careful analysis in Pennsylvania

2023In Valley Forge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the school district’s preliminary objections should not have been sustained because the appellant’s complaint had “set[] forth a valid claim that the [s]chool [d]istrict’s appeal policy violate[d] the Uniformity Clause.” 163 A.3d at 980 .

2023In Valley Forge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the school district’s preliminary objections should not have been sustained because the appellant’s complaint had “set[] forth a valid claim that the [s]chool [d]istrict’s appeal policy violate[d] the Uniformity Clause.” 163 A.3d at 980 .

1987Id., 397 Pa. at 621-622 , 156 A.2d at 310 ; see also Commonwealth v. Gaerttner, 335 Pa.Super. 203, 214 , 484 A.2d 92, 98 (1984); Commonwealth v. Short, supra, 278 Pa.Superior Ct. at 586-587, 420 A.2d at 696-97 .

1987Id., 397 Pa. at 621-622 , 156 A.2d at 310 ; see also Commonwealth v. Gaerttner, 335 Pa.Super. 203, 214 , 484 A.2d 92, 98 (1984); Commonwealth v. Short, supra, 278 Pa.Superior Ct. at 586-587, 420 A.2d at 696-97 .

1982Dauphin County Bar Ass'n. v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545 , 351 A.2d 229 (1976); Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81 , 193 A. 20 (1937). [3] See Section 1 of the Act of July 1, 1978, P.L. 598, No. 116, 66 Pa. C.S. § 301.

1982Dauphin County Bar Ass'n. v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545 , 351 A.2d 229 (1976); Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81 , 193 A. 20 (1937). [3] See Section 1 of the Act of July 1, 1978, P.L. 598, No. 116, 66 Pa. C.S. § 301.

2025Cappuccio’s Brief at 48 (quoting Cappuccio I, 48 A.3d at 1241 ). [J-97-2024] - 16 composition of a new Board is free to ignore a predecessor Board’s careful analysis and conclusions of law, and that its decisions are only as binding as the length of its members’ service”).

2019The sentence the trial court imposed was not “manifestly unreasonable” – and it certainly cannot be said that the sentence was “the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” See Lane, 424 A.2d at 1328 .

2010Additionally, Appellant maintains that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 , 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979), requires the commitment decision to involve a careful analysis of the youth's background and treatment history, as well as an examination, in order to comport with due process.

2010Additionally, Appellant maintains that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 , 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979), requires the commitment decision to involve a careful analysis of the youth's background and treatment history, as well as an examination, in order to comport with due process.

2009Therefore, I join in the ruling to affirm the judgment of sentence. ¶2 However, may I very respectfully note, that in my view a stipulated item of evidence remains mere “evidence” until accepted by the jury. 1 Thus, the preferred procedure, and one more consistent with the spirit of the guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), would be to have the jury instructed on, and required to find, all of the “additional facts” that are necessary to support the imposition of a statutorily mandated increased se

2009Therefore, I join in the ruling to affirm the judgment of sentence. ¶2 However, may I very respectfully note, that in my view a stipulated item of evidence remains mere “evidence” until accepted by the jury. 1 Thus, the preferred procedure, and one more consistent with the spirit of the guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), would be to have the jury instructed on, and required to find, all of the “additional facts” that are necessary to support the imposition of a statutorily mandated increased se

2009CONCURRING STATEMENT BY McEWEN, P.J.E.: ¶ 1 The author of the majority Opinion, in his usual astute fashion, reveals a careful analysis and presents a perceptive expression of rationale in support of its decision that is consistent with precedent generally, and, specifically, with the recent decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 774 , 968 A.2d 1280 (2009).

2009CONCURRING STATEMENT BY McEWEN, P.J.E.: ¶ 1 The author of the majority Opinion, in his usual astute fashion, reveals a careful analysis and presents a perceptive expression of rationale in support of its decision that is consistent with precedent generally, and, specifically, with the recent decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 968 A.2d 1280 (2009).

2009CONCURRING STATEMENT BY McEWEN, P.J.E.: ¶ 1 The author of the majority Opinion, in his usual astute fashion, reveals a careful analysis and presents a perceptive expression of rationale in support of its decision that is consistent with precedent generally, and, specifically, with the recent decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 774 , 968 A.2d 1280 (2009).

2009CONCURRING STATEMENT BY McEWEN, P.J.E.: ¶ 1 The author of the majority Opinion, in his usual astute fashion, reveals a careful analysis and presents a perceptive expression of rationale in support of its decision that is consistent with precedent generally, and, specifically, with the recent decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 968 A.2d 1280 (2009).

2008I write separately, however, to express, most respectfully, the view that, once remanded, the proceedings in this case should be governed by the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863 (1986), and this Court in Commonwealth v. Iverson, 358 Pa.Super. 1 , 516 A.2d 738 (1986). ¶ 2 As recognized by the majority in this case, the Lagaña rule provides: [I]n those instances where two prosecutions arise out of a single search and/or seizure, a decision by a suppression judge during the first prosecution can, upon the motion of the previous preva

2008I write separately, however, to express, most respectfully, the view that, once remanded, the proceedings in this case should be governed by the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863 (1986), and this Court in Commonwealth v. Iverson, 358 Pa.Super. 1 , 516 A.2d 738 (1986). ¶ 2 As recognized by the majority in this case, the Lagaña rule provides: [I]n those instances where two prosecutions arise out of a single search and/or seizure, a decision by a suppression judge during the first prosecution can, upon the motion of the previous preva

2008I write separately, however, to express, most respectfully, the view that, once remanded, the proceedings in this case should be governed by the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863 (1986), and this Court in Commonwealth v. Iverson, 358 Pa.Super. 1 , 516 A.2d 738 (1986). ¶ 2 As recognized by the majority in this case, the Lagaña rule provides: [I]n those instances where two prosecutions arise out of a single search and/or seizure, a decision by a suppression judge during the first prosecution can, upon the motion of the previous preva

2008I write separately, however, to express, most respectfully, the view that, once remanded, the proceedings in this case should be governed by the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863 (1986), and this Court in Commonwealth v. Iverson, 358 Pa.Super. 1 , 516 A.2d 738 (1986). ¶ 2 As recognized by the majority in this case, the Lagaña rule provides: [I]n those instances where two prosecutions arise out of a single search and/or seizure, a decision by a suppression judge during the first prosecution can, upon the motion of the previous preva

2005Specifically, this Court held “that a committed juvenile does not have the right to appeal from a review order that continues his commitment in the same manner and place and that maintains the status quo.” In the Interest of M.D., 839 A.2d at 1121 . ¶ 9 In In the Matter of R.B., 765 A.2d 396 (Pa.Super.2000), R.B. was adjudicated delinquent and, on May 18, 1998, he was placed at the Alternative Rehabilitation Communities, Inc. (ARC).

2005Specifically, this Court held “that a committed juvenile does not have the right to appeal from a review order that continues his commitment in the same manner and place and that maintains the status quo.” In the Interest of M.D., 839 A.2d at 1121 . ¶ 9 In In the Matter of R.B., 765 A.2d 396 (Pa.Super.2000), R.B. was adjudicated delinquent and, on May 18, 1998, he was placed at the Alternative Rehabilitation Communities, Inc. (ARC).

2004This Court recently, in Commonwealth v. Reed, 851 A.2d 958 (Pa.Super.2004), when confronted with a claim that the hallway and stairway of an apartment house were protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution, concluded that “[i]f even one unrelated person had an unfettered right to access an area, the area is not protected in Pennsylvania from government searches and seizures.” Id. at 962 .

2004This Court recently, in Commonwealth v. Reed, 851 A.2d 958 (Pa.Super.2004), when confronted with a claim that the hallway and stairway of an apartment house were protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution, concluded that “[i]f even one unrelated person had an unfettered right to access an area, the area is not protected in Pennsylvania from government searches and seizures.” Id. at 962 .

2004This Court, in Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250 (Pa.Super.1998), in an Opinion by our esteemed colleague Judge Justin M.

2004This Court, in Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250 (Pa.Super.1998), in an Opinion by our esteemed colleague Judge Justin M.

2003What emerges from a careful analysis of.. .Section 72 of the Act is the inescapable ... conclusion that a co-employee who is injured in the course of employment cannot hold another co-employee hable for injuries occasioned by his or her act or omission (negligence); rather such co-émployee can only be held liable for injuries resulting from intentional acts. 3 Gardner v. Erie Insurance Co., 456 Pa.Super. 563 , 691 A.2d 459, 463-464 (1997), affirmed, 555 Pa. 59 , 722 A.2d 1041 (1999) (emphasis omitted). ¶ 7 Section 52 of the Act, which discusses an employer’s liability to an employee’s employee

2003What emerges from a careful analysis of.. .Section 72 of the Act is the inescapable ... conclusion that a co-employee who is injured in the course of employment cannot hold another co-employee hable for injuries occasioned by his or her act or omission (negligence); rather such co-émployee can only be held liable for injuries resulting from intentional acts. 3 Gardner v. Erie Insurance Co., 456 Pa.Super. 563 , 691 A.2d 459, 463-464 (1997), affirmed, 555 Pa. 59 , 722 A.2d 1041 (1999) (emphasis omitted). ¶ 7 Section 52 of the Act, which discusses an employer’s liability to an employee’s employee

2003McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287 , 153 A. 424 (1930).

2003McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287 , 153 A. 424 (1930).

2001Based upon a careful analysis of the pertinent law regarding party walls and prescriptive easements, we agree that under the circumstances here present there was no duty to rebuild this wall. ¶ 11 Both parties rely on the case of Thompson v. DeLong, 267 Pa. 212 , 110 A. 251 (1920) to support their positions.

2001Based upon a careful analysis of the pertinent law regarding party walls and prescriptive easements, we agree that under the circumstances here present there was no duty to rebuild this wall. ¶ 11 Both parties rely on the case of Thompson v. DeLong, 267 Pa. 212 , 110 A. 251 (1920) to support their positions.

1999We granted en banc review in' this case to re-examine the holdings of panels of this Court in Manolakis v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 396 Pa.Super. 256 , 578 A.2d 503 (1990), appeal granted, 526 Pa. 637 , 584 A.2d 319 (1991), and Laguna v. Erie Insurance Group, 370 Pa.Super. 308 , 536 A.2d 419 (1988), both of which surely reveal a careful analysis and sound expression of rationale.

1999We granted en banc review in' this case to re-examine the holdings of panels of this Court in Manolakis v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 396 Pa.Super. 256 , 578 A.2d 503 (1990), appeal granted, 526 Pa. 637 , 584 A.2d 319 (1991), and Laguna v. Erie Insurance Group, 370 Pa.Super. 308 , 536 A.2d 419 (1988), both of which surely reveal a careful analysis and sound expression of rationale.

1999We granted en banc review in' this case to re-examine the holdings of panels of this Court in Manolakis v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 396 Pa.Super. 256 , 578 A.2d 503 (1990), appeal granted, 526 Pa. 637 , 584 A.2d 319 (1991), and Laguna v. Erie Insurance Group, 370 Pa.Super. 308 , 536 A.2d 419 (1988), both of which surely reveal a careful analysis and sound expression of rationale.

1999We granted en banc review in' this case to re-examine the holdings of panels of this Court in Manolakis v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 396 Pa.Super. 256 , 578 A.2d 503 (1990), appeal granted, 526 Pa. 637 , 584 A.2d 319 (1991), and Laguna v. Erie Insurance Group, 370 Pa.Super. 308 , 536 A.2d 419 (1988), both of which surely reveal a careful analysis and sound expression of rationale.