the criminal may rest alone upon his uncorroborated confession” (italics ours), and herein the proof of the fact that the deceased was dead and had been killed was proved absolutely and beyond peradventure of a doubt, aliunde the confessions or admissions or statements of the defendant, and this court as early as Fifth Idaho considering the suff

1979The majority correctly states that statutory requirements governing the time for filing appeals under the Employment Security Law are mandatory and jurisdictional, citing Fouste v. Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 162 , 540 P.2d 1341 (1975), and Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531 , 366 P.2d 589 (1961).

1979The majority correctly states that statutory requirements governing the time for filing appeals under the Employment Security Law are mandatory and jurisdictional, citing Fouste v. Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 162 , 540 P.2d 1341 (1975), and Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531 , 366 P.2d 589 (1961).

1979The majority correctly states that statutory requirements governing the time for filing appeals under the Employment Security Law are mandatory and jurisdictional, citing Fouste v. Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 162 , 540 P.2d 1341 (1975), and Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531 , 366 P.2d 589 (1961).

1979The majority correctly states that statutory requirements governing the time for filing appeals under the Employment Security Law are mandatory and jurisdictional, citing Fouste v. Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 162 , 540 P.2d 1341 (1975), and Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531 , 366 P.2d 589 (1961).

1952Cook v. Justice’s Court of San Diego Tp., 16 Cal.App.2d 745 , 61 P.2d 357 at 360 .

1952Cook v. Justice’s Court of San Diego Tp., 16 Cal.App.2d 745 , 61 P.2d 357 at 360 .

1940The really controlling question in that case was written on the face of the deed as follows: "This deed is given and of no effect until after my death and is not to be recorded until after my death." (Italics supplied.) By the terms written on the face of that deed, no title could pass until after the grantor's death. ( Gonzaga University v. Masini , 42 Idaho 660 , 668 , 249 P. 93 .) In the concluding part of the opinion (p. 677) Chief Justice Lee, who wrote the case, said: *Page 305 "I have confined the citation of authorities to that class of cases wherein there was a limitation clause in th

1940The really controlling question in that case was written on the face of the deed as follows: "This deed is given and of no effect until after my death and is not to be recorded until after my death." (Italics supplied.) By the terms written on the face of that deed, no title could pass until after the grantor's death. ( Gonzaga University v. Masini , 42 Idaho 660 , 668 , 249 P. 93 .) In the concluding part of the opinion (p. 677) Chief Justice Lee, who wrote the case, said: *Page 305 "I have confined the citation of authorities to that class of cases wherein there was a limitation clause in th

1937The instruction herein is more favorable to the defendant than that approved in State v. Smith, 30 Ida. 337 at 346 , 164 Pac. 519 , as follows: “Many of appellant’s assignments of error are directed against the instructions of the court as given and the refusal *419 to give requested instructions.

1937The instruction herein is more favorable to the defendant than that approved in State v. Smith, 30 Ida. 337 at 346 , 164 Pac. 519 , as follows: “Many of appellant’s assignments of error are directed against the instructions of the court as given and the refusal *419 to give requested instructions.

1935The authorities cited by respondents while containing some *312 expression of opinion contrary to the above, upon a careful analysis of the facts, show that such authorities do not support respondents’ position, or are in conflict with the previous holdings of this court, supra. In Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Ida. 89 , 286 Pac. 353 , the real question considered was the constitutionality of a city ordinance, restricting the building of gasoline service stations within 500 feet of a schoolhouse.

1935The authorities cited by respondents while containing some *312 expression of opinion contrary to the above, upon a careful analysis of the facts, show that such authorities do not support respondents’ position, or are in conflict with the previous holdings of this court, supra. In Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Ida. 89 , 286 Pac. 353 , the real question considered was the constitutionality of a city ordinance, restricting the building of gasoline service stations within 500 feet of a schoolhouse.

1935What was said as to the right of ingress and egress was incidental to said main point and moreover does not differ from the conclusion herein and the court cited with approval Sandpoint v. Foyle, supra. In Brazell v. City of Seattle, 55 Wash. 180 , 104 Pac. 155 , one-half of the street in question was vacated by the city council, thus giving the adjoining owner title to the vacated portion which was to the injury of appellant in that ease, because when he joined in the petition he contemplated the full vacation of the street which would have also given him his half of the vacated street; the i

1935What was said as to the right of ingress and egress was incidental to said main point and moreover does not differ from the conclusion herein and the court cited with approval Sandpoint v. Foyle, supra. In Brazell v. City of Seattle, 55 Wash. 180 , 104 Pac. 155 , one-half of the street in question was vacated by the city council, thus giving the adjoining owner title to the vacated portion which was to the injury of appellant in that ease, because when he joined in the petition he contemplated the full vacation of the street which would have also given him his half of the vacated street; the i

1934Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273 , 179 Pac. 966 , *509 is one of the leading cases in support of the doctrine and the court quotes freely from many of the leading cases which uphold the doctrine, clearly setting forth the rule and the reason therefor, best illustrated by the quotation approved from King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217 , 204 S. W. 296 , L.

1934Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273 , 179 Pac. 966 , *509 is one of the leading cases in support of the doctrine and the court quotes freely from many of the leading cases which uphold the doctrine, clearly setting forth the rule and the reason therefor, best illustrated by the quotation approved from King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217 , 204 S. W. 296 , L.

1934Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273 , 179 Pac. 966 , *509 is one of the leading cases in support of the doctrine and the court quotes freely from many of the leading cases which uphold the doctrine, clearly setting forth the rule and the reason therefor, best illustrated by the quotation approved from King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217 , 204 S. W. 296 , L.

1933Upon a careful analysis of that case, as well as the case of Blount v. Windley, 95 U. S. 173 , 24 L. ed. 424, cited therein in support of the doctrine *84 of set-off, we fail to see how the law as laid down, in said two eases is applicable in this case, under the particular facts and circumstances.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.

1933(Marlow v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 163 Okl. 198 , 21 Pac. (2d) 746 ; Bryant et al. v. Demo et al., 163 Okl. 195 , 21 Pac. (2d) 747 ; Vecchio et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., (Utah) 22 Pac. (2d) 212 ; Odems et al. v. King et al., (Okl.) 23 Pac. (2d) 379 ; McArthur v. Department of Labor and Industries, 173 Wash. 701 , 23 Pac. (2d) 417 ; Tassi v. A. C.